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– ABSTRACT – 
 
 The state of the natural environment is a topic of increasing concern, with 
climate change, loss of biodiversity, and diminishing natural resources all posing 
eminent threats to the well-being of the planet and its inhabitants. Much of this 
environmental degradation is caused by human behaviour that can be changed. 
Psychologists have realised their role in understanding and influencing pro-
environmental behaviours to help (see Chapter 1). Most psychological research of 
environmental behaviour has focused on the individual person as the unit of analysis. 
While this has been helpful, less attention has been given to how group memberships, 
and the social influences these create, affect environmental behaviour. Because 
environmental behaviour often occurs within a social context, understanding the social 
element may be critically important to promoting environmentally sustainable 
behaviour (see Chapter 2). Using the social identity approach, this research investigates 
how various aspects of social group membership interact with individual attributes to 
influence environmental behaviour. Three related strands of research explore this issue 
(see Chapter 3 for an overview). 
 In Chapter 4, two studies (Studies 1 and 2) examined how group feedback in the 
form of social comparisons affect individual behaviour. Based on social identity theory, 
it was predicted that positive social comparisons would lead to more positive 
behaviour, and less positive comparisons to less positive behaviour, especially among 
individuals who identified strongly with the target ingroup. Results from both studies 
found some support for these hypotheses on certain (but not all) behavioural 
dependent measures, both at the time of manipulation and one week later. This 
supports the notion that individual social identification strength can moderate 
behavioural response to group-level feedback on environmental topics. 
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 In Chapter 5, Study 3 considered how interaction within groups via discussion 
might induce group norms about environmental behaviour that over-ride the effects of 
intergroup comparisons. A design similar to Study 1 was used, with the addition of a 
small-group discussion following the feedback manipulation. Discussion content was 
hypothesised to predict environmental behaviour, with the feedback manipulation 
having less impact than in Study 1. Results found that the more participants discussed 
environmental behaviours, the more they engaged in them one week later. This effect 
was independent of pre-existing environmental values, suggesting that the effects of 
group interaction were not merely a reflection of existing individual orientations. 
Following the discussion, values were also found to be very strong predictors of 
behaviour, a result not found in Study 1, suggesting that group interaction not only 
shapes individual behaviour but also reduces the classic value-action gap. Together, 
these findings point to the powerful role that intra-group interaction can play in 
forming norms of environmental behaviour and shaping individual responses.  
 In Chapter 6, two studies (Studies 4 and 5) explored how comparisons within a 
group over time (i.e., intra-group comparisons) may function differently to comparisons 
between groups (i.e., inter-group comparisons), which were explored in Chapter 4. 
Based on the findings in Chapter 4, positive intergroup comparisons were predicted to 
result in more positive individual intentions, whereas negative intergroup comparisons 
were expected to result in reduced intentions. With respect to intra-group comparisons, 
however, the opposite pattern of effects was predicted. The results of Study 4 did not 
support these hypotheses. However, feedback from participants suggested that the 
experimental design may have produced reactance. To address this, Study 5 made use 
of a revised design, and the results of this study indicated support for the hypotheses. 
Importantly, in addition to negative and positive comparisons having opposing effects 
depending on whether these were intra- or inter-group, the processes behind these 
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effects also differed. The effects of intra-group comparisons were mediated by shared 
responsibility whereas the effects of intergroup comparisons were mediated by 
environmental value centrality. 
 These results are integrated and discussed in Chapter 7. The recurring theme of 
these results is that group-level feedback can interact with individual-level variables in 
subtle but powerful ways, leading to differing outcomes of environmental behaviour. 
These findings highlight the socially imbedded nature of individual environmental 
actions, and suggest new avenues for theoretical and practical work in the 
environmental domain. In particular, on the basis of the studies included in this thesis it 
is recommended that psychologists who are interested in understanding and changing 
individual environmental behaviour should incorporate an understanding of intra- and 
inter-group processes into their theorising and future research. 
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– CHAPTER 1 – 
The Environmental Dilemma: 
A review of environmental threats and psychological research  
of environmentally sustainable behaviour 
 
Our enormously productive economy demands that we make consumption 
our way of life, that we convert the buying and use of goods into rituals, that 
we seek our spiritual satisfactions, our ego satisfactions, in consumption. The 
measure of social status, of social acceptance, of prestige, is now to be found 
in our consumptive patterns. The very meaning and significance of our lives 
today expressed in consumptive terms. The greater the pressures upon the 
individual to conform to safe and accepted social standards, the more does he 
tend to express his aspirations and his individuality in terms of what he wears, 
drives, eats- his home, his car, his pattern of food serving, his hobbies. … We 
need things consumed, burned up, worn out, replaced, and discarded at an 
ever increasing pace. 
       Victor Lebow (1955, p. 5) 
 
Humans are well adapted to deal with immediate and personal threats, such as a 
hostile person, a potentially dangerous animal, or other localised hazards. These are the 
threats with which, historically, we have the most experience, and both our minds and 
bodies are well-suited to dealing with them. As human society has developed and 
stabilised, these immediate, short-term threats have become less common; few readers 
will have been chased by a bear or confronted with life-threatening violence. Over time, 
these historical risks have been supplanted with more long-term, less visible risks, such 
as cancer from smoking and heart disease from sedentary lifestyles. In Europe as a 
whole, violence is rare enough that it accounts for less than 1 in 100 deaths (WHO, 
2004). While this partly represents a societal triumph over humanity’s ancient 
afflictions, another threat is rising in place of the old; degradation of the natural 
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environment, often invisible and slow beyond perception, has the potential to impact 
life in profound ways for which our societies are ill-prepared. 
This chapter reviews the research literature on environmental degradation, 
beginning with a number of historical cases of environmental collapse followed by a 
review of some of the most pressing environmental risks today. Following that, the 
chapter discusses why responding to environmental threats is often a challenge and 
then reviews several different theoretical approaches to understanding environmentally-
relevant behaviours. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of attempts at 
theoretical integration of models of environmental behaviour. 
Environmental Collapse: Historical Lessons 
 However unlikely it may seem, catastrophic environmental collapse has 
occurred before, and is a reality for which modern societies should be prepared. Today, 
many people believe environmental threats are exaggerated and that the risk of 
environmental collapse is low (BBC/Populus, 2010; Eurobarometer, 2009; Ipsos 
MORI, 2008; Gallup, 2009; Pew, 2009), which can present a barrier to taking pro-
environmental action (Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, & Whitmarsh, 2007). Although it is 
less familiar to us today, our ancestors experienced environmental collapse at several 
points, often contributing to the societal decline or collapse of the people who lived in 
that environment. In most cases, the state of the environment was not the only cause of 
societal decline; rather, environmental change was a distal factor contributing to more 
proximal factors such as famine or warfare over scarce resources (see Diamond, 2005 
for a thorough review of several societies, including those discussed below).  
 A classic example of long-term environmental damage which crippled a nation 
is the case of medieval Iceland. Vikings settled in the late 9th century, and began 
farming as they had in Scandinavia, pleased to find Iceland had deep and fertile soil. 
However, Iceland’s soil and climate were not suitable to supporting livestock, and once 
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the grass was over-grazed, the rich but light-weight volcanic soil blew away in the wind 
(Maizels & Caseldine, 1991). Within a few generations, much of Iceland’s once rich 
soils were gone and its woodlands deforested, leading Iceland to become one of 
Europe’s poorest countries through the middle ages, suffering from frequent famines 
(Karlsson, 2000). To this day, Iceland has little soil and few trees one thousand years 
after the environmental damage occurred (Vésteinsson, McGovern, & Keller, 2002). 
Like in Iceland, the 10th century Vikings of Greenland degraded the fragile ecosystem 
through over-grazing livestock and deforestation (Amorosi et al., 1997; Jakobsen, 
1991), ultimately leading to wide-spread poverty and starvation (Arneborg et al., 1999). 
Unlike the Icelandic Vikings, who at least survived, the Vikings of Greenland 
disappeared completely by the early 15th century (Seaver, 1996). 
Other civilizations that declined in part through environmental collapse include 
the Classic Maya civilization (Webster, 2002; Culbert & Rice, 1990), the Anasazi of the 
American southwest (Betancourt & Van Devender, 1981; Samuels & Betancourt, 1982), 
and the ancient Mycenean Greeks of Homer the poet, whose collapse led Greece into a 
non-literate dark age for 300 years (Redman, 1999). Similarly, the Easter Islanders 
eventually deforested their island and extirpated most of the wildlife for which they 
depended on for food (Flenley & King, 1984; Steadman, 1995). The loss of all trees and 
large animals led to hunger, increased warfare, and the loss of most of their population 
(Flenley & Bahn, 2003; Loret & Tancredi, 2003).  
One may wonder, “surely these societies did the best they could in a difficult 
situation and managed their resources as best they could.” However, archaeological 
findings suggest these collapsed societies often dedicated a significant portion of their 
limited critical resources to support the prestige and status of individuals. The Maya 
deforested their land and depleted their soil to add ever-thicker layers of socially-
desirable lime plaster to their houses and temples (Webster, 2002). The most opulent 
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Anasazi jewellery, including a single hoard of 56,000 turquoise pieces, was produced 
just before the Anasazi collapse (Pepper, 1909, as cited in Mathien, 2001) at a time of 
high civil unrest and famine (Turner & Turner, 1999; White, 1992). The Easter 
Islanders used the islands’ last trees to erect the largest of the moai statues, which weigh 
as much as 270 tons (245,000 kilograms), representing a colossal effort for a society 
short of both food and building materials (Flenley & Bahn, 2003; Flenley & King, 
1984). Many of these societies were advanced for their time, and made impressive 
achievements; societal collapse may have seemed unlikely at their peak of power and 
pride. That sense of invulnerability, which eventually crumbled, is captured in the final 
lines of the poem Ozymandias:  
And on the pedestal these words appear— 
‘My name is Ozymandias, king of kings: 
Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!’ 
Nothing besides remains. Round the decay 
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare 
The lone and level sands stretch far away.” 
Shelley (1826) 
The decisions of collapsed societies may seem foolish in hindsight, but upon 
reflection, one may ask if our global society is any wiser in using non-renewable oil to 
make plastic that is discarded almost immediately or by damaging the long-term health 
of soil to grow huge quantities of food, much of which is never eaten. As quoted at the 
start of this chapter, Lebow (1955) writes in the Journal of Retailing that the pace of 
modern consumption of resources is not required to meet our physical needs, but is 
designed to satisfy social acceptance and short-term economic gains. Like many ancient 
collapsed societies, people today are using scarce resources not for necessities, but for 
luxuries and frivolities. The parallels between our present way of life and that of the 
ancient collapsed societies are disquieting. 
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However, our society is different from those of the past in two important ways: 
our improved technology and ability to learn and communicate. Technology may in fact 
help prevent environmental collapse, but present technology is also the source of much 
environmental degradation. Future advancements may not be environmentally benign, 
and as technology develops, so does our potential to degrade the earth. Our short-term 
success in using technology does not guarantee our long-term success. Each one of the 
collapsed societies discussed above succeeded for hundreds of years, longer than the 
age of the United States, or the time since the industrial revolution. As with King 
Ozymandias, our sense of power and mastery is tempered by the humility of historical 
perspective. 
Modern methods of learning and communication far outreach that of our 
ancestors, and this, perhaps more than anything, is a reason for optimism. In addition 
to researching the chemistry, physics, and biology of how the natural environment 
functions, modern societies also possess the ability to learn about human behaviours. 
However, the psychological influences of what leads to human behavioural choices that 
harm the environment are still under-researched. Better understanding what leads 
people to engage in pro-environmental behaviour and communicating that knowledge 
is a critical element of preventing environmental degradation. 
Environmental Collapse: The Present Dilemma 
Even today, environmental problems can be major factors in what appear to be 
societal problems. The recent 1994 genocide in Rwanda was fuelled in part by conflict 
over scarce environmental resources. In Rwanda in 1993, the population was so dense 
that in a typical area the average farm was less than one acre in size with only one 
seventh of an acre of overburdened land to support each person (André & Platteau, 
1998). This contributed to chronic malnourishment, inflaming old ethnic conflict over 
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control of land and resources. The location and severity of violence was directly related 
to the scarcity of environmental resources (André & Platteau, 1998). 
 Fortunately, few environmental crises have boiled over into societal collapse 
recently. However, many other global environmental risks have been growing and have 
major implications for the way of life for people and ecosystems in the coming decades. 
While too great and intertwined to fully enumerate here, a few of the most pressing 
aspects of global environmental degradation include climate change, loss of 
biodiversity, the dwindling supply of natural resources, and pollution. 
 The first major environmental threat is climate change, caused by carbon-based 
gasses and water vapour that trap heat within the earth’s atmosphere. Carbon-based 
gases are caused by many human activities, such as the burning of carbon-based fuels 
like coal and oil, which are primary sources of the energy used for electricity production 
and transportation. While pre-industrial levels of carbon dioxide were about 284 parts 
per million (ppm) in 1832 (Etheridge et al., 1998), they are now 387 ppm and increasing 
(Tans, 2010). During the 20th century, temperatures increased by 0.74 °C ± 0.18 °C 
(IPCC, 2007). Predicting the specifics of how and when the climate will change is 
complex and entails some uncertainty. However, high-certainty predictions by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change include an increase in mean global 
temperatures, rising sea levels, and more frequent droughts, making food production 
more difficult. According to the Stern Review (2006) and IPCC (2007) an increase of 2 
°C is likely to cause severe disruptions in the way of life for people throughout the 
world, while 4 °C is considered to be the “tipping point” for the stability of many 
meteorological and ecological systems, when equilibrium is no longer maintained. 
Currently, global mean temperatures are predicted to rise by between 1.1 °C and 6.4 °C 
by 2100, depending upon future carbon emission levels (IPCC, 2007). The flooding of 
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coastal cities accompanied by increased scarcity of food and clean water is expected to 
cause extensive human suffering and death (IPCC, 2007). 
 The second major environmental threat is the loss of biodiversity, both in terms 
of loss of wildlife habitat and species extinction. Since 1970, animal populations have 
declined by 30% and coral reefs by 40% (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, 2010). Functioning ecosystems are the ultimate source of breathable air, clean 
water, food, and raw materials necessary for survival. Deforestation is currently 
estimated to cost 2 to 5 trillion dollars per year in additional costs, such as erosion and 
air quality, than if the forests were kept intact and managed sustainably (Secretariat of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2010). This loss of biodiversity damages 
productivity and threatens the sustainability of human societies. The rate at which 
species are becoming extinct is between 100 and 1,000 times the historical background 
rate, leading some scientists to conclude we are experiencing earth’s sixth major 
extinction event (Kingsford et al., 2009; Lawton & May, 1995; Pimm, Russell, 
Gittleman, & Brooks, 1995; Sala et al., 2000). The most recent period in which 
extinctions were as common was at the end of the Cretaceous in the final days of the 
dinosaurs. The effects of climate change are expected to exacerbate the extinction rate, 
and appear to be currently doing so for many species (Sinervo et al., 2010). Although 
exact predictions are still uncertain, biologists expect that as many as 20% of all species 
may be extinct by 2028 (AMNH, 1998), and as many as 50% by 2100 (Wilson, 2002). In 
addition to the ethical issues of widespread extinction, the unintended consequences of 
mass extinction could have strong impacts on human life, such as increases in pest 
populations, disease vectors, and the loss of pollinating insects (Sinervo et al., 2010). 
The third environmental dilemma presented here is the depletion of fossil fuels, 
particularly oil. Oil is the primary fuel for transportation of both people and cargo and 
is the source of most plastics. Even the fertilizer and insecticides used to produce most 
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food are derived from fossil fuels. Aside from all the environmental reasons to find 
alternatives to fossil fuels, a more mundane reason is that their supply is finite, that 
supply is dwindling, and our societies are currently dependent upon them for mobility, 
food production, and other goods. While demand for oil is increasing, the supply is 
expected to decrease soon. Oil production in the US peaked in 1970, while Saudi 
Arabia, the largest exporter of oil, is expected to reach peak production within the next 
few years (Deffeyes, 2006). Predictions vary as to how soon global peak oil will occur, 
with academic reports claiming within a decade (Owen, Inderwildi, & King, 2010), and 
oil companies such as Shell claiming a date of 2025 or later, but most assessments agree 
peak oil will occur within the lifetimes of adults today (Hirsch, Bezdek, & Wendling, 
2005). If people do not conserve more fuel, and find alternative fuels soon, the 
standards of living throughout the world could change dramatically. 
 Finally, the negative effects of environmental change are not reserved for plants 
and animals, or future generations of humanity. The World Health Organization 
estimates that in 2002, about 4 million people died because of air and water pollution 
(WHO, 2007), nearly twice as many deaths as those attributed to drugs, alcohol, road 
traffic accidents and violence combined (WHO, 2004). Regardless of future risks, 
environmental degradation already kills millions of people throughout the world each 
year. 
 While these problems may appear hopelessly large, there are some reasons for 
cautious optimism. Historically, most societies have not degraded their environments to 
the tipping point; environmental collapse is not inevitable. Even when collapse has 
occurred in the past, societies have lived side-by-side while one declines and the other 
thrives. While the last Greenlander Vikings starved to death after deforesting and 
exhausting the fertility of their land, the Inuit were able to survive in the same lands by 
living through more sustainable means (Berglund, 1986). While Haiti has suffered 
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because of its deforestation, overpopulation, and pollution, the neighbouring 
Dominican Republic has enjoyed relative prosperity in part because of its strict 
environmental protections (Wucker, 2000). Environmental degradation, while common, 
is preventable; it is ultimately caused by controllable human choices which can be 
researched and understood. 
Environmental Degradation as a Behavioural Choice 
 While the current environmental problems present a grim picture, the 
environment has its share of success stories, brought about by intentional human 
decisions. When Rachel Carson’s book Silent Spring (1962) documented how pesticides 
such as DDT were killing off wildlife populations, it converged with other factors to 
help inspire the modern environmental movement. Within ten years, and after a 
widespread cultural shift in perceptions of how people live within the natural 
environment, DDT use was restricted in the USA and many other countries. Species 
which had been on the verge of extinction, such as the bald eagle, have recovered as a 
result. As a continuing legacy, environmental awareness is still high amongst the public, 
even if those values do not always translate into action. A similar environmental victory 
was achieved in removing lead from fuel and consumer products. As a result, 
atmospheric lead pollution in the US has stopped almost completely, and the level of 
lead in American blood has dropped 78% since the 1970s (Landrigan et al., 1975; 
Landrigan et al., 1976; Pirkle et al., 1994). Likewise, the international removal of ozone-
destroying CFCs (Molina & Rowland, 1974) has been described as the “single most 
successful international agreement to date” by Kofi Annan and the ozone layer is 
expected to be restored by the mid-21st Century (NOAA, 2006). Similarly, the problem 
of deforestation has mostly been stabilised within most developed nations (Secretariat 
of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2010). Japan, despite having one of the 
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highest population densities in the world, has retained 80% of its forests through a 
tradition of careful woodland management (Richards, 2003).  
 These success stories remind us that our actions toward the environment are 
behavioural choices. While people have made mistakes, they are also capable of getting 
it right. Though people may feel powerless as individuals in the face of global 
environmental threats (Lorenzoni et al., 2007), human actions are still an aggregate of 
individual behavioural choices. Even top-down decisions, such as governmental 
regulation of toxins or carbon emissions, are only a few steps removed from bottom-up 
processes, like the strength of voters’ environmental priorities; each of the top-down 
environmental victories reviewed above was only achieved after years of pressure from 
the bottom-up. The technology to address most of our environmental dilemmas exists 
today; relatively simple measures like home insulation, energy-efficient travel and 
appliances, and lower-impact diets have a greater environmental impact than many 
more high-profile environmental actions. For example, cavity wall insulation pays for 
itself in about 2 years in Britain, while photovoltaic solar panels can take decades 
(Energy Savings Trust UK, 2010). Many environmental optimists point to future 
technologies that will solve our environmental problems, and likewise, many 
governmental initiatives are focussed on researching and developing new technologies. 
These advancements are important, and improved technology will undoubtedly help 
the environment, but technology alone is an incomplete solution. Most technological 
advancements still require intentional human behaviours to implement them and, as a 
whole, people are already struggling behaviourally to make the pro-environmental 
choices that are already available. How then can people be influenced to engage in 
more environmentally sustainable behaviours? 
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The Challenge of Responding to Environmental Threats 
 Researchers have considered many reasons why humans appear to respond mal-
adaptively to threats to the natural environment (e.g., Hanski, 2008). The three broadest 
reasons for why many environmental threats are difficult to solve are discussed here: 
environmental threats can be difficult to see, the cost is often externalised to people 
who did not cause the degradation, and the consequences of environmental destruction 
can be so unfamiliar that catastrophic outcomes seem unlikely. Each of these reasons 
will now be considered in turn. 
First, many types of environmental degradation, such as species extinction or 
toxic contamination, are not easily visible. Similarly, evidence of climate change can be 
difficult for humans to perceive because year-to-year changes are small, and the high 
level of natural variation in the weather masks the “signal” of long-term climate trends 
with the “noise” of short-term variability. Ironically, the most visible damage to the 
environment, such as litter, is often the least damaging in global terms. Likewise, many 
environmentally damaging behaviours, such as energy use, can be difficult for 
consumers to measure or even visualise (Aronson, 1990; Coltrane, Archer, & Aronson, 
1986; Kurz, Donaghue, & Walker, 2005); there is little visible indication that a home 
electric oven typically requires hundreds of times the electricity to operate as a low-
energy lightbulb. Without specialist knowledge, people may not know the natural 
environment around them is being harmed and that their everyday behaviours may be 
contributing to that harm. Even if people know this in the abstract, the causal link 
between actions and behaviour may not appear to be direct. This can lead to a 
divergence between pro-environmental intentions and actual environmental impacts, as 
well-placed intentions do not materialise into environmentally-meaningful behavioural 
outcomes (Stern, 2000; Whitmarsh, 2009). 
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 Second, environmental resources can be extracted in such a way that the party 
benefiting from the resources does not pay the ecological cost of doing so. This is 
known as externalisation and occurs across distance as well as time. In the case of 
distance, chemical effluent from a factory may travel downstream and contaminate land 
and water far from the original site. In the case of time, externalisation occurs when 
normally renewable resources, such as fisheries, are exhausted through over-extraction, 
or when carbon gases are released from energy production today at the cost of a stable 
climate for future generations. One striking example of externalisation is the 
contamination of the Arctic, where airborne pollutants are carried by long range air 
currents, similar to a whirlpool in the global atmosphere. As a result, native Inuit and 
Nunavik people ingest high levels of toxic PCBs, pesticides, and other pollutants 
originating in countries far away. Inuit breast milk is heavily contaminated (Sandau et 
al., 2000; Solomon & Weiss, 2002), causing disorders of the immune system, 
neurological impairment, and higher risk of cancer in Inuit children (Carpenter, 2006; 
Dewailly et al., 2000). Because many of these toxic compounds degrade very slowly, the 
Arctic will continue to be contaminated long after emissions stop. In cases of 
externalisation, even if people are aware of the environmental damage they are causing, 
they may be less motivated to prevent it because they do not pay the cost while still 
retaining the benefit. This situation highlights the mismatch between individual 
interests and group interests. Garrett Hardin (1969) described this as the “tragedy of 
the commons,” referring to the environmental destruction that occurs when common 
resources are over-exploited by individuals acting in their own self-interest. 
 Finally, environmental crises such as climate change may seem so extreme and 
unfamiliar that many people reject the possibility of environmental calamity as 
improbable or at least exaggerated, a fallacy termed the normalcy bias (Omer & Alon, 
1994). After all, when the sun is shining and the grass is green, ecological disaster seems 
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remote. This barrier to perceiving threats is similar to the first one, in that threats are 
difficult to see, but even when acknowledged they can be difficult to perceive as “real.” 
The reasons that people are often sceptical of environmental destruction are likely to be 
complex. Extreme environmental damage implies moral wrong-doing, which may 
provoke feelings of guilt, anxiety, or denial. In support of this, while the scientific 
evidence for the severity of climate change has been increasing (IPCC, 2007), public 
belief in climate change has been recently decreasing (BBC/Populus, 2010; 
Eurobarometer, 2009; Ipsos MORI, 2008; Gallup, 2009; Pew, 2009). In controlled 
experiments, people have been found to be more willing to engage in pro-
environmental behaviours when climate change is portrayed as moderate rather than 
extreme (Ferguson & Branscombe, 2010). The reasons for this are likely to be complex, 
but Ferguson and Branscombe implicate the role of collective guilt. Alternatively, 
Dickinson (2009) suggests that awareness of massive environmental destruction might 
elicit anxiety over individual mortality that in turn prompts environmentally-damaging 
terror management strategies to deal with this anxiety (Arndt, Solomon, Kasser, & 
Sheldon, 2004; Kasser & Sheldon, 2003). However, this latter possibility remains 
untested. 
Psychological Research and Environmental Behaviour 
The study of psychology and the prevention of the degradation of the natural 
environment may initially seem like an odd pairing. However, if the psychologist’s goal 
is to understand human thought and behaviour, and the present environmental threats 
are rooted in human thoughts and behaviours, then that pairing seems essential for 
progress. Curiously, the field of psychological study of environmentally-relevant 
behaviours has been relatively small and has not always been appreciated as having a 
role to play in confronting environmental threats. Even within the APA, a 2000 survey 
revealed not one of the 52 divisions had an environmental policy, and respondents 
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replied to the survey with statements like “This seems not to be a psychological issue, 
and thus not within our sphere” and “It is virtually impossible to understate the 
importance of APA divisions [in regard to protecting the environment]” (Clayton & 
Brook, 2005, p 88). Likewise, environmental professionals have rated psychology as one 
of the least important domains to their work, rating the study of psychology within 
their discipline at 1.5 on a 1 to 5 scale (Clayton & Brook, 2005). 
These attitudes are changing, however, as more researchers have explicitly called 
for psychologists to lend their efforts to studying, understanding, and influencing how 
people engage in environmentally-relevant behaviours (e.g., Clayton & Brook, 2005; 
Mascia et al., 2003; McKenzie-Mohr, 2000; Oskamp, 2000; Saunders, 2003). The 
research literature has grown, and an APA Task Force recently published a lengthy 
report summarising the interface between psychological research and climate change 
(Swim et al., 2009). Over the past ten years, environmental behaviour has grown from 
being the research interest of a scattered few to the new sub-domain of “conservation 
psychology.” Environmental behaviour can take many forms, but its defining feature as 
used in this thesis and by other conservation psychologists (Stern, 2000) is that it is a 
behaviour which impacts the natural environment either relatively positively or 
negatively. This can take the form of public-sphere behaviours, such as volunteering or 
petitioning for more sustainable government policies or private-sphere behaviours, 
such as recycling, conserving energy, or making more sustainable personal consumption 
choices. Research of environmental behaviours is diverse in methodology and 
theoretical perspectives, having attracted the interest of social psychologists, 
geographers, sociologists, economists, governmental organisations, and environmental 
campaigners; perhaps the most shared feature of this research is its lack of unifying 
theory. The diversity of research has been a strength as well as a weakness, offering 
many angles and explanations of behaviour, but communication of these theories is 
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often confined within the original discipline’s journals and conferences. Below is a 
review of traditional perspectives within psychology to understanding why people 
engage in environmental behaviours. These theoretical groupings are not always clearly 
demarcated, and many practicing researchers and campaigners today take an ecumenical 
approach. As discussed here, the theoretical perspectives are informational, rational-
economic, attitudinal, habitual, social dilemmas, and normative. Notably, most of these 
perspectives focus on the individual person as the primary unit of analysis, leaving out 
details of social processes. I believe this individually-focused approach does not reflect 
actual human decision-making, and this theoretical limitation accounts for the limited 
predictive power of most traditional theories. 
Informational Models of Environmental Behaviour 
As the environmental movement awakened in the 1960s, many early approaches 
assumed that if people learned about the environmental impact of their behaviours and 
how to change them, people would choose to live more sustainably. Although the 
simplicity of this logic is appealing, its empirical support has been disappointing. As 
with many complex behaviours, providing information alone tends to produce little 
behavioural change, as health psychologists learned long ago (Hyman & Sheatsly, 1947). 
In one series of workshops on home energy conservation, knowledge was found to 
increase substantially, but conservation behaviours did not change (Geller, 1981). 
Similar results were found in a 10-week longitudinal study of water conservation where 
participants received comprehensive informational materials (Geller, Erickson, & 
Buttram, 1983). These same non-results for information-only strategies have been 
observed in many other experiments and case studies (Ester & Winett, 1982; Hirst, 
Berry, & Soderstrom, 1981; McDougall, Claxton, & Ritchie, 1983). 
This is not to say that education about environmental issues is unimportant, but 
rather that education alone is rarely enough to bring about behavioural change. A deficit 
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of environmental information can be a barrier to pro-environmental action at many 
levels, such as realising an environmental problem exists, knowing which behaviours 
are problematic, and which alternative behaviours would be beneficial (Lorenzoni et al., 
2007; Whitmarsh, 2009). In this respect, knowledge is similar in concept to a hygiene 
factor in organisational psychology (Herzberg, 1968); its absence may present a barrier, 
but increasing it further once already present does not necessarily provide increased 
motivation. The typical inefficacy of purely educational interventions has not been fully 
communicated beyond academia as attested by the enduring popularity of fact-filled 
leaflets as a primary form of behavioural intervention by campaigners, organisations, 
and local governments. 
Rational-Economic Models of Environmental Behaviour 
 Rational-economic models assert that people engage in environmental 
behaviours according to what will give them the most individual economic benefit. This 
model has been popular with economists and many incentive-based environmental 
programmes. Applications of this model include grants for home insulation and 
increased taxation on polluting fuels. In surveys, more people claim they conserve for 
economic benefit than out of environmental concern (DEFRA, 2002), and simple 
conservation measures can be very lucrative for both organisations and individuals; for 
example, cavity wall insulation in the UK costs about £250 for a home and provides 
about £115 in savings each year indefinitely (Energy Saving Trust UK, 2010). Few 
investment opportunities provide a consistent 46% annual return on a one-time 
expense. While the initial cost can be a barrier to conservation (Lorenzoni et al., 2007), 
grants and subsidised loans are offered in both the US and UK that cover some or all 
of the installation cost. These types of conservation measures can be a guaranteed way 
of saving hundreds of pounds each year. However, surprisingly few people take 
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advantage of these offers, suggesting economics alone offer an inadequate account of 
decision-making.  
While economics certainly plays a role in behaviour, the immediate drawback of 
rational-economic models is that people are not purely rational and do not make their 
everyday behaviours after an exhaustive cost-benefit analysis. In one field study, few 
people requested a free energy-audit, and of those who did, few followed the money-
saving advice they received (Hirst, Berry, & Soderstrom, 1981). In a review of several 
public programmes from the US, Stern et al. (1986) found that most offers of grants 
and low-interest loans for conservation measures were taken up by only a small percent 
of the population, with the average consumer uptake of these offers ranging from 0.5% 
to 5% by region. Even a programme that offered totally free home weatherisation was 
used by only 6% of possible users (Miller & Ford, 1985). In another field experiment, 
residential energy users were assigned to one of three pricing tariffs for peak and off-
peak energy pricing of either 2:1, 4:1, or 8:1 pricing ratios. This difference in cost 
accounted for only 2 percent of the variance in energy consumption behaviour 
(Heberlein & Warriner, 1983). The most interesting finding of incentive-based 
programmes is not that economic incentives can motivate behavioural decisions, but 
that they rarely appear to do so. While people often claim economic rather than social 
reasons for conserving, research suggests social norms are actually more influential than 
economic incentives (Nolan, Schultz, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2008). 
The successfulness of incentive programmes often appears to be independent of 
the economic advantage offered by the programme. Using principles from advertising 
and social psychological research, rational-economic incentives were packaged with 
frequent reminders and more comprehensive information about the savings that were 
available (Heberlein & Baumgartner, 1985, as cited in Stern, 1999). In another set of 
programmes, Gonzales, Aronson, and Costanzo (1988) used vivid imagery and 
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persuasive messaging to compel users to take part in the programme. Stern et al. (1986) 
intervened in another set of programmes by reducing the number of steps for users to 
take advantage of the programme. In all cases, uptake of the programmes increased 
substantially and energy use decreased. The combination of information, incentives, 
and persuasion appear to explain conservation success better than any of these methods 
alone (Stern, 1999). 
One drawback to economic incentives is that as efficiency increases a “rebound 
effect” may occur where users relax their prior conservation efforts (Gonzales, 
Aronson, & Costanzo, 1988), similar to a dieter who eats twice as much food because it 
has half the calories. Incentive programmes still achieve some overall savings, but often 
not the same level as the raw efficiency savings. In some cases, fining problem 
behaviour has the effect of increasing it, because the problem has been commodified at a 
price people are willing to pay (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000). Another drawback to 
rational-economic interventions is they require a continuous external economic 
pressure, such as the provision of grants for efficiency upgrades or higher taxation on 
damaging behaviours. If funding sources decline or taxation becomes unpopular, the 
economic incentive to influence behaviour also disappears. In summary, rational-
economic interventions are not always successful, and they have their limitations, but 
they can work well when complemented by other measures, such as comprehensive 
information, persuasive messages, vivid imagery, and convenience of use. 
Attitudinal Models of Environmental Behaviour 
In a broad sense of the word “attitudes,” attitudinal models encompass several 
individual-level types of beliefs such as attitude toward the natural environment itself, 
attitudes toward specific environmentally-relevant behaviours, and paradigms of 
humanity’s role within the environment, such as the New Ecological Paradigm (Dunlap 
& Van Liere, 1978; Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 2000). Attitudinal research has 
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been popular within psychology, and Kaiser, Wölfing, and Fuhrer (1999) estimate that 
most psychological publications investigating environmental behaviour incorporate 
some type of attitude measure. 
Early research into general attitudes found them to be poor predictors of 
specific behaviour (Wicker, 1969). Further research found specific, concrete attitudes 
improved predictions substantially over generalised attitudes (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). 
Thus, knowing someone’s general attitude toward nature is unlikely to reveal how much 
they drive a car, but knowing their specific attitude toward driving a car is more 
informative. Attitude prediction of behaviour was incorporated into the Theory of 
Reasoned Action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), which claims 
attitudes and norms predict intentions, which then predict behaviour. The Theory of 
Planned Behaviour also includes perceived control as a predictor of behavioural 
intentions (Ajzen, 1991). A meta-analysis of 185 studies across many behavioural 
domains found that the theory of planned behaviour accounts for about 39% of the 
variance in intentions and 27% of behaviour (Armitage & Conner, 2001). However, 
most of these studies did not concern environmentally-relevant behaviours, and 
predicting behaviour is not the same as the ability to influence behaviour. A meta-
analysis of environmental behaviours in particular found attitudes to predict about 12% 
of the variance in environmental behaviour (Hines, Hungerford, & Tomera, 1986/87). 
One application of attitudinal concepts predicting behaviour is the New 
Environmental Paradigm (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978), which goes beyond simple 
attitudes and attempts to measure the worldview in which people see humans fitting 
into the natural world. According to Dunlap and Van Liere (1978), the NEP measures 
the transition from an old societal paradigm of nature as a resource to exploit to a new 
paradigm of humans as aware of adverse consequences toward nature, fitting within 
nature rather than outside it, and acting as environmental stewards. The NEP has since 
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been revised into a new scale, updating some questions and replacing “Environmental” 
for “Ecological,” but its purpose remains the same (Dunlap et al., 2000). The NEP has 
been widely used within research, and is predictive of awareness of environmental 
consequences, personal environmental norms, behavioural intentions, and actual 
behaviours (Cordano, Welcomer & Scherer, 2003; Schultz & Zelezny, 1998; Tarrant & 
Cordell, 1997). However, the NEP is a much stronger predictor of environmental 
awareness and personal norms than actual behaviours (Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano & 
Kalof, 1999). 
One drawback of attitudinal models is that as attitudes become more narrowly 
defined and specific to the behaviour they predict, they become less informative about 
the broader psychological process that may lead to behavioural change. Attitudes about 
driving a car to work may partially predict whether one does drive a car to work, but 
this analysis by itself is limited in theoretical scope, reveals little about how attitudes 
arise, and ignores the social environment in which behaviours occur. Second, given 
how attitudes might appear to be obvious and direct predictors of behaviour, 
psychologists have been surprised at their low predictive power, even when they are 
targeted at specific, concrete behaviours. As will be discussed, these two drawbacks of 
isolation of theory and low predictive power are rooted in the same problem; these 
paradigms do not account for the social determinants of behaviour. Increasing 
theoretical scope to incorporate social variables dramatically increases the usefulness of 
attitudinal models. 
Habitual Models of Environmental Behaviour 
Given the relatively low predictive power of the three types of models described 
above, the reader may surmise that environmental behaviour seems to live a life of its 
own, independent of the factors that one might expect to be most influential. Indeed, 
individual behaviour can be particularly intractable even in the face of concerted efforts 
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to promote change, a point that has been demonstrated in a variety of domains 
including drug abuse prevention (Derzon & Lipsey, 2002; West & O’Neal, 2004), sexual 
health (Albarracín et al., 2005; Brückner & Bearman, 2005; Hauser, 2004; Trenholm et 
al., 2007), and conservation behaviour (Gardner & Stern, 1996; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 
2002; Stern, 1999; Stern et al., 1986). Although the UK government has spent many 
millions of pounds promoting conservation behaviour through behavioural 
intervention programmes, environmentally destructive behaviour like CO2 emissions 
continues to rise (DEFRA, 2006). Despite the poor performance of many behavioural 
change campaigns, these approaches are still commonly relied upon by governments 
and NGOs (Owens, 2000). 
 Habitual models view many behaviours as entrenched and automatic rather than 
deliberative and planned. The defining feature of habits is not the frequency of an 
action, but its automaticity (Verplanken, 2006). As people perform the same actions 
repeatedly, they link cues within their lived environment with associated actions, such 
as sofas and snacking. This finding has been recorded in many behavioural outcomes 
(Verplanken & Wood, 2006), but has also been observed at the neurological level; 
habitual behaviours decrease the involvement of goal-related neural structures like the 
prefrontal cortex (Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005). One implication of this work is that 
“downstream” interventions that occur after habituation has set in are unlikely to be 
successful in influencing behaviour, even if they do influence attitudes and intentions. 
 In support of this, behavioural intentions for driving cars (Verplanken, Aarts, 
van Knippenberg, & Moonen, 1998), taking the bus, and eating fast food (Ji & Wood, 
2007) were strong predictors when the behaviour was not habituated, but intentions did 
not predict behaviour when habits were strong. While these results may seem almost 
fatalistic, they offer insight into how habituated behaviours may be influenced. Because 
habits are often context dependent, they are best suited to change when the situational 
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context has also changed. For example, people are most likely to switch from a car to 
public transportation when they move to a new city; providing new residents with free 
bus passes takes advantages of a time when habituated behaviours are vulnerable to 
change, and allows more positive habits to develop. When combined with additional 
features, such as enhanced information and economic incentives, these “downstream 
plus context change” interventions have the potential to be more successful than typical 
campaigns (Bamberg, Ajzen, & Schmidt, 2003; Fujii & Kitamura, 2003).  
 “Upstream” interventions, which address harmful habits preventatively rather 
than curatively, have considerable potential. These types of interventions disrupt 
negative habits by altering the structure of the lived environment in which they might 
occur. Successful examples include congestion charges for over-crowded roads and 
optimising recycling collection to make the behaviours as easy as possible (Schultz, 
Oskamp, & Mainieri, 1995). The limitation of upstream interventions is that they 
typically need to occur in a top-down way, organised carefully by a sufficiently 
supportive and skilled authority. A combination of downstream and upstream 
interventions show much promise in promoting environmental behaviour, but only 
fairly common behaviours are likely to become automatic and habituated. Occasional 
behaviours like buying a car or boiler can have as much environmental impact as daily 
behaviours, but these would be unlikely to become automatic.  
Social Dilemma Models of Environmental Behaviour 
 Social dilemmas, made famous by Garrett Hardin’s (1968) “tragedy of the 
commons” example, are defined as situations where there is a mismatch between 
private and collective interests (Dawes, 1980). Many environmental issues can be 
viewed as social dilemmas, such as fishing, logging, and the release of greenhouse 
gasses. While it may benefit individual actors to engage in these behaviours as much as 
possible, if too many people do so, everyone loses as resources diminish to 
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unsustainable levels. The research literature on social dilemmas is vast, spanning 
beyond psychology, with many researchers coming from economic and political science 
perspectives. In contrast to many of the other perspectives reviewed in this chapter, 
social dilemmas accounts for group-level processes more explicitly. An underlying 
assumption behind most social dilemma research is that actors operate through rational 
self-interest, but their decisions are also influenced by situational context and others’ 
actions (Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004). The dominant experimental paradigm in 
social dilemma research involves a resource management game that simulates a social 
dilemma played by a small number of participants. Cooperation rates within these 
groups are influenced by a large number of factors, such as past experience with other 
actors, awareness of the social dilemma, central governance, individual-level attributes, 
and within-group dynamics (Gifford, 2007). The fate of the resources these groups 
manage can vary widely, but under the right conditions, responsible and sustainable 
choices can emerge (Ostrom, 2000). 
Perhaps one of the most valuable findings from the social dilemma research 
literature is the importance of social variables in determining individuals’ decisions. The 
level of trust between actors has a strong impact on how cooperative their decisions 
will be (Sato, 1989), but this effect decreases as the number of actors increases 
(Komorita & Lapworth, 1982). Sharing a collective identity also boosts cooperation in 
social dilemmas (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Edney, 1980; Kramer, 1991; Kramer & 
Brewer, 1984). Brewer (1979) proposes that this occurs because the group is seen as an 
extension of the self, and group welfare is incorporated into individual welfare. 
Empirical results support the notion that a strong shared identity transforms actors’ 
goals into a desire for mutual well-being in social dilemmas (De Cremer & Van Vugt, 
1999).  
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 Some social dilemma theorists have criticised laboratory-based experimental 
findings as not being generalisable to real-world environmental scenarios, particularly 
regarding climate change. First, while experimental results show both trust and prior 
experience with dilemma partners increase cooperation (Messick et al., 1983; Ostrom et 
al., 2002), the sheer number of actors in most environmental problems make trust and 
cooperation strategies less feasible (McGinnis & Ostrom, 2007). In simulation models, 
simply increasing the number of actors from three to seven significantly reduces 
cooperative and responsible decisions (Seijts & Latham, 2000). Still, social dilemma 
research applications have had some real-world success in creating sustainable local 
fisheries (Clayton & Myers, 2009). Exploiting a shared identity when there are a large 
number of actors may be a feasible strategy, because shared identity expands the sphere 
of concern for wellbeing from the individual-level to the social-level (De Cremer & Van 
Vugt, 1999). 
However, strong social bonds are not a straightforward panacea for resolving 
social dilemmas. In one study of sustainability practices by three different Guatemalan 
tribal groups, the group with the strongest social interconnections between members 
was also the worst at making environmentally-sustainable choices. The researchers 
found this was because of a shared cultural norm that minimised perceiving the reality 
of environmental degradation (Atran, Medin, & Ross, 2005). Thus, social influence may 
be helpful in resolving social dilemmas, but social context is important in determining 
the outcome, as social influence can also exacerbate dilemmas. 
Another complication in practical applications of social dilemma findings is that 
for many environmental behaviours, such as energy use, people are often unaware of 
their own personal impact because both energy use and its environmental impact are 
difficult to see. Most social dilemma research operates on the assumption that actors 
are aware of and can measure their own impact; without these prerequisite conditions, 
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social dilemma research applications are unlikely to be successful (Weber, Kopelman, & 
Messick, 2004). Thus social dilemma based strategies may need to be accompanied by 
additional approaches to make users more aware of environmental problems and their 
own behavioural impacts. In summary, social dilemma research has produced 
compelling research findings, and applications have been used successfully for some 
local environmental problems. Importantly, social dilemma research shows how social 
processes can influence what superficially may appear to be individual-level decisions. 
Normative Models of Environmental Behaviour 
Subjective norms, defined as social pressures people feel from those around 
them, have been incorporated into both the Theory of Reasoned Action (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1975) and Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991). However, they are often the weakest 
predictor compared to attitudes and perceived control (Armitage & Conner, 2001), 
leading some theorists to conclude individual-level factors are more predictive of 
behaviour than social factors (Ajzen, 1991). 
 In contrast to this, other researchers have argued that prior conceptualisations 
of norms have been too unitary, and that norms have been poor behavioural predictors 
of behaviour because of theoretical and methodological confounds. Cialdini, Reno, and 
Kallgren (1990) describe norms as including a descriptive element (what people are 
doing) and an injunctive element (what people should be doing), a theoretical nuance 
prior researchers had not taken into account in their experimental manipulations or 
measurements. Cialdini and colleagues demonstrated that when these norms are 
mismatched, normative messages are less persuasive. This is often the case for 
environmental issues, where pro-environmental attitudes are valued (injunctive norm) 
but pro-environmental behaviours are not (descriptive norm). This kind of mismatch 
can eventually propagate a norm of inconsistency, perpetuating the problem 
(McKimmie et al., 2003). Reinforcing both types of norms together has a more 
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beneficial effect than either norm alone (Smith & Louis, 2008). Normative influence 
also has the most impact when people are consciously aware of them (Kallgren, Reno, 
& Cialdini, 2000). Even so, many normative approaches provide relatively low 
predictive power (Armitage & Conner, 2001). However, norm theorists have recently 
developed models that provide a more integrative account of social influences that have 
achieved much higher predictive power in explaining behaviour than traditional 
individually-focused models. These theories are discussed in further detail in Chapter 2. 
Attempts at Theoretical Integration 
Although the theoretical paradigms of environmental behaviours are diverse in 
their grounding, they can all account for some proportion of behaviour, and the most 
effective predictions tend to take aspects of many models into account. This has led 
some pro-environmental intervention designers to take an ecumenical approach, using 
complementary elements from several of the models above to focus more on practical 
results rather than theoretical conceptualisation. Social marketing approaches use 
traditional advertising methods to spread information and shift attitudes, but also use 
community representatives to work with their neighbours to establish social influence 
and the creation of new habits and group norms (McKenzie-Mohr, 2000; McKenzie-
Mohr & Smith, 1999). While social marketing can be effective at promoting 
environmentally sustainable behaviours, these efforts also require time and money and 
may not be scalable with current resources.  
 Other researchers have pursued a more theoretical integration of why people 
engage in pro-environmental behaviours. Kurz (2002) proposes a socio-ecological 
understanding of environmental behaviour, which incorporates aspects of several of the 
models above. Building on other theoretical developments (Baron & Misovich, 1993; 
Gibson, 1979; Hormuth, 1999), the socio-ecological approach adopts the concepts of 
affordances, attunements, and effectivities. Affordances refer to the multiple functions 
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of objects; for example, a car has the affordance of transportation, but also of status 
and pollution. When a particular affordance is salient in the mind, that person is said to 
be attuned to the affordance. Effectivities are the knowledge, skills, and resources that 
enable use of affordances, such as knowing how to apply for a grant to install loft 
insulation. The models above can be reinterpreted as fitting into the framework of 
affordances, attunements, and effectivities. While the socio-ecological approach does 
not theorise about social influences directly, each of the three elements are to be 
interpreted as socially embedded. In one field experiment using socio-ecological 
principles (Kurz, Donaghue, & Walker, 2005), interventions were designed to keep 
participants attuned to the environmental affordances of everyday behaviours, such as 
water used during showering. These interventions were successful for water 
conservation, but less so for energy conservation. 
In another attempt at theoretical integration, Stern and colleagues (1991) draw 
upon several theoretical strands in their Value-Belief-Norm (VBN) theory to predict 
environmental behaviours. According to this theory, environmental values lead to 
beliefs such as the New Ecological Paradigm, leading to an increase in awareness of 
consequences and personal responsibility. This leads to a pro-environmental personal 
norm which leads to increased pro-environmental behaviours. The VBN model is 
primarily focused on the predictors of pro-environmental behaviour rather than how to 
influence people to engage in more pro-environmental behaviour. Based on telephone 
surveys, the VBN model accounts for about 20% of the variance in private-sphere pro-
environmental behaviour, such as home energy conservation and recycling (Stern et al., 
1999). Stern (2000) acknowledges that many other contextual variables may contribute 
toward pro-environmental behaviour, and theories of environmental behaviour change 
still need development. 
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More specifically, the VBN model was developed as “a theory of the basis of 
support for a social movement” of pro-environmentalism (Stern et al., 1999, p. 81). 
Although the theory describes a social movement, the VBN model is comprised only of 
individual-level factors without any formal accounting of social factors. The “norm” in 
VBN refers to personal norms, which are more akin to habits than to social or group 
norms. The authors explain that personal norms are a part of self-concept while social 
norms are not: 
Personal norms rather than social norms are central because to the extent that 
movements are forces for social change, they cannot build support on existing 
social norms. … nearly every strain of the environmental movement actively 
engages with the policy system and is not content to confine itself to the 
politics of identity. (Stern et al., 1999, pp 83, 92).  
Stern et al. (1999) imply that identity processes are antagonistic to achieving policy 
goals. This understanding of norms and identity, as monolithic, static, and tangential to 
social movements, is fundamentally different from how they are conceptualised in the 
social identity approach. Although VBN theory does not address social factors directly, 
and appears to downplay their influence, Stern (2000) does identify gaps in theory 
regarding the context in which VBN occurs, and how people may be influenced to 
engage in pro-environmental behaviour.   
Conclusion 
 Environmental degradation such as climate change, loss of biodiversity, and 
dwindling natural resources are unprecedented threats to the well-being of both people 
and eco-systems. This degradation is the result of preventable human behaviours. While 
both environmental professionals and psychologists have been slow to realise 
psychology’s role in understanding these behaviours, psychology is increasingly being 
recognised as a necessary tool in preventing environmental destruction caused by 
human behaviours. 
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Psychological research into pro-environmental behaviour has been rooted in 
many different and sometimes overlapping theoretical models including informational, 
rational-economic, attitudinal, habituation, social dilemma, and normative models. With 
a few exceptions, most understandings of pro-environmental behaviour are focused on 
individual-level factors without accounting for social influences. Much of the research is 
focused on predictors of behaviour and behavioural outcomes rather than exploring the 
psychological process that leads to these outcomes. Despite attempts at theoretical 
integration, research into pro-environmental behaviour remains diverse in its theoretical 
background and psychological assumptions. The following chapter explores the utility 
of analysing environmental intentions as an interface between individual and social 
factors and then provides a review of the research literature of social identity theory and 
self-categorization theory. 
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– CHAPTER 2 – 
Environmental Behaviour as a Group-Level Outcome: 
The application of social identity and self-categorization theory 
 
 The previous chapter reviewed both environmental threats and several 
theoretical models for understanding environmental behaviour. A commonality of most 
prior research into environmental behaviour is that the primary unit of analysis focuses 
on the individual person. In this chapter, I propose that environmental behaviour can 
be understood from a group-level analysis, and start with a discussion of several 
reasons why environmental behaviour is particularly suited to be understood as 
embedded within social group processes. I then review social identity theory and self-
categorization theory. These two complementary meta-theories provide a framework 
for understanding the interface between social groups and their individual members. 
Finally, I review studies that have examined environmental behaviour at the group level. 
Environmental Behaviour as a Function of Social Group Processes 
 Psychologists have dedicated much research to understanding why people 
engage in particular behaviours, and generalised theories, such as the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991), have already been formulated to predict behavioural 
outcomes. Why do we need more specialised theorising for predicting environmental 
behaviour? First, these generalised theories leave the bulk of the variance unexplained 
in typical behaviours, about 73% for the TPB (Armitage & Conner, 2001), leaving 
considerable room for further psychological processes. Second, environmental 
behaviour is different from many other behaviours that psychologists have tried to 
predict and influence, such as wearing a seat-belt in a car. Unlike these examples, many 
aspects of environmental behaviour are socially embedded, which make it particularly 
suited for analysis from a perspective of social groups.  
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As reviewed in Chapter 1, attempting to influence public behaviours by 
changing individual attitudes or beliefs alone has had lacklustre success. Hornik (1989, 
1997) argues in the field of health psychology that if social forces are structured to 
make individual behavioural change difficult, individual cognitive changes are unlikely 
to be productive in eliciting behavioural change. Public, social changes must occur to 
accommodate behavioural change. Similarly, Ockwell, Whitmarsh, and O’Neill (2009) 
argue that top-down policies to force pro-environmental behaviour need to be balanced 
with bottom-up grass-roots movements that can provide the social support necessary 
for accepting top-down regulation and enduring personal behavioural change. 
Expanding on these ideas, there are several theoretical reasons why environmental 
behaviour is particularly well-suited to group-level analyses. 
Environmental Behaviour is Socially Relative 
Humans have always had an impact on the natural environment, even from 
prehistoric times. As human technology and population has grown, our impact has 
become much greater. This impact varies widely by time and region and has no 
standard or baseline value. Thus, the primary definition of what is “environmentally-
friendly” is often based on comparing one person’s or group’s impact to others. For 
example, in the UK, per capita CO2 emissions are 9.4 metric tons per year. Whether 
this is a lot or a little depends upon the comparator. In the US, per capita CO2 
emissions are 19 metric tons, while only 5.6 per capita metric tons of CO2 are released 
in Sweden (CDIAC, 2007). 
In social identity theory, this concept is known as comparative context. The 
values and norms that group members ascribe to themselves depend in part upon the 
comparator that is available. According to social identity theory, groups typically seek 
positive distinctiveness, and contrast their ingroup stereotypes away from salient 
outgroups to achieve this (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This was demonstrated empirically 
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when psychologists were asked to compare themselves to either dramatists or 
physicists, and then rate psychologists as a group as either artistic or scientific. When 
compared to dramatists, psychologists described themselves as more scientific, but 
when compared to physicists, psychologists claimed to be more artistic (Doosje, 
Haslam, Oakes, & Koomen, 1998). Thus, the stereotypes people hold about their own 
group depend upon the comparator. 
These social comparisons were demonstrated in the environmental domain by 
Rabinovich and colleagues (2008), which will be reviewed in greater detail below. 
Simple national comparisons, which made no mention of environmental performance, 
resulted in shifts of environmental self-stereotypes, value centrality, and behavioural 
intentions. By making these social comparisons, participants not only moved the goal 
posts of what counts as pro-environmental, but they changed their own behavioural 
goals as well. 
These types of social comparisons already occur on a regular basis, as the 
following recent newspaper headlines illustrate: “China overtakes US as no. 1 emitter of 
carbon dioxide”; “How China overtook the US in renewable energy”; and “The UK 
dumps more household waste into landfill sites than any other EU state.” At higher 
institutional levels, the 2009 Copenhagen Summit failed to reach a treaty amidst mutual 
accusations between developed and developing countries that the other side was not 
pulling their own environmental weight. Because environmental impact can be difficult 
to measure on the individual level, feedback is often presented in reference to social 
groups. Research on comparative context suggests these types of comparisons, which 
are common in the media and from politicians, can have a very real impact on how 
people perceive themselves and how they act, but much is still unknown about the 
extent of these effects.  
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Environmental Issues are Already Integrated with Existing Identities 
 Many environmentally relevant issues are expressions of existing personal and 
social identities. For example, owning a large car can be an identity expression of 
independence, social status, and wealth. A hybrid electric car is another high-status 
expression of identity of a different kind. Some pro-environmental behaviours, such as 
drying clothes on a line, are associated with low-status identities, Other behaviours, 
such as buying local, muddy, cosmetically imperfect vegetables, have undergone a shift 
from low-status to high-status over time. If a particular behaviour is incompatible with 
existing values and identity, it is unlikely to be adopted even if attitudes are positive and 
economic incentives are available (Schultz & Zelezney, 2003). 
 In addition to being expressions of personal identity, environmental issues can 
become interwoven with social identities. Opotow and Brook (2003; Brook, Zint, & De 
Young, 2003) interviewed ranchers in Colorado and Wyoming about an endangered 
species of mouse, the protection of which had become a source of conflict between 
ranchers and urban environmentalists. Both ranchers and urban environmentalists 
thought of themselves as more environmentally friendly than the other, and viewed the 
other as hypocritical and untrustworthy. As the conflict grew, sound environmental 
messages were dismissed because they originated from the mistrusted outgroup (Brook 
et al., 2003; Opotow & Brook, 2003), putting an endangered species at greater risk 
because of conflict social groups. Since outgroup messages are typically not as trusted 
(Hornsey & Imani, 2004; Rabinovich & Morton, 2010), behavioural fragmentation 
along social lines can have real consequences for whether beneficial advice is followed 
and practices are implemented. 
Perhaps the most well known convergence of environmental issues and social 
identities is the case of political parties in America today. Democrats and Republicans 
once had similar views on the environment and climate change. The Environmental 
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Protection Agency was started by a Republican president, and in 1997, equal numbers 
of Democrats and Republicans said the effects of global warming were beginning to 
occur (Gallup, 2008). As time went on, the environment became increasingly 
politicised, and Democrats are now three times as likely as Republicans to say the 
environment should be a national priority (Pew, 2009), and three times less likely to say 
climate change is exaggerated in the media (Gallup, 2009). As of 2008, 76% of 
Democrats believed global warming was occurring while only 41% of Republicans 
believed so (see Figure 2.1; Gallup, 2008). Thus, political party identity has facilitated 
not just a difference in environmental priorities, but a difference in the perception of 
the environmental reality itself, and belief in climate change is becoming a shibboleth of 
American partisan identity. This polarisation of the environment is not a simple aspect 
of liberalism or conservatism, as differences of this extremity did not occur in 
America’s past and are not found in other nations today, such as the UK (Carter, 2006). 
However, as demonstrated by Rabinovich and colleagues (2008), British people are 
already integrating a certain standard of environmental behaviour into their national 
self-concept that, though malleable to context, has the power to shape values and 
behaviour. Considering the above, pro-environmental intervention approaches which 
do not acknowledge the contours of existing social identities are unlikely to be 
successful, while approaches which harness the power of existing social groups are 
more likely to be successful. 
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Figure 2.1. Percentage of Americans agreeing that “the effects of global warming have 
already begun” by political party and year from Gallup (2008). Data for 1998 to 2000 
are not available. 
 
Environmental Issues are Often Ambiguous, Making Them Susceptible to Group Norms 
 As the state of the natural environment has risen to public consciousness, so 
have an increasingly large number of environmentally relevant issues and behaviours. 
The public is now confronted with complex questions of climatology and ecology as 
well as what type of lightbulbs to buy and whether one should bring their own bags on 
shopping trips. To many, these questions are novel and the answers are ambiguous, an 
aspect of environmental issues that was discussed in Chapter 1. The interpretation of 
these ambiguous questions occurs in part through social reality testing. To help 
interpret this new information, people rely on the shared opinions of similar others, 
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derived through observation and social interaction. In other words, people rely on 
group norms. 
 Group norms facilitate behaviour by providing information about how to act. 
As people learn through observing and interacting with similar others, they learn the 
technical prerequisites of enacting behaviours, such as knowing how to install a low-
flow shower head. People also learn which behaviours are expected within the group. 
This is referent informational influence, which communicates which actions are socially 
expected of group members and how to achieve them (Turner, 1991). Empirical testing 
suggests that when individual are uncertain, they rely on group norms to guide their 
behaviours even more than usual (J. Smith, Hogg, Martin, & Terry, 2007). Because the 
science of environmental issues is often beyond the lay public’s experience, group 
norms may be especially informative in interpreting their validity. Likewise, as 
environmentally relevant behaviours are often unfamiliar, people rely on their peers to 
find out what they should be doing and how to do it. As many environmental issues are 
already embedded into social identities, the notion of which environmental beliefs and 
behaviours are appropriate can become stratified by social definitions. 
Environmental Degradation is a Shared Problem Best Addressed Collectively 
Environmental problems, by their global nature, suggest a group-level response. 
Individuals may choose to live more sustainably, but even a few people can have a large 
environmental impact through activities such as over-fishing, illegal logging, or toxic 
contamination. As discussed in Chapter 1, many environmental issues are challenging 
to resolve because they are social dilemmas, where individual gains can lead to 
collective losses (Hardin, 1968). Because of this, environmentally harmful behaviours 
may be beneficial to individuals while the costs are externalised to others. When too 
many people engage in these harmful behaviours, the collective losses accumulate to 
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outweigh the individual benefits. Only through cooperation do participants reach a 
mutually beneficial outcome. 
In laboratory experiments, a strong sense of social identification can help to 
boost cooperation in social dilemmas (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Edney, 1980; Kramer, 
1991; Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Van Vugt & De Cremer, 1999). Social identity theorists 
suggest this occurs as self-concept expands from a concern for individual welfare to 
group welfare (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Empirical testing confirms that 
the increase in cooperation associated with strong social identification does occur 
through a process of goal-transformation as predicted, where a desire for individual 
well-being is expanded to a desire for collective well-being (De Cremer & Van Vugt, 
1999).  
Casting environmental problems within a framework of shared identity may be 
an effective strategy at encouraging pro-environmental behaviours, particularly in 
situations where environmentally harmful behaviour is personally rewarding. In support 
of this, people with a strong regional identity have already been found to engage in 
more pro-environmental behaviour to protect not only their local region (Carrus, 
Bonaiuto, & Bonnes, 2005; Stedman, 2002) but also the world as a whole (Pol, Moreno, 
Guàrdia, & Iniguez, 2002; Uzzell, Pol, & Badenas, 2002; Valera & Guàrdia, 2002; Vaske 
& Kobrin, 2001). Exploiting a shared sense of identity may be requisite to engaging 
with these types of shared problems. 
To explore the social aspects of environmental behaviour further, two theories 
of social group processes are reviewed below. Social identity theory provides a 
theoretical analysis for how social groups interact with each other, while self-
categorization theory provides an account of how individuals come to see themselves as 
group members. These broad theories offer a framework for group processes that allow 
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us to better understand how people come to identify with social groups, how groups 
perceive each other, and how groups guide individuals’ values and behaviours. 
Social Identity Theory 
Social identity theory (SIT) was formulated out of a desire to better understand 
how group identities drive individual thoughts and behaviours. Prior theories of group 
psychology were not scientifically grounded (e.g., LeBon, 1895) and had become 
unpopular among many social psychologists. Prevailing theories of the time emphasised 
individual differences and did not view groups as different from individuals (Steiner, 
1974). Influential psychologists like Floyd Allport (1924, 1962) flatly rejected the notion 
that social groups were psychologically different than the sum of their members, 
describing this approach as the “group fallacy.” However, the extremes of prejudice 
and discrimination of the mid-twentieth century were not easily explainable by 
individual-level theories and psychologists were prompted to investigate group-level 
processes in greater depth. 
 Social identity theory research began with the “minimal groups” experimental 
paradigm, in which participants are arbitrarily assigned to groups that have little overt 
meaning. In these studies, participants were often observed to favour the ingroup, 
ensuring that the ingroup was better rewarded than the outgroup, even if that meant a 
loss in terms of the absolute reward the ingroup received (Tajfel, Flament, Billig, & 
Bundy, 1971). Participants prioritised doing better than the other group over 
maximising the ingroup’s success, even when it meant the participants were losing real 
money. This same finding has been observed with employees who prefer to take a 
lower salary if it means making more than a competing group of employees (Brown, 
1978).  
 In trying to understand participants’ motivations in the minimal group studies, 
Tajfel (1974) theorised that when people are categorized as group members, they 
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internalise that membership as a part of their self-concept and form a shared group 
identity. People want their group to have positive distinctiveness, which acts as a source 
of self-esteem. In essence, the group’s success becomes their own success. The desire 
to think positively about ingroups is supported by findings that participants rate 
members of their own minimal group as kinder and fairer than the outgroup, even 
when the group membership assignments are random and they do not know who they 
are rating (Brewer & Silver, 1978; Doise et al., 1972). Similarly, workers tend to rate 
their department’s role as more valuable than the role of other departments (Ashforth 
& Mael, 1989; Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade, & Williams, 1986). 
 Tajfel and Turner (1974) found that groups often engage in social competition, 
seeking to outdo each other on varying dimensions of success. Inevitably, groups do 
not always fare well in these competitions, and sometimes one’s group will be a “loser.” 
To balance psychological motives for positive identity with negative feedback about 
one’s group, people often engage in a number of identity maintenance strategies. For 
example, when faced with lower group status, individual group members might engage 
in social creativity (Tajfel, 1974), a redefinition of success, by either comparing 
themselves on a more flattering metric or comparing themselves against an even lower-
performing outgroup. Upon losing a sports game, a team captain may tell team 
members, “We may not have won, but we were better sportsmen and that is what really 
counts,” shifting the metric of success. Another team member might say, “And, hey, 
we’re nowhere near as bad as that other team we played last week,” changing the 
comparison group to be more positive. If group boundaries are permeable, members 
may also pursue a strategy of individual mobility (Doosje & Ellemers, 1997; Spears, 
Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997); in the sports analogy, that would be trying out for a spot on 
the winning team. 
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 Social identity theorists propose that social identity is much more than just a 
facilitator of ingroup bias or the rationalisation of group failures, but rather it is the 
mechanism through with organized group behaviour is made possible (Haslam, 2004; 
Haslam, Postmes, & Ellemers, 2003; Turner, 1991). Mutual social influence through 
shared identity allows group members to construct similar social realities and work 
toward common goals. Self-categorization theory, an extension of social identity theory, 
elaborates on how this process of social influence occurs. 
Self-Categorization Theory 
While social identity theory offers a comprehensive account of how social 
groups interact, it does not explain how individuals come to identify with particular 
social groups. Self-categorization theory (SCT) was developed to fill this theoretical gap 
(Turner, 1991; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). According to SCT, 
our self-concept occupies a movable point on a continuum from personal identity to 
social identity. When personal identity is salient, people act more in line with their 
individual self-concept. As self-concept moves closer to social identity and away from 
personal identity, people self-stereotype themselves more as an interchangeable group 
member and will begin to think and act more as a prototypical group member, a 
process called depersonalisation. As depersonalisation occurs, group members see both 
ingroup and outgroup members as more homogenous. Group norms are especially 
influential in intergroup contexts where depersonalisation is high (Hogg & Turner, 
1987; Simon, Glässner-Bayerl, & Stratenwerth, 1991). 
 Many possible social identities are available to each person, but typically only 
one is salient at any given time. The salient identity is determined in part through the 
principle of meta-contrast, which proposes that categories form by cohering entities 
with the smallest differences relative to the largest differences, achieving comparative fit 
(Hogg, Turner, & Davidson, 1990; Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Turner, 1991). For 
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example, when a Scottish person meets an English person, the Scottish identity may be 
most salient for the Scottish person, but if the two of them meet a Greek person, the 
two may both share a salient British identity (Hopkins, Regan, & Abell, 1997). If the 
three of them meet a Chinese person, the three may share a salient European identity, 
but if the four of them happened to meet a Vulcan, the human identity may be most 
salient. Thus, the type of identity that is salient and its level of abstraction depend upon 
the comparator, with outgroup comparisons designed to achieve maximal 
differentiation between groups (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997). While social 
identities have some enduring cognitive structure, their interpretation and salience shifts 
depending on context, and can include several complex, overlapping identities (Abrams, 
Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990; Roccas & Brewer, 2002).  
 Normative fit also plays a role in identity salience. When the content of group 
comparisons is compatible with existing identity stereotypes, the relevant identities are 
more likely to become salient. For example, if during a work break, an English worker 
has some tea and biscuits while their French co-worker has cheese and a baguette, their 
national identities are more likely to be salient than if they had both just had 
sandwiches. When the comparison content is counter-stereotypical, such as a deadpan 
drama teacher or a comedic physicist, these identities are less likely to be salient. 
Likewise, if the point of comparison is perceived to be irrelevant to a particular identity, 
such as comparing shoe sizes by employer, the salience of that social identity is likely to 
be low. 
 Irrespective of contextual variations in salience, some people will define 
themselves more in terms of a given identity. Strength of identification therefore plays a 
large role in how social identities will be interpreted. People who identify strongly with 
a group are more likely to think and act in terms of group norms (Jetten, Postmes, & 
McAuliffe, 2002; McAuliffe, Jetten, Hornsey & Hogg, 2003). Strength of identification 
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also moderates how people respond when their group is under threat, such as a threat 
of being outperformed (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), a threat to the group’s moral integrity 
(Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999), or a threat to group distinctiveness 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979). When group threat is absent, low-identifiers tend to be non-
involved with that particular identity, while high-identifiers express their group identity 
(Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1999; Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1999). When a group 
threat confronts low-identifiers, they are likely to distance themselves from the group, 
emphasise the group’s heterogeneity, and pursue individual mobility from the group 
(Doosje & Ellemers, 1997; Jetten et al., 2002; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997; but see 
also Packer, 2008; Morton, Postmes, & Jetten, 2006). Conversely, high-identifiers 
typically respond to group threats by rallying and “digging in” to their group identity, 
affirming the group’s cohesiveness and norms (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999). 
Since its development, the social identity approach has been explored in 
thousands of studies (e.g., Haslam, 2004). Because it explores group-level processes, it 
offers a theoretical perspective that is unique from dominant individual-level 
paradigms. The social identity approach has been used to study stereotyping, 
discrimination, politics, negotiation, organisational psychology, and other domains, 
providing practical applications to real-world dilemmas. However, to date, relatively 
little research has explored environmental behaviours from this perspective. 
Nonetheless, a number of areas of research have considered the role of group 
processes in environmental behaviour, specifically group norms and intergroup 
comparisons. 
Prior Research into Social Groups and Environmental Behaviour 
In Chapter 1’s review of traditional approaches to conceptualising 
environmental behaviour, normative models of influence were discussed. In these 
models, norms are conceptualised as monolithic, external influences from society that 
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pressure individuals into conformity. A number of theorists consider this theorisation 
to be an inadequate conceptualisation of how norms influence behaviour. According to 
the social identity perspective, social influence primarily occurs internally as people 
identify with particular social groups, instead of through a notion of generalised societal 
pressure from outside sources (Turner, 1991). From this perspective, broad societal 
subjective norms are relatively unimportant, while group norms are important. One can 
easily think of several subcultures which are characterised by a simultaneous rejection 
of societal norms and conformity to group norms; for example, the punk rock 
counterculture of the 1970s shared a rejection of societal standards of appropriate 
appearance, language, and music, while also showing conformity to punk rock group 
norms among self-identified members. Outgroup norms are mostly ineffectual in 
influencing ingroup members (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1996). Given that most early 
studies of norms took no account of these critical social nuances, the low predictive 
power of subjective norms is unsurprising. 
 Applying the social identity perspective to norms, and conceptualising them at 
the group level rather than societal level, has revealed them to have much more 
predictive power than once thought. Individual attitudes, which have long been 
considered as weak predictors of behaviour, become much better predictors when they 
are reinforced by a supportive group-level norm (Smith & Louis, 2009; Terry & Hogg, 
1996; Terry, Hogg, & McKimmie, 2000). In respect to environmental behaviours, this 
effect has been demonstrated with recycling (Terry, Hogg, & White, 1999), sustainable 
farming methods (Fielding, Terry, Masser, & Hogg, 2008), and pro-environmental 
activism (Fielding, McDonald, & Louis, 2008). Group norms are particularly influential 
when subjective uncertainty is high (Smith et al., 2007) and when both group 
descriptive norms (what group members are doing) and injunctive norms (what group 
members say they should be doing) are consistent, while outgroup norms are ineffective 
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(Smith & Louis, 2008). Researchers have also realised that relying purely on self-report 
measures of normative influence is unreliable, as people routinely underestimate the 
extent that they are influenced by norms (Cialdini, 2005; Nolan, Schultz, Cialdini, 
Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2008). These theoretical refinements have lifted normative 
influence from being considered a weak predictor to a powerful moderator of how 
individual- and group-level factors interact to predict behaviour. While norms at the 
broadest level have not been very predictive of behaviour, the interaction between 
specific norms and individual-level factors like attitudes has greatly improved the 
predictive power of normative models of behaviour.  
While several studies have examined the effects of broad normative influence 
and individual comparisons on environmental behaviours (see Chapter 1), few have 
looked at comparisons of social groups. Comparisons are important because this is a 
mechanism through which group identity and norms are construed. Based on the social 
identity approach, the cognitive processes that occur for group comparisons may be 
different from individual comparisons. To investigate the effects of group comparisons, 
Siero, Bakker, Dekker, and van den Burg (1996) designed a 20-week longitudinal study 
to look at the effect of group feedback on energy-saving behaviour in two Dutch 
metallurgical factories. Both factories received feedback about their own performance, 
but one factory also received comparative feedback about the other factory. They 
theorised that receiving this comparative feedback would activate the group’s social 
identity and encourage social competition. Although Siero and colleagues did not 
investigate any underlying processes that might drive behaviour, their results supported 
their predictions, and the group receiving comparative feedback saved significantly 
more energy. These savings continued for more than six months after the end of the 
study and the feedback, suggesting that the changes in behaviour had become 
internalised. Interestingly, the participants’ pro-environmental attitudes were 
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unchanged, supporting the notion that group rather than individual processes led to the 
change in behaviour.  
Siero and colleagues (1996) conclude that social competitions may be a 
promising way to encourage pro-environmental behaviour. Their results are supported 
by social identity theory; however, social identity theory also suggests an alternative 
outcome. Had the group been performing poorly, they may have engaged in social 
creativity instead of social competition, downplaying the importance of pro-
environmental behaviours. In this case, competition can backfire, leading some to 
disengage from the desired behaviour. Unfortunately, Siero and colleagues’ 
methodological constraints leave this possibility unexplored. 
To examine social comparisons more thoroughly, Rabinovich, Morton, 
Postmes, and Verplanken (2008) designed an orthogonally balanced test of group 
comparisons. British participants compared themselves to either American or Swedish 
people, but were not given any environmental information about national groups. The 
authors reasoned that British self-stereotypes would be informed by differentiation 
from the outgroup, which would lead to a shift in environmental values and 
behavioural intentions. After comparing themselves to Americans, participants rated 
themselves as valuing the environment more and intending to engage in more pro-
environmental behaviour. The reverse occurred when compared to the Swedish. 
Mediation analysis confirmed that the change in behavioural intentions was mediated 
by self-stereotyping and environmental value centrality. This negative effect on 
intentions is an important complement to Siero and colleagues’ (1996) study, as it 
demonstrates that competition can lead to less of the desired behaviour rather than 
more. Participants appeared to be inferring the norms of their group by contrasting 
away from the outgroup and then engaging with those norms. This is a different 
process from individual-level comparisons; when Schultz and colleagues (2007) 
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provided people with descriptive comparisons about their energy usage, positive 
comparisons led to a decrease in behaviour, rather than the increase found with group 
comparisons. These diverging results underline the importance of differentiating 
between individual- and group-level processes. 
Although prior research on social group comparisons and environmental 
behaviour has been limited, existing research demonstrates that social group-based 
comparisons offer the potential for real behavioural change. These studies, while 
promising in their results, leave open many new avenues of future research. In the 
following chapter, I expand on these ideas by providing a rationale and proposal for a 
series of research studies to further investigate the role of social influence in guiding 
environmentally-relevant behaviours. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter began with a discussion of why environmental behaviour lends 
itself to a group-level understanding for several reasons: environmental impact is 
defined through social comparisons, environmental values are already integrated into 
existing social identities, environmental issues’ complex and ambiguous nature mean 
that group norms may be especially influential, and because a collective, group-level 
effort may be necessary to overcome this type of collective problem. Following this, I 
reviewed social identity theory, which explains how social groups perceive and interact 
with each other, and self-categorization theory, which explains how particular social 
identities become salient to individuals, depending on context. I then reviewed 
experimental research that tested social identity principles in fostering pro-
environmental behaviours through group norms and group comparisons. These studies 
were able to influence environmental behaviours or behavioural intentions as predicted. 
However, despite their success in achieving behavioural change, these studies leave 
many empirical questions open with ground for further research. The following chapter 
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presents a rationale for the present research, expanding on how social comparisons 
influence environmental behaviour, and outlines the structure of the empirical studies 
that will follow. 
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– CHAPTER 3 – 
Rationale and Structure of the Thesis 
 
 Substantial research has been conducted to understand and predict 
environmental behaviour. The most common theoretical frameworks of understanding 
environmental behaviour include investigating individual knowledge, personal 
economic benefit, personal attitudes, habits, and personal/societal norms (see Chapter 
1). While all of these approaches have contributed to the understanding of 
environmental behaviour, most studies have relatively low predictive power of pro-
environmental behaviour, and even less power for influencing it. In most 
conceptualisations of these theories, psychological variables are understood primarily at 
the individual level (e.g., the attitudes of individual people). While social influences are 
often acknowledged as playing some role in environmental behaviour, with a few 
exceptions, they are rarely studied empirically or with robust theorising about nuanced 
social processes. 
 Advances in social identity theory and self-categorization theory have shown 
that social influences can be powerful determinants of behaviour (see Chapter 2). 
According to the social identity approach, when a self-defining group membership is 
salient, group members tend to think and act less as autonomous individuals and more 
in ways that are influenced by group norms and stereotypes. Thus, a salient sense of 
shared identity leads to coordinated, collective behaviour. When group membership is 
meaningful in an enduring, rather than simply situational, sense, group traits can also 
become internalised as individual traits. Applied to subjects like organisational 
psychology, prejudice, and politics, the social identity approach has provided a unique 
and valuable perspective.  
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Rationale for the Present Research 
 While prior understandings of environmental behaviour have been informative, 
they leave much to be explained, both theoretically and behaviourally. I believe applying 
a social identity perspective will help fill this research gap. For several reasons, 
environmental behaviour is a social behaviour. Because there is no baseline standard of 
behaviour, people look to similar others to determine what behaviours are “normal.” 
Environmental attitudes and behaviours are already incorporated into many social 
identities, such as political parties in the United States. Because many environmental 
issues are novel and ambiguous, people may rely on group norms more than usual. 
Because environmental problems are often shared problems, a communal approach 
may be necessary to solving these problems effectively. While a few studies have 
applied social identity principles to understanding environmental behaviour and 
achieved promising results (Fielding, McDonald, & Louis, 2008; Fielding, Terry, 
Masser, & Hogg, 2008; Rabinovich, Morton, Postmes, & Verplanken, 2008; Terry, 
Hogg, & White, 1999), many aspects of environmental behaviour are still unexplored. 
This gap in the research literature is fertile ground for an in-depth investigation 
of both the social determinants of environmental behaviour and social identity 
principles. The aim of this research is to understand how the interplay of both social 
group membership and individual attributes together affect environmental behaviour. 
Throughout this thesis, I will test several hypotheses to investigate this interplay, 
specifically focusing on how group comparisons work through social identity processes 
to guide individuals’ behaviour. My overarching predictions are that 1) social group 
comparisons can be used to deduce the content of the group identity, implying 
particular environmental norms; 2) group members with high levels of social 
identification are more likely to assimilate toward the implied group norm than low-
identifiers; 3) discussion within a group also works to guide behaviour, by inducting 
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group norms based on the content of the discussion; and 4) comparisons within a 
group over time also work to guide individuals’ environmental behaviour, but through a 
different process than comparisons between groups. The empirical chapters of this 
thesis are outlined below. This thesis is designed so that the chapters can be read as 
stand-alone manuscripts and as an integrated whole. Consequently, there is some 
repetition in the content of the chapters, particularly in introducing the background 
research literature. 
Chapter 4: Strength of Social Identification and Comparative Feedback 
 One of the primary assertions in this thesis is that comparative group feedback 
can alter individual intentions and behaviours. I believe this will occur because 
deductive comparisons give meaning to the content of a social identity, implying certain 
group norms (Doosje, Haslam, Oakes, & Koomen, 1998). A positive intergroup 
comparison implies that pro-environmental behaviour is defining of identity, while a 
negative intergroup comparison implies the opposite. According to the social identity 
approach, when a particular identity is salient, group members typically seek to act more 
like a prototypical group member, and are more likely to follow the norms of that 
group (Turner, 1991). Thus, in Chapter 4 I examine the effect of comparative group 
feedback on environmental behaviour over time. I predict that intergroup comparisons 
will lead members to assimilate their environmental behaviour toward the implied 
norm. 
 However, according to social identity theory, assimilation to the implied 
standards of a group should only occur to the extent that the individual identifies with 
the relevant group. If social identity processes guide individual responses to group-level 
comparative feedback, the effects of comparison should be moderated by individual 
differences in identification. Specifically, positive comparative feedback, which suggests 
that pro-environmental behaviour is defining of the group, should lead highly identified 
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group members to follow this implied norm by individually reporting more positive 
behavioural intentions. Conversely, negative feedback about one’s group suggests that 
environmental concerns are less identity-defining and should result in highly identified 
group members following that implied norm by reducing environmental intentions. 
Less identified group members should be less likely to follow the group norms implied 
by comparative feedback, because such feedback does not connect to their sense of 
self. Through testing these predictions I aim to provide evidence that group-level 
comparisons guide individual environmental behaviour, and that these effects are 
guided by social identity processes (i.e., moderated by identification).  
Chapter 5: Inductive Norm Formation Through Small-Group Interaction  
 While the deductive, or top-down, comparisons that are explored in Chapter 4 
have been the backbone of much prior social identity research, newer theoretical 
models suggest inductive, or bottom-up, small-group interaction plays just as important 
a role in group norm formation (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005). Discussing and 
reaching consensus about a topic is a way for people to interpret otherwise ambiguous 
realities, and serves to solidify group norms regarding the subject of discussion. In a 
number of studies, the content of small-group discussion has been found to play a 
powerful role in guiding behaviours such as discrimination (L. Smith & Postmes, 2009, 
L. Smith & Postmes, 2010a), overcoming stereotype threat (L. Smith & Postmes, 
2010b), and pro-human rights activism (McGarty, Khalaf, Blink, Gee, & Stone, 2007; 
Thomas & McGarty, 2009). However, despite compelling results in other domains, the 
power of discussion to guide behaviour remains mostly untested in regard to pro-
environmental behaviours. 
 In Chapter 5, I attempt to fill this gap in the research literature by examining 
how small-group discussion informs pro-environmental behaviour. I predict that 
interactive processes that occur within small groups can (a) override the deductive 
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effects of intergroup comparisons explored in Chapter 4, and (b) provide a stronger 
basis for individual action. To explore this, the design used in Chapter 4 is replicated, 
but participants interacted with each other following the comparative feedback. The 
expectation was that the content of these discussions would guide subsequent 
behaviour more strongly, and more enduringly, than the comparative feedback 
information. Through testing these predictions, previous insights into the effects of 
intergroup comparisons may be supplemented with an appreciation of the power of 
intragroup processes in shaping behaviour.  
Chapter 6: Intergroup and Intragroup Comparisons  
 The social comparisons studied in Chapters 4 and 5 have all been targeted at 
other groups. However, intergroup comparisons are not the only form of comparative 
information that is relevant to defining social identity. Instead, social identity may be 
defined through comparisons within the group (e.g., with its past) as well as 
comparisons with other groups. Theory suggests that these two forms of comparison 
(intragroup versus intergroup) are likely to be very different psychologically. While 
comparisons between groups serve to distinguish and contrast the ingroup from others, 
comparisons within a group are informative about the group’s own standards of 
performance. Chapter 6 investigates the unique consequences of these different 
comparisons. While intergroup comparisons are likely to lead to contrast away from the 
comparison standard (as tested in Chapter 4), intragroup comparisons might instead 
lead to assimilation toward the comparison standard. Furthermore, in addition to 
having different consequences, these different comparison types are likely to operate 
through different psychological processes. Comparisons between groups focus on the 
difference between the ingroup and outgroup, and contextually defines the ingroup’s 
values in contrast to the outgroup’s, resulting in influence via self-stereotyping 
(Rabinovich et al., 2008). However, comparisons to the ingroup’s past behaviour are 
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likely to focus more on the ingroup itself, and any discrepancies between actual 
performance and the group’s standards of performance, leading to influence via 
appraisals of shared responsibility for addressing behavioural discrepancies with past 
standards. In testing these predictions, I aim to explicitly compare the nature and 
effects of inter- versus intra-group processes in guiding individual environmental 
action.  
Chapter 7: General Discussion 
 Throughout this research, I find support for each of the over-arching 
predictions in this thesis. In Chapter 7, I integrate and discuss the findings from across 
the three empirical chapters. The consistent theme from these results is that people 
respond to group-level feedback when forming their environmental intentions, but this 
occurs in a nuanced way that is moderated by the context of the feedback and the 
strength of identification with the social group. Some of these effects were relatively 
powerful, continuing to influence behaviour several days after the experimental 
manipulation. From these results, I suggest practical interventions to promote pro-
environmental behaviour, using both group comparisons and within-group interaction. 
While social processes have the power to increase environmental behaviour, they can 
also decrease it, requiring careful attention for these techniques to be implemented 
successfully. Given that most approaches within conservation psychology have focused 
on individuals’ attributes and have had only modest success in predicting environmental 
behaviour, I suggest that widening the theoretical scope to account for the interplay 
between individual and social factors will allow for a richer and more productive 
understanding of pro-environmental behaviour. 
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– CHAPTER 4 – 
The Interaction of Environmental Group Feedback and Social Identification Strength 
 
Prioritisation of care for the natural environment has become increasingly 
bound up with issues of identity. Newspaper headlines inform us of how much our 
nation pollutes compared to others and what kind of lifestyles use the most or least 
energy. Because producing feedback about the pro-environmental behaviours of 
individuals is often impractical, environmental feedback often targets the places we live 
and the social groups in which we are members. As this trend of associating 
environmental issues with social groups increases, people increasingly respond to 
environmental dilemmas through the lens of group membership. 
 Perhaps the most visible example of identity’s influence upon environmental 
behaviour is political identity in the United States, particularly regarding climate change. 
In 2008, only 41% of self-identified Republicans believed climate change was starting to 
occur, compared to 76% of Democrats (Gallup, 2008). When considering whether the 
risks of climate change are exaggerated, Republicans say yes three times as frequently as 
Democrats, 66% and 22% (Gallup, 2009). Likewise, regarding the environment more 
generally, a 2009 poll found that citizens who identify as Democrats are nearly three 
times more likely than Republicans to say addressing environmental should be a top 
priority for the nation (Pew, 2009). Thus political identities clearly inform individual 
beliefs about environmental issues.  
However, the political identity gap in environmental beliefs is only a recent 
development. The United States’ National Park and National Forest systems were 
created by Republican president Theodore Roosevelt in 1916, a man known for his 
cowboy image, while Republican president Richard Nixon founded the Environmental 
Protection Agency in 1970. As recently as 1997, polls found no difference in belief in 
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climate change by political party, with 47% of self-identified Republicans and 46% of 
Democrats claiming climate change was beginning to occur (Gallup, 2008). Thus recent 
polarisation around environmental issues is not a simple aspect of the left-right political 
spectrum, and a corresponding political schism of this extreme is not apparent in other 
parts of the world, such as the UK (Carter, 2006). 
Even when two social groups value the environment, their mutual antagonism 
can leave pro-environmental behaviour as the victim. In the case of rural ranchers and 
urban environmentalists in the western United States, both groups tend to see 
themselves as defenders of nature and the other as hypocritical and untrustworthy. 
Because of conflict between these two groups who both claim to care for the 
environment, particular pro-environmental behaviours have become stigmatised within 
one group because the other group endorses them, and the survival of a threatened 
species is at further risk as a result (Brook, Zint, & De Young, 2003; Opotow & Brook, 
2003). Even when one group has a sound environmental message to deliver, it may be 
dismissed by people who consider the message source to be an outgroup (Louis & 
Smith, 2007 as cited in Smith & Louis, 2009). As such, identity can have very real 
consequences for the natural environment. 
Identity and Pro-Environmental Behaviour 
 Identity has been a feature of research into pro-environmental behaviour, and 
has spurred a wide range of research, particularly regarding identity with the 
environment itself and identity with a particular place or region (see Clayton & 
Opotow, 2003 for a full review). Identity very often involves an extension of the 
individuals’ concept of self beyond their physical person. Whether identity takes the 
form of extending the self to include a place, role, or social group, all of these have the 
power to promote pro-environmental behaviour because environmental issues often pit 
individual short-term interests against long-term or collective interests (Hardin, 1968). 
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Expansion of the personal self through various identities may be a particularly powerful 
motivator in influencing pro-environmental behaviour (Dickinson, 2009) because this 
should reduce the gap between individual and collective concerns. As the sense of self 
becomes broader and collective groups become more influential to the self, 
externalising environmental costs to others is no longer a viable strategy. 
In support of this idea, a strong regional identity or place attachment is often 
related to pro-environmental behaviours aimed at protecting both their place of 
attachment (Carrus, Bonaiuto, & Bonnes, 2005; Stedman, 2002) and the world more 
generally (Pol, Moreno, Guàrdia, & Iniguez, 2002; Uzzell, Pol, & Badenas, 2002; Valera 
& Guàrdia, 2002; Vaske & Kobrin, 2001). However, having a strong sense of regional 
identity can also lead people to perceive existing environmental problems in their 
locality as being less severe, compared to those less strongly identified (Bonaiuto, 
Breakwell, & Cano, 1996). Strong identification with a place can lead people to be more 
concerned and vigilant to threats against it, but also blind to seeing its own blemishes. 
 Less studied in regards to pro-environmental behaviour is social identity. 
According to the social identity approach, (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, 
Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), people belong to many different social groups, 
such as those defined by their place of work, school, or nationality. Social groups 
provide their members with information about the normative behaviour for group 
members. As people see themselves more in terms of group membership, they tend to 
act more in line with these group norms, stereotyping themselves as a group member 
and acting more as a prototypical group member would act. Prior research has found 
that social identity can play a facilitative role in encouraging pro-environmental 
behaviour. When social group norms complement individuals’ environmental attitudes, 
those attitudes become much better predictors of pro-environmental behaviour 
(Mannetti, Piero, & Livi, 2004; Terry, Hogg, & White, 1999) and pro-environmental 
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behaviours become more common in general (Hogg & Smith, 2007; Smith, Terry, 
Crosier, & Duck, 2005). From this perspective, social identity is the mechanism 
through which other people, specifically ingroup members, can become a powerful 
influence on individual behaviours, via the internalisation of group norms. However, 
this form of social influence only occurs when group membership is psychologically 
real and the social identity is strong. In this sense, literal group membership is irrelevant 
in determining behaviour, ceding the power of social influence to perceptions of identity. 
This potential discrepancy between literal group membership and the strength of social 
identity can determine whether norms will encourage behaviour, be ineffectual, or 
backfire altogether. 
Social Identification Strength and Pro-Environmental Behaviour 
 In some cases, such as opinion-based groups, membership is highly permeable 
and determined only by members’ shared beliefs, such as groups based on shared 
values like the civil rights movement (Bliuc, McGarty, Reynolds, & Muntele, 2007). In 
other cases, when group boundaries are less permeable, members have barriers to 
leaving a group they do not identify with. For example, a worker may dislike their 
employer, but remain in the group because they need an income. In these cases, group 
members with low group identity may choose to leave the group symbolically, but not 
literally, by engaging in counter-normative behaviours to distance themselves from the 
undesirable group.  
High-identifiers typically seek to assimilate toward group norms through a 
process of self-stereotyping as a prototypical group member (Turner, 1991). Low-
identifiers, on the other hand, are less likely to self-stereotype themselves as group 
members. As a result, low-identifiers may show non-involvement toward group norms, 
or may even make a point of contrasting away from those norms (Ellemers, Spears, & 
Doosje, 1997; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002; Lapinski, Rimal, DeVries, & Lee, 
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2007). Although the divergence in how high- and low- identifiers respond to group 
norms has long been established by self-categorization theory, recent research into 
identity processes and environmental behaviours has confirmed empirically that 
ingroup stereotyping is a mediator through which group norms predict behaviour 
(Rabinovich, Morton, Postmes, & Verplanken, 2008).  
As social identity salience increases, the strength of these effects may also 
increase. One way in which social identity salience is increased is through intergroup 
comparisons. In a series of studies where participants described their own national 
stereotypes either before or after describing another nation’s stereotypes, the simple act 
of intergroup comparison sharpened stereotyping consensus considerably, therefore 
converging on the content of ingroup norms (Haslam et al., 1998; Haslam, Oakes, 
Reynolds, & Turner, 1999; see also Sani & Thomson, 2001). Thus, intergroup 
comparisons can act to increase social identity salience, accentuating ingroup norms, 
and the extent to which high-identifiers will self-stereotype these norms. 
Threats to the group, such as criticism or negative feedback, may have a similar 
effect in moderating how low- and high-identifiers act regarding group norms. Threats 
to the group often involve an intergroup comparison with an outgroup who appears to 
be superior on some measure of performance or morality, or whose identity is too 
similar to the ingroup’s, which threatens the status or distinctiveness of the ingroup 
identity. When a group is under threat, high-identifiers tend to “dig in,” express group 
solidarity, and enforce group norms. Low-identifiers tend to pursue a strategy of 
disengagement and dissociation from the group, emphasizing the group’s heterogeneity 
and therefore decreasing the applicability of the criticism to themselves (Doosje & 
Ellemers, 1997; Jetten, Postmes, & McAuliffe, 2002; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997; 
but see also Packer, 2008; Morton, Postmes, & Jetten, 2006).  
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The Present Research 
 The present studies investigate both the role of identity and intergroup 
comparisons on pro-environmental behaviours. This is assessed by measuring student 
participants’ social identity with their university, providing participants with 
environmental feedback about how students at their university are doing as a whole, 
and measuring pro-environmental behaviours. 
I predict that those with a strong social identity with their university would 
assimilate toward the group norm implied by the feedback. If the university is portrayed 
as having a poor environmental track record, high-identifiers’ environmental 
behaviours will be low. Conversely if the university is portrayed as doing well, high-
identifiers are predicted to engage in more pro-environmental behaviours, while the 
opposite will occur for low-identifiers, who are predicted to contrast away from the 
norm suggested by the feedback. If the university is portrayed as doing well 
environmentally, they will engage in less pro-environmental behaviour, but if the 
university is portrayed as doing poorly, they will engage in more pro-environmental 
behaviour. A secondary prediction is that presenting the feedback in the form of an 
explicit intergroup comparison will strengthen all of these effects by making the 
ingroup categorization more salient through the reference to a specific outgroup. 
 The duration of these effects is unknown, so this research incorporates a 
longitudinal measurement of pro-environmental behaviour both at the time of 
manipulation, and one week later. I predict that the effects will weaken over time, but 
any changes will be more strongly maintained for high-identifiers one week later, as 
high-identifiers’ attachment to their group is deeper and longer-lasting than for low-
identifiers. One week after their initial reaction, low-identifiers’ change in behaviour is 
predicted to weaken because, by definition of being a low-identifier, the group’s 
normative behaviours are not as important and less likely to be internalised, even 
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though they are reacting away from these implied group norms instead of converging 
toward them. 
STUDY 1  
Method 
Participants 
Participants (N = 107) were university students of ages 18 to 25 years, with a 
median age of 19 years. Participants were recruited by email from a list of university 
students who had previously volunteered to take part in psychological 
studies. Participation was rewarded with a chance to win one of four £20 online 
shopping vouchers. 
Design 
 This study used a 2 × 2 between-subjects design, with independent variables of 
comparison type (specific intergroup or general intergroup) and valence (positive or 
negative), presented in an online questionnaire. Social identification as a university 
student was measured before the manipulation, and dependent variables of pro-
environmental behaviour were measured at the time of manipulation (Time 1) and one 
week later (Time 2).  
Manipulations 
Participants were provided with information about the University of Exeter’s 
environmental performance relative to other universities, either in general, or 
specifically compared to the University of Plymouth. Participants were told Exeter was 
either doing well, or poorly. The manipulation was worded as follows, with words in 
bold indicating text that varied depending on condition, with the words in square 
brackets appearing in the specific intergroup comparison condition: 
“To figure out what kinds of people are helping the environment, 
DEFRA (The Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs) has 
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been studying groups of people throughout the UK.  
 
In a recent study released in early 2007, they found that although most 
people care about the environment, students at the University of Exeter 
have been doing a particularly good/poor job. Over the past two years, 
students at Exeter have been saving/wasting 15% more electricity than 
the national average for university students. Additionally, students at 
Exeter have been recycling 22% more/less than the national average. [In 
addition to doing better/worse than average, Exeter students 
significantly outperformed/underperformed in comparison to their 
local rival, the University of Plymouth.] Students at Exeter say they value 
the environment, and/but their actions /do not live up to their words.” 
Measures 
 Just before the manipulation, participants completed a measure of social identity 
with the University of Exeter. Following the manipulation, participants completed a 
measure of how willing they were to volunteer with an environmental organisation of 
their choice and then generated a list of five pro-environmental behaviours they could 
do within the next week (Time 1). Participants were thanked, and led to believe that the 
survey had ended, but participants were contacted one week later (Time 2) to ask how 
much they had conserved energy, and how much they had engaged in the five pro-
environmental behaviours they had listed one week prior.  
 Social identification. Identification with the University of Exeter was measured 
with 9 items like, “I identify with other students at the University of Exeter,” with four 
items reverse-scored, such as, “I have little respect for the University of Exeter,” using 
a 7-point Likert-style scale anchored with “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree.” The 
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measure was adapted from a scale developed by Ellemers, Kortekaas, and Ouwerkerk 
(1999), and was reliable (α = .86) and averaged into a single measure. 
Ingroup environmental norms. Following the manipulation, participants were asked 
to respond to the following items on a Likert-type scale, “Exeter students value the 
environment”; “Exeter students are taking action to protect the environment”; “Exeter 
students are doing enough to protect the environment”; and “Exeter students are 
behaving in accordance with their values”. These items were highly reliable (α = .78) 
and were averaged into a single measure. 
Pro-environmental volunteering. Participants were told that they would receive 
contact information for a wide range of pro-environmental charities and organisations 
that they could choose to volunteer with, such as regional wildlife trusts, local university 
student groups, and national groups like Friends of the Earth. The organisations were 
balanced to provide a range of organisation types and political orientations, so as to 
minimise the influence of any one particular organisation on participants’ volunteering 
intentions. Participants were asked “Would you be willing to spend time helping these 
organizations?,” measured on a 7-point scale, anchored with “not at all” and “very 
much so”. Participants were then asked “During a typical week, how much time (in 
hours) would you be willing to volunteer to these kinds of organisations?,” and 
responded freely. Because the measurement range of these two items were different, 
they were standardised into z-scores. These standardised scores were highly correlated 
(r = .71, p < .001 ), and averaged into a single measure. 
Pro-environmental behaviours. At Time 1, participants were asked to look over a list 
of ten actions they could do which would benefit the environment, such as “Wash 
clothes at a lower temperature,” and “Take recyclables to a recycling bin”. These ten 
ideas were generated by non-participating students through pilot testing. Participants 
were asked to select five of these ten ideas that they believed they could realistically do 
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within the next week, but were not explicitly directed to engage in them. Participants 
also gave intention ratings for these behaviours at Time 1. At Time 2, participants were 
reminded of the five actions they selected and asked how much they had engaged in 
them over the past week, responding on a 7-point scale anchored with “not at all” and 
“very much so”. These items were moderately reliable, and were averaged into a single 
measure (α = .57). Participants were also asked at Time 2, “Over the past one week, 
how much have you conserved electricity? (turned off lights when leaving a room, put 
on a jumper before turning on the heating, bought energy efficient products instead of 
inefficient ones, etc).”, and responded on a 7-point scale anchored with “not at all” and 
“very much so”. The responses for the five pro-environmental behaviours and energy 
conservation were fairly reliable (α = .60). Because the energy conservation item 
measures a broad range of behaviours, and the five specific items only measure one 
type of behaviour each, the two overall scores were averaged together into a single 
measure of general self-reported conservation at Time 2. This combined measure was 
the primary dependent variable for Time 2 conservation. 
Environmental values. Using two items, “I value the environment” and “The 
environment is an important issue to me personally,” environmental values were 
measured before the manipulation (pre-test values), after the manipulation (Time 1 
values), and one week later (Time 2 values).1 
Procedure 
Participants were invited to participate in the study through email and given a 
link to one of four surveys. Participants were not aware of the experimental design or 
that there were multiple versions of the survey. Once participants completed the survey 
(Time 1), they were thanked, and led to believe the study had ended. One week later 
                                                     
1 Environmental values were not a core part of this study’s predictions, but they are discussed in Chapter 5 in 
a meta-comparison of Study 1 and Study 3. The correlations between environmental values and behaviours 
are presented in Table 5.9 and are discussed further in Chapter 5. 
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(Time 2), participants were contacted again to report how much energy they had 
conserved, and if they had engaged in the environmental behaviours they had selected 
at Time 1. Of the 107 participants who completed Time 1, 79 completed Time 2. 
Following this, all participants were thanked again and debriefed.  
Results 
The means and standard deviations of all measures within each cell are 
presented in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1.  
Means and Standard Deviations of All Variables in Studies 1 and 2 by Condition 
 
      
 Positive Negative  
Study 1     Total 
 General Specific General Specific  
      
      
Ingroup Env. Norms 4.71(0.78) 4.67(1.01) 3.64(1.12) 3.79(0.92) 4.26(1.06) 
Identification 5.81 (0.69) 5.57(1.18) 5.45(1.12) 5.77(0.65) 5.65(0.95) 
Pre-Test Env. Values 5.69(0.94) 5.90(0.88) 6.08(0.83) 5.85(0.91) 5.87(0.89) 
Env. Values (Time 1) 5.91(0.85) 5.97(0.93) 6.00(0.83) 5.82(0.84) 5.93(0.86) 
Env. Values (Time 2) 5.63(0.96) 6.02(0.72) 5.97(0.92) 5.94(0.70) 5.89(0.83) 
Pro-Env. Volunteering (z) -0.07(0.83) 0.02(0.80) 0.19(1.18) -0.08(0.95) 0.01(0.93) 
Gen. Conservation (Time 2) 5.16(1.05) 5.47(0.96) 5.80(0.84) 5.70(0.76) 5.52(0.93) 
      
      
 Positive Negative  
Study 2     Total 
 Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup  
      
      
Ingroup Env. Norms 4.72(0.99) 4.97(0.84) 3.68(0.96) 2.72(0.87) 4.11(1.24) 
Identification 5.45 (0.83) 5.45(1.14) 5.58(0.95) 5.65(1.05) 5.55(0.99) 
Negative Emotions 2.65(1.06) 3.50(1.09) 4.27(0.94) 4.48(1.25) 3.68(1.28) 
Calm Emotions 4.35(1.19) 3.60(1.07) 2.78(0.90) 2.56(0.74) 3.37(1.22) 
Productivity Emotions 4.97(1.32) 4.81(1.23) 4.21(1.23) 4.19(1.56) 4.56(1.36) 
Pro-Env. Volunteering (z) -0.13(0.84) 0.01(0.92) -0.15(0.99) 0.17(0.96) -0.04(0.93) 
Gen. Conservation (Time 2) 4.86(1.28) 4.67(1.29) 4.69(1.24) 4.61(1.14) 4.71(1.24) 
      
Note. All scores measured on a scale of 1 to 7, except for volunteering, which is a 
composite of two volunteering-related z-scores. 
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Ingroup Environmental Norms 
 To test that participants’ perceptions of ingroup norms were manipulated, I 
analysed the items with a 2 (valence: positive, negative) × 2 (comparison type: specific, 
general) analysis of variance. The results revealed a main effect of valence, F(1,103) = 
27.02, p < .001, ηp2 = .21, with participants receiving positive feedback scoring higher 
on the ingroup norm measures (M = 4.69, SD = 0.90) than those with negative 
feedback (M = 3.71, SD = 1.02), indicating that participants understood the feedback 
directed at their group in the manipulation. As expected, comparison type had no main 
effect, F(1,103) = 0.10, p = .75, ηp2 < .01, as the items were focused on valence. The 
interaction was also not significant, F(1,103) = 0.28, p = .60, ηp2 < .01. 
Moderation of Identification and Feedback Valence on Pro-Environmental Behaviour 
To investigate how student social identity is related to feedback valence, 
intergroup comparisons, and pro-environmental behaviours, I followed methods 
outlined by Aiken and West (1991) for conducting moderated regression analyses of 
continuous and categorical data. Feedback valence (coded as good, 1; bad, -1), 
intergroup comparisons (coded as intergroup, 1; non-intergroup, -1) and student social 
identity (centred with M = 0) were entered at Step 1 of the regression, followed by the 
three two-way interaction terms at Step 2, and the three-way interaction term at Step 3.  
The analysis of pro-environmental volunteering intentions revealed that 
feedback valence, β = -.04, t(103) = 0.40, p = .70, comparison type, β = -.04, t(103) = 
0.36, p = .72, and identification, β = -.11, t(104) = 1.12, p = .27 were not significant 
predictors at Step 1, R2 = .015, F(3,103) = 0.51, p = .67. Step 2 revealed a significant 
two-way interaction of feedback valence by identification, β = .32, t(102) = 2.79, p = 
.006. The interaction for comparison type by identification and valence by comparison 
type were not significant, β = -.16, t(102) = 1.46, p = .15 and β = .08, t(102) = 0.78, p = 
.44, respectively. Overall for Step 2, ∆R2 = .077, ∆F(1,100) = 2.84, ∆p = .042. The 
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three-way interaction was not significant, β = -.12, t(99) = 1.09, p = .28, and for Step 3, 
∆R2 = .011, ∆F(1,99) = 1.19, ∆p = .28. The full output is presented in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2. 
Moderated Regression Table of Feedback Valence, Comparison Type, and Identification Predicting 
Volunteering Intentions (Time 1), Study 1. 
 
      
 B Std. Error β t p 
      
      
Step 1      
(Constant) .017 .091  .185 .854 
Valence -.035 .091 -.038 -.387 .700 
Comparison -.033 .090 -.035 -.360 .719 
Identification -.105 .095 -.108 -1.100 .274 
      
      
Step 2      
(Constant) .006 .089  .070 .945 
Valence -.056 .090 -.060 -.624 .534 
Comparison .002 .090 .002 .020 .984 
Identification -.134 .096 -.137 -1.403 .164 
ID×Valence .310 .111 .318 2.793 .006 
ID×Comparison -.160 .110 -.164 -1.462 .147 
Comp.×Valence .070 .090 .076 .782 .436 
      
      
Step 3      
(Constant) -.011 .090  -.118 .907 
Valence -.053 .090 -.057 -.590 .557 
Comparison .004 .090 .004 .041 .967 
Identification -.072 .111 -.074 -.644 .521 
ID×Valence .299 .111 .307 2.689 .008 
ID×Comparison -.139 .111 -.142 -1.247 .215 
Comp.×Valence .078 .090 .085 .868 .387 
ID×Val.×Comp. -.121 .111 -.123 -1.089 .279 
      
 
Note. N = 107. Valence is coded as negative = -1, positive = 1. Reference is coded as 
ingroup = -1, outgroup = 1. To prevent multicollinearity, identification is centred with 
M = 0. Step 1 R2 = .015 (p = .67); Step 2 ∆R2 = .077 (∆p = .04); Step 3 ∆R2 = .011 (∆p 
= .28). 
 
When the interaction of identification and feedback valence was decomposed 
through simple slopes analysis, no difference was found between low- and high- 
identifiers for positive feedback, t(102) = 0.70, p = .49. However, when feedback was 
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negative, the difference between identification levels was significant, t(102) = 2.58, p = 
.01, with high-identifiers intending to volunteer less and low-identifiers intending to 
volunteer more as predicted. The overall slope for high-identifiers was not significant, 
t(102) = 1.46, p = .15 , but was trending in the predicted direction of assimilating 
toward the norm implied by feedback valence. The slope for low-identifiers was 
significant, t(102) = 2.00, p = .05, with low-identifiers contrasting away from the group 
norm implied by the valence feedback as predicted. These results are plotted in Figure 
4.1. 
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Figure 4.1. The interaction of feedback valence and identification strength on pro-
environmental volunteering intentions at Time 1, Study 1. 
 
To investigate self-reported conservation behaviours one week later, I 
conducted a similar moderated regression as above. This analysis revealed a significant 
effect of feedback valence, β = -.23, t(76) = 2.06, p = .043, which was the only 
significant effect in the entire three-step model with all other ps > .1. Negative feedback 
was associated with slightly higher self-reports of pro-environmental behaviour, though 
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the Step overall was not significant. For Step 1, R2 = .057, F(3,75) = 1.51, p = .22. For 
Step 2, ∆ R2 = .015, ∆F(3,72) = 0.39, ∆p = .76. For Step 3, ∆R2 = .026, ∆F(1,71) = 
2.08, ∆p = .15. The full results are presented in Table 4.3. 
 
 
Table 4.3.  
Moderated Regression Table of Feedback Valence, Comparison Type, and Identification Predicting 
General Conservation (Time 2), Study 1. 
 
      
 B Std. Error β t p 
      
      
Step 1      
(Constant) 5.537 .104  53.048 <.001 
Valence -.215 .104 -.231 -2.059 .043 
Comparison .064 .106 .069 .604 .548 
Identification .020 .114 .020 .176 .861 
      
      
Step 2      
(Constant) 5.527 .108  51.255 <.001 
Valence -.220 .107 -.237 -2.051 .044 
Comparison .066 .108 .071 .607 .546 
Identification .034 .125 .034 .274 .785 
ID×Valence .055 .147 .056 .376 .708 
ID×Comparison -.045 .146 -.045 -.308 .759 
Comp.×Valence .115 .109 .124 1.061 .292 
      
      
Step 3      
(Constant) 5.505 .108  50.934 <.001 
Valence -.247 .108 -.266 -2.287 .025 
Comparison .084 .108 .091 .780 .438 
Identification .146 .146 .147 1.001 .320 
ID×Valence .067 .146 .067 .459 .648 
ID×Comparison -.017 .146 -.017 -.120 .905 
Comp.×Valence .125 .108 .135 1.159 .250 
ID×Val.×Comp. -.211 .146 -.209 -1.441 .154 
      
 
Note. N = 79. Valence is coded as negative = -1, positive = 1. Comparison is coded as 
general = -1, intergroup = 1. To prevent multicollinearity, identification is centred with 
M = 0. Step 1 R2 = .057 (p = .22); Step 2 ∆R2 = .015 (∆p = .76); Step 3 ∆R2 = .026 (∆p 
= .15). 
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Mediation of Group Norms 
 To test if the moderation effects above were mediated by group norms, I tested 
for statistical mediation using the logic of Baron and Kenney (1986). First, group norms 
were entered as a predictor of volunteering at Step 1. This was not significant, β = -
.140, p = .10. When all of the variables from the moderation were added in three 
additional steps, all variables were qualitatively unchanged from the original 
moderation. For the identification × valence interaction, β = .300, p = .008 (originally β 
= .310, p = .006), and group norms in the final step, β = -.114, p = .27. Thus, group 
norms did not mediate the moderation effect on volunteering intentions. 
 Because there was no moderated effect for Time 2 behaviours, no mediation 
was possible. However, as an individual predictor of Time 2 behaviours, group norms 
were not significant, β = -.053, p = .60. 
Discussion 
As predicted, negative group feedback led high group identifiers to engage in 
less pro-environmental behaviour than with positive feedback, in the form of 
volunteering intentions. Also as predicted, low-identifiers engaged in more pro-
environmental behaviour intentions when the group feedback was negative rather than 
positive. The corresponding predictions for positive feedback were not supported, with 
no significant difference between low- and high-identifiers. At Time 2, one week later, 
all of these effects had dissipated, and there was no difference in self-reported 
conservation behaviours between high- and low-identifiers. 
The original prediction was that the effects of group-based feedback among low 
and high-identifiers would be amplified when presented in a specific comparative 
context. However, the intergroup comparison component of the manipulation did not 
appear to evoke any response in participants and did not result in any statistically 
significant effects. The intergroup comparison manipulation may have been too subtle 
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to influence participants’ behaviours, as even the non-intergroup comparison condition 
contained a general, implicit comparison. To adjust for this possibility, I conducted 
another study in which the intergroup manipulation was changed to be specifically 
about a rival group. Additionally, I included an emotional response scale immediately 
after the manipulation to further explore how participants interpreted the feedback 
about their group. Finally, I relaxed the nature of the pro-environmental behaviour 
ideas, so instead of selecting items from a list, participants were asked to create their 
own ideas in an open-ended format. Participants might be more likely to engage in 
behaviours they had personally thought of rather than selected from a list given to 
them. 
STUDY 2  
Method 
Participants 
Participants (N = 185) were university students of ages 18 to 36 years, with a 
median age of 19 years. Participants were recruited by the same method as the prior 
study, but people who participated in Study 1 were screened from participating in Study 
2. Participation was rewarded with a chance to win one of four £25 cash payments. 
Design 
 This study used a similar 2 × 2 design to Study 1, except the target was either 
the University of Exeter (ingroup focus with no specific intergroup comparison) or the 
University of Plymouth (outgroup focus, implying an intergroup comparison). The 
universities were portrayed as doing either well or poorly environmentally. Like Study 1, 
this study was presented in an online questionnaire, with dependent variables of pro-
environmental behaviour measured at the time of manipulation (Time 1) and one week 
later (Time 2).  
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Manipulations 
 The manipulation used was as follows, with words in bold indicating text 
that varied depending on condition: 
“To figure out what kinds of people are helping the environment, 
DEFRA (The Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs) has 
been studying groups of people throughout the UK. 
 
In a recent study released in early 2007, they found that although everyone 
cares about the environment, students at the University of 
Plymouth/Exeter have been doing a particularly good/poor job. Over 
the past two years, students at Plymouth/Exeter have been 
saving/wasting 15% more electricity than the national average for 
university students. Additionally, students at Plymouth/Exeter have 
been recycling 22% more/less than the national average. Students at 
Plymouth/Exeter seem to value the environment, and/but their actions 
/have failed to match this.” 
Measures 
 The measures were similar to the prior study, except that emotional responses 
were measured after the manipulation, and the pro-environmental behaviours were 
open-ended rather than selected from a list. 
 Identification. Identification with the University of Exeter was measured as in 
Study 1 (α = .88). 
Ingroup environmental norms. These items were the same as in the prior study, but 
referred to either the University of Exeter or Plymouth as appropriate. These items 
were reliable (α = .84) and were averaged into a single measure. 
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Negative emotions. After reading the study manipulation, participants were asked 
to report how much they were feeling anxious, uncomfortable, disappointed, guilty, sad, 
and angry using a 7-point Likert type scale for each emotion. These items were highly 
reliable (α = .88), and were averaged together into a single measure.  
Calm emotions. Similar to the negative emotions, participants reported how much 
they felt relaxed, calm, and assured. These items were reliable (α = .87), and averaged 
together into a single measure. 
Productivity emotions. Similarly, participants reported the levels they felt motivated 
and inspired. These items were also reliable (α = .87), and were averaged into a single 
measure.  
Negative emotions were negatively correlated with calm emotions, r = -.54, p < 
.001, but were not correlated with productive emotions, r = .01, p = .87. Calm emotions 
were positively correlated to productive emotions, r = .29, p < .001. All of the 
individual emotions from all three components were analysed with factor analysis using 
a direct oblimin rotation, as is recommended for intercorrelated factors. The analysis 
produced a three-factor solution confirming the factor structure used here, with each 
emotion loading on to the appropriate category. 
 Pro-environmental volunteering. Volunteering was measured in the same way as in 
Study 1, and averaged into a single standardised measure (r = .69, p < .001). 
 Pro-environmental behaviours. Pro-environmental behaviours were generated at 
Time 1 using an open-ended format for participants to complete, rather than selected 
from a list of 10 ideas as in Study 1. The text of the item was, “Think about the kinds 
of actions people can do to help the environment. These can range from simple and 
low-effort to complex and high-effort. Please write down 5 things you think you could 
realistically do to help the environment in the next one week.” Responses were recorded at 
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Time 2 in the same manner as in Study 1 (α = .61) and were averaged into a single 
measure combined with general conservation (α = .72). 
 Participants responses covered a range of behaviours with most applying to 
conserving energy (“use energy saving light bulbs,” “unplug laptop at night,” “dry my 
hair naturally instead of using the hair dryer”), conserving water (“don’t take overly 
long showers,” “wash my clothes only when I need to,” “Don’t leave the faucet 
dripping”), and waste (“recycle,” “reuse plastic bags,” “pick up litter”). Participant 
responses also referred to transportation (“walk instead of driving,” “use public 
transportation,” “share lifts when using the car”), purchases (“use eco friendly cleaning 
and washing products,” “do not buy products with excess packaging,” “buy recycled 
products”), food consumption (“Buy local produce instead of going to a supermarket,” 
“buy food with less packaging,” “eat less meat”), and awareness-raising (“Encourage 
others to be more green,” “put up posters to create an awareness of the problem,” 
“play some films or documentaries to make my friends aware of the situation”). 
Procedure 
 The procedure was the same as in Study 1, with participants unaware of the 
experimental conditions or that they would be contacted again at Time 2. Of the 185 
participants who completed Time 1, 151 completed Time 2. 
Results 
Ingroup Environmental Norms 
 To confirm that the manipulation affected perceptions of group norms, the 
norm items were analysed with a 2 (valence: positive, negative) × 2 (target: Exeter or 
Plymouth), analysis of variance. The results revealed a main effect of valence, F(1,181) 
= 143.50, p < .001, ηp2 = .44, with positive feedback scoring higher (M = 4.84, SD = 
0.92) than those with negative feedback (M = 3.30, SD = 1.03), showing that 
participants understood the manipulation feedback. There was a main effect for 
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reference target, F(1,181) = 6.77, p = .01, ηp2 = .04, that was qualified by a significant 
interaction, F(1,181) = 19.56, p < .001, ηp2 = .10. Simple effects analysis showed that 
when feedback was positive, participants rated environmental performance the same, 
F(1,181) = 1.78, p = .18, ηp2 = .01, whether the target was Exeter (M = 4.72, SD = 
0.99) or Plymouth (M = 4.97, SD = 0.84), but when the feedback was negative, pro-
environmental ratings differed depending on target, F(1,181) = 23.06, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.11, with participants rating Exeter as doing better than Plymouth (M = 3.68, SD = 0.96 
and M = 2.72, SD = 0.87, respectively). This interaction reflects ingroup bias in 
responses to negative feedback: “our” poor performance is not perceived to be as bad 
as “theirs”.  
Emotions 
 To explore the kinds of emotions participants felt as they read the feedback, I 
conducted a series of 2 × 2 ANOVAs (Valence × Reference Target) on negative, calm, 
and productivity-related emotions. 
 For negative emotions (anxious, uncomfortable, disappointed, guilty, sad, and 
angry), there was a main effect of valence, F(1,181) = 66.26, p < .001, ηp2 = .27, with 
negative feedback provoking more negative emotions (M = 4.35, SD = 1.07) than 
positive feedback (M = 3.07, SD = 1.15). Reference target also produced a main effect, 
F(1,181) = 11.04, p = .001, ηp2 = .06, with feedback about Exeter eliciting fewer 
negative emotions (M = 3.49, SD = 1.28) than feedback about Plymouth (M = 3.91, SD 
= 1.25). However, this was qualified by a marginal interaction, F(1,181) = 3.82, p = 
.052, ηp2 = .02. Simple main effects show that when feedback was negative, participants 
reported the same negative emotions regardless of the target group, F(1,181) = 0.87, p 
= .35, ηp2 < .01, whether the target was Exeter (M = 4.72, SD = 0.94) or Plymouth (M 
= 4.48, SD = 1.25), but when the feedback was positive, participants felt the least 
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negative emotion when their group was the target, F(1,181) = 14.98, p < .001, ηp2 = .08, 
(MExeter = 2.65, SD = 1.06 and MPlymouth = 3.50, SD = 1.09). 
 Calm emotions (relaxed, calm, and assured) produced a very similar pattern of 
results as negative emotions, with a strong main effect of valence, F(1,181) = 76.31, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .30, and a main effect of comparison target, F(1,181) = 10.53, p = .001, ηp2 
= .06, which again was qualified by an interaction of marginal significance, F(1,181) = 
3.12, p = .079, ηp2 = .02. The simple effects are similar to those of negative emotions; 
when feedback was negative, there was no difference between the groups, F(1,181) = 
1.02, p = .31, ηp2 < .01, but when feedback was positive, participants felt calmer and 
more assured when the target was Exeter, F(1,181) = 13.50, p < .001, ηp2 = .07. All 
means are provided in Table 4.1. For productivity-related emotions (motivated and 
inspired), there was a main effect of valence, F(1,181) = 12.44, p = .001, ηp2 = .06, with 
positive feedback being more motivating and inspirational (M = 4.89, SD = 1.27) than 
negative feedback (M = 4.20, SD = 1.36). No effect was found for target reference, 
F(1,181) = 0.21, p = .65, ηp2 < .01, or the interaction, F(1,181) = 0.12, p = .73, ηp2 < 
.01. Based on these results, participants seemed to interpret the feedback about another 
university (Plymouth) not necessarily as just an outgroup (a rival university), but also as 
a representative of a larger, shared ingroup (university students). Thus, all comparisons 
could have been perceived as referring to different levels of the ingroup (students at 
Exeter or students in general). The pattern of means suggest stronger reactions for 
Exeter than Plymouth, as though Exeter is the more meaningful ingroup of the two.  
Moderation of Identification and Feedback Valence on Pro-Environmental Behaviour 
As in Study 1, I investigated how student social identity is related to feedback 
valence and pro-environmental behaviours, following the methods outlined by Aiken 
and West (1991) for conducting moderated regression analyses of continuous and 
categorical data. Feedback valence (coded as bad -1, good 1), reference target (Exeter -
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1, Plymouth 1), and student identification (centred with M = 0) were entered at Step 1 
of the regression, followed by the three two-way interaction terms at Step 2, and the 
three-way interaction term at Step 3.  
The analysis of pro-environmental volunteering intentions at Time 1 revealed 
that neither feedback valence, β = -.03, t(182) = 0.41, p = .68, reference target, β = .12, 
t(182) = 1.58, p = .12, nor identification, β = .004, t(182) = 0.05, p = .96, were 
significant predictors at Step 1, R2 = .014, F(2,182) = 0.85, p = .47. Step 2 revealed a 
significant two-way interaction of feedback valence and social identification, β = .22, 
t(178) = 3.02, p = .003, but not for reference target by identification, β = -.09, t(178) = 
1.17, p = .25, or reference target by valence, β = -.054, t(178) = 0.73, p = .47. Overall 
for Step 2, ∆R2 = .052, ∆F(3,178) = 3.29, ∆p = .02. The three-way interaction at Step 3 
was not significant, t(177) = 0.02, p = .83. For Step 3, ∆R2 < .001, ∆F(1,177) = 0.04, ∆p 
= .83. The full output of this moderation is presented in Table 4.4. 
To investigate the valence by identification interaction, I conducted simple 
slopes analyses. As predicted for low-identifiers, volunteering was higher when valence 
was negative rather than positive, β = .24, t(180) = 2.31, p = .02. Also as predicted for 
high-identifiers, volunteering was higher when valence was positive rather than 
negative, β = -.18, t(180) = 1.70, p = .09, though this was only marginally significant. 
For positive valence, the difference between low- and high-identifiers was significant, β 
= .20, t(180) = 1.99, p = .048, and likewise for negative valence, β = -.22, t(180) = 2.03, 
p = .044. These results are plotted in Figure 4.2. 
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Table 4.4. 
Moderated Regression Table of Feedback Valence, Comparison Reference, and Identification 
Predicting Volunteering Intentions (Time 1), Study 2. 
 
      
 B Std. Error β t p 
      
      
Step 1      
(Constant) -.029 .069  -.426 .670 
Valence -.028 .069 -.030 -.408 .684 
Reference .109 .069 .117 1.578 .116 
Identification .004 .069 .004 .051 .959 
      
      
Step 2      
(Constant) -.012 .068  -.180 .858 
Valence -.039 .068 -.042 -.567 .572 
Reference .122 .068 .131 1.791 .075 
Identification -.002 .069 -.003 -.036 .971 
ID×Valence .211 .070 .224 3.017 .003 
ID×Reference -.082 .070 -.087 -1.165 .246 
Ref.×Valence -.050 .068 -.054 -.732 .465 
      
      
Step 3      
(Constant) -.012 .068  -.170 .865 
Valence -.039 .068 -.042 -.567 .572 
Reference .123 .068 .132 1.796 .074 
Identification -.005 .070 -.006 -.078 .938 
ID×Valence .209 .070 .222 2.980 .003 
ID×Reference -.082 .070 -.087 -1.166 .245 
Ref.×Valence -.050 .068 -.054 -.734 .464 
ID×Val.×Ref. .015 .070 .016 .211 .833 
      
 
Note. N = 185. Valence is coded as negative = -1, positive = 1. Reference is coded as 
ingroup = -1, outgroup = 1. To prevent multicollinearity, identification is centred with 
M = 0. Step 1 R2 = .014 (p = .47); Step 2 ∆R2 = .052 (∆p = .02); Step 3 ∆R2 < .001 (∆p 
= .83). 
 
I conducted a similar moderation for the pro-environmental behaviours 
measured at Time 2. This revealed that feedback valence had no effect at Step 1, β = 
.07, t(147) = 0.84, p = .40, and neither did reference target, β = -.05, t(147) = 0.65, p = 
.51, but identification had a positive effect on behaviour, β = .19, t(147) = 2.34, p = .02.  
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Figure 4.2. The interaction of feedback valence and identification strength on pro-
environmental volunteering intentions at Time 1, Study 2. 
 
Overall for Step 1, R2 = .04, F(3,147) = 2.07, p = .11. Step 2 showed a marginal two-
way interaction of feedback valence and social identification, β = .16, t(144) = 1.91, p = 
.059. The reference target by identification interaction was not significant, β = .03, 
t(144) = -0.40, p = .69, and neither was the valence by reference interaction, β = -.01, 
t(144) = 0.82, p = .94. Overall for Step 2, ∆R2 = .026, ∆F(3,144) = 1.36, ∆p = .26. The 
three-way interaction was not significant, β = -.02, t(143) = 0.29, p = .78, Step 3 ∆R2 = 
.001, ∆F(1,143) = 0.82, ∆p = .78. The full output of this moderation is presented in 
Table 4.5. 
To investigate the valence by identification interaction, I conducted simple 
slopes analyses. For low-identifiers, pro-environmental behaviours were not influenced 
by valence, β = .12, t(146) = 0.81, p = .59. However, high-identifiers’ behaviours were 
influenced by valence, engaging in more pro-environmental behaviour when the 
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Table 4.5. 
Moderated Regression Table of Feedback Valence, Comparison Type, and Identification Predicting 
General Conservation (Time 2), Study 2. 
 
      
 B Std. Error β t p 
      
      
Step 1      
(Constant) 4.702 .100  46.853 <.001 
Valence .085 .101 .069 .841 .402 
Reference -.066 .101 -.053 -.654 .514 
Identification .240 .102 .190 2.343 .020 
      
      
Step 2      
(Constant) 4.726 .102  46.541 <.001 
Valence .084 .102 .068 .829 .408 
Reference -.054 .101 -.043 -.533 .595 
Identification .241 .102 .192 2.366 .019 
ID×Valence .196 .103 .155 1.906 .059 
ID×Reference .041 .103 .033 .399 .691 
Ref.×Valence -.008 .102 -.007 -.082 .935 
      
      
Step 3      
(Constant) 4.724 .102  46.275 <.001 
Valence .085 .102 .069 .829 .409 
Reference -.057 .102 -.046 -.560 .576 
Identification .245 .103 .195 2.375 .019 
ID×Valence .195 .103 .154 1.892 .060 
ID×Reference .041 .103 .033 .397 .692 
Ref.×Valence -.008 .102 -.006 -.077 .938 
ID×Val.×Ref. -.030 .103 -.023 -.286 .775 
      
 
Note. N = 151. Valence is coded as negative = -1, positive = 1. Comparison is coded as 
general = -1, specific = 1. To prevent multicollinearity, identification is centred with M 
= 0. Step 1 R2 = .041 (p = .11); Step 2 ∆R2 = .026 (∆p = .26); Step 3 ∆R2 = .001 (∆p = 
.78). 
 
feedback was positive than negative, β = -.23, t(146) = 2.00, p = .047. For positive 
valence, the difference between low- and high-identifiers was significant, β = .35, t(146) 
= 3.08, p = .003, but not for negative valence, β = .03, t(146) = 0.28, p = .78. These 
results are plotted in Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3. The interaction of feedback valence and identification strength on general 
conservation behaviour at Time 2, Study 2. 
 
Mediation of Group Norms 
 To test if the moderated effects above were mediated by group norms, we 
tested for statistical mediation using the logic of Baron and Kenney (1986). First, group 
norms were entered as a predictor of volunteering at Step 1. This was not significant, β 
= -.018, p = .74. When all of the variables from the moderation were added in three 
additional steps, all variables were qualitatively unchanged from the original 
moderation. For the identification × valence interaction, β = .211, p = .003 (originally β 
= .209, p = .003), and group norms in the final step, β = -.017, p = .83.  
 A similar mediation test was performed for conservation behaviour at Time 2. 
Group norms were not significant predictors at Step 1, β = -.015, p = .45. With the 
other variables from the moderation added in three additional steps, all variables were 
qualitatively unchanged from the original moderation. For the identification × valence 
interaction, β = .200, p = .057 (originally β = .196, p = .059), and group norms in the 
 96 
final step, β = -.032, p = .79. Thus, the measure of group norms did not mediate the 
moderation of either volunteering or Time 2 conservation behaviour. 
Discussion 
 Our attempt to make the intergroup manipulation more explicit by targeting 
feedback to a nearby university appears to have had a different effect than intended. 
Exeter students felt more distressed when Plymouth was doing poorly than when it was 
doing well. Exeter students also felt calmer and more motivated when Plymouth was 
performing well rather than when they were doing poorly. However, the magnitude of 
these effects was stronger when the reference target was Exeter, suggesting that Exeter 
was a more pertinent and meaningful ingroup than Plymouth. This is consistent with 
prior social identity research finding that people have multiple levels of overlapping 
identities that become salient depending on context (Abrams et al., 1990; Roccas & 
Brewer, 2002). Based on these emotional responses to the manipulation, students 
appeared to interpret the feedback about a potential rival university not necessarily as 
targeting a rival outgroup, but instead referring to a larger more abstract ingroup of 
university students in general. Thus, these results will be interpreted in the context of 
positive and negative feedback and strength of social identity, dropping the intergroup 
comparison variable which did not produce any significant effects related to pro-
environmental behaviour. 
 Apart from the effect of the intergroup comparison manipulation, the results 
supported the hypotheses as predicted. At Time 1, high-identifiers acted in line with the 
direction of the feedback, intending to engage in more pro-environmental volunteering 
when the feedback was positive, and less when the feedback was negative. Low-
identifiers showed the reverse by contrasting away from the direction of group 
feedback; when feedback was positive, they had lower pro-environmental intentions, 
and when feedback was negative, low-identifiers’ intentions were higher. Also as 
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predicted, these effects endured after one week, but for high-identifiers only, 
particularly with positive feedback. The enduring effect of the valence manipulation 
among high-identifiers suggests that they may have internalised the feedback, whereas 
low-identifiers’ behaviours were unchanged. The longitudinal effect of high-identifiers 
assimilating toward the implied norm occurred when feedback was positive but not 
when feedback was negative.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
I predicted that when given an implied group norm, low-identifiers would 
contrast away from that norm, while high-identifiers would assimilate toward the norm. 
Over time, the high-identifiers’ assimilation would be internalised and maintained, while 
the low-identifiers’ contrastive effect would not. These results generally support the 
hypotheses. Broadly, I found that at Time 1 in both studies high-identifiers tended to 
assimilate and internalise group norms, acting as typical group members would. In 
Study 2, this effect persisted at Time 2. In comparison, low-identifiers appeared to act 
in a more counter-normative way. In both studies, low-identifiers contrasted away from 
the group norm, intending to engage in less pro-environmental behaviour when norms 
are positive and more when norms are negative, as if psychologically and behaviourally 
distancing themselves from the group. However, these effects were not carried over 
into Time 2, where low-identifiers’ self-reported behaviours were consistent across 
conditions. The notion that high-identifiers act normatively and low-identifiers act 
counter-normatively is a consistent pattern of effect in research on self-categorization 
and social identity theory (Ellemers et al., 1997; Ellemers et al., 2002). These two 
studies offer additional insight by demonstrating these effects on environmental 
behaviours, investigating how these responses endure over time, and how the 
internalisation of group norms may depend on strength of identification. Although our 
measure of norms did not mediate the behavioural effects directly, this does not mean 
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norms are uninvolved. Research by Rabinovich and colleagues (2008) found that 
ingroup-stereotypes (a reflection of group norms) do mediate behaviour from 
comparison valence, but only with the addition of value centrality in a two-step 
mediation chain; ingroup-stereotyping alone was not a significant predictor of 
behaviour. 
In the second study, but not the first, there was a longitudinal effect; the 
manipulation participants had read a week prior affected how much pro-environmental 
behaviour they had engaged in over the last week. Why no longitudinal effect was 
detected in the first study is not known but could be related to the smaller sample size 
and more restricted way of measuring environmental behaviours (e.g., selecting from a 
list of pro-environmental behaviours in Study 1 rather than generating the behavioural 
ideas themselves in Study 2). This suggests that under the right conditions, brief, simple 
feedback about group performance can have effects long after the point of comparison. 
Given that people hear similar feedback about their environmental behaviours on a 
regular basis through news reports and other media, this constant barrage of 
information has the potential to lead to very real effects in how people actually act 
toward the environment.  
Looking at the effects of both study results as a whole, negative feedback 
appeared to provoke a reaction initially but not in the long term; only positive feedback 
produced a longitudinal effect. This may be because the manipulated positive norm was 
more consistent with participants’ perceptions of the existing group norm and their 
own personal attitudes. Pro-environmental attitudes are relatively high in the United 
Kingdom, and prior research has found that norms and attitudes best predict behaviour 
when they are consistent rather than inconsistent (Terry, Hogg, & McKimmie, 2000; 
Terry, Hogg, & White, 1999). Additionally, because a function of social identity is to 
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provide group members with positive self-esteem (Hogg & Turner, 1985; Turner & 
Tajfel, 1979), positive group norms may be easier to internalise than negative norms. 
Our results also suggest that longitudinal effects are stronger for high-identifiers 
than low-identifiers. While the effects for high and low-identifiers were approximately 
equivalent immediately after the experimental manipulation, the effect was weaker for 
low-identifiers than high-identifiers one week later. The longitudinal patterns suggest 
that high-identifiers internalised the group feedback as normative information about 
their group, and act in line with those norms one week later. This may be because, by 
definition, social identity is more central to high-identifiers, and social influence of the 
group occurs more easily when the identity is salient. Furthermore, because high-
identifiers’ social identity is more likely to be chronically salient, there will be more 
opportunities for them to be influenced by the norms of that group. Low-identifiers 
may be more variable in their response because they are less committed to the group. 
They may also resent what they perceive as a social miscategorization and rebel against 
the group norm only as long as the categorization is active, and once that threat is 
removed, they may prefer disinterest over counter-normative behaviour (Ellemers et al., 
2002). 
Interestingly, when low-identifiers were given positive feedback about their 
group, they could have capitalised on this beneficial feedback, taking a “free ride” on 
the efforts of a group that they are not heavily invested by sharing in its positive 
environmental norm. However, in both studies low-identifiers’ pro-environmental 
behaviours increased when the implied group norm was negative and decreased as the 
implied norm became positive. Although the exact process behind the contrastive 
behaviour is not known, it is congruent with past research that has found that when 
people’s preferred self-categorizations are ignored, such as when low-identifiers are 
subjected to group comparisons, they may resist these comparisons (Barreto & 
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Ellemers, 2002; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000), and experience increased physiological 
reaction, even when the categorization is meant to be positive (Branscombe, Ellemers, 
& Spears, 1999). Unwanted categorization can be unpleasant, and praise for a group in 
which one does not wish to belong can likewise be undesirable. 
 An asset of these studies is the variety of the dependent variables used to 
measure environmentally sustainable behaviours. In addition to general pro-
environmental volunteering intentions, I also measured self-reported behaviours one 
week later, including energy conservation and five specific, concrete behaviours created 
by participants themselves. Behavioural intentions and self-reported behaviours are 
different types of measures, and although they are not perfect, they are both fair 
proxies of actual behaviour (Armitage & Conner, 2001). The pro-environmental 
behaviours participants considered were concrete, specific, and self-generated, which 
are generally more accurate than abstract generalised intentions (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
1975; Kraus, 1995).  
Practical Implications 
Because of the individual longitudinal effects found here after providing group 
feedback, this research suggests group feedback may be a viable way of influencing 
individual behaviours over an extended time. If campaigners are able to isolate high-
identifiers with their message, then providing feedback that implies a pro-
environmental group norm could have a positive, lasting effect in promoting 
environmentally sustainable behaviour. 
However, if campaigners are not able to isolate high-identifiers with their 
message, but are addressing both low and high-identifiers together, the intervention 
must be carefully crafted to avoid potential backlash from low-identifiers (a similar 
“boomerang effect” has been found with other interventions; c.f., Schultz, Nolan, 
Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007). In these cases, because group feedback has a 
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more lasting effect on high-identifiers than low-identifiers, group feedback to a mixed 
audience should target constant behaviours that occur over time, like turning off 
electrical devices and recycling; high-identifiers are likely to stick with it, while low-
identifiers’ counter-normative reactions may be short-lived. One-off behaviours, like 
who to vote for, whether to buy an efficient appliance, and whether to install subsidised 
cavity-wall insulation are not as suitable for targeting by group feedback because low-
identifiers may react against the suggestion of the positive norm, and a short-term 
reaction can have a long-term effect. 
This research also suggests some good news; while people are barraged every 
day with negative environmental group feedback about the environment, these findings 
suggest individual responses to negative group feedback tend to be short-lived; only 
positive feedback showed a longitudinal effect in this research. While more studies are 
needed to investigate this aspect, and these studies had no control condition to 
compare behavioural results against, this result is welcome amongst the worrying 
findings of how suggestions of negative environmental group norms can lead to 
negative environmental behaviours (Cialdini et al, 2006; Smith et al., 2010; see Smith & 
Louis, 2008; Smith & Louis, 2009 for a similar effect in non-environmental domains).  
Limitations and Future Research 
One limitation to the design of the second study is that the intergroup 
comparison may not have functioned as intended. In the first study, the intergroup 
comparison was relatively weak, and did not elicit any effects in the dependent 
variables. I aimed to correct this by making the manipulation in the second study 
feature a rival university, which I assumed would imply a comparison to their own 
university. Instead, it appears students perceived this feedback as applying to the larger 
shared ingroup of university students. Although unintentional, this reinforces the 
notion that we all belong to numerous overlapping social groups simultaneously 
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(Roccas & Brewer, 2002), and which particular group is salient at any one time is highly 
dependent on situational factors (Abrams et al., 1990; Doosje, Haslam, Spears, Oakes, 
& Koomen, 1998). Despite the weak intergroup comparison manipulation, these 
studies still provide useful insight into the main thrust of the hypotheses, how strength 
of social identity moderates the effects of group feedback on environmentally 
sustainable behaviour. Although this means that in Study 2, identification was measured 
at the level of specific university, and the manipulation was sometimes targeted at 
university students in general, the effect of this appear minimal, and the moderating 
effect of identity still occurred reliably.  
Although the perspective presented in this thesis is that intergroup comparisons 
can play an important and dynamic role in determining how social influence can affect 
environmentally sustainable behaviour, the present two studies are only a first attempt 
to address this issue. To build on the patterns observed here, I conducted three 
additional studies to investigate the role of different types of comparative feedback on 
individual behaviour (see Chapters 5 and 6). 
In the following chapter, I focus on investigating the role of group discussion in 
generating environmental group norms in response to group feedback social 
comparisons. The two studies presented in this chapter offer compelling evidence that 
group feedback has the power to influence group norms and individual behaviour, but 
it also lacked actual interaction with group members, which is an important component 
of reaching consensus and forming norms within groups. 
Conclusion 
 While it has long been known that providing feedback about social group norms 
can influence behaviour at the time of feedback, this research demonstrates that group 
feedback about environmental performance can have a longitudinal effect on individual 
environmental behaviours. While high-identifiers converge toward the group norm 
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implied by the feedback, low-identifiers seem to contrast away from it. Moreover, the 
effects of group-directed feedback on individual behaviour appeared to be more 
enduring among high-identifiers, whereas the contrastive behaviour of low-identifiers 
appeared to be more reactive and temporally constrained.  
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– CHAPTER 5 – 
Small-Group Interaction and Inductive Norm Formation 
 
The other work in this thesis has researched how social comparisons can imply 
group norms and influence intentions and behaviours. This was done by giving group 
members feedback that implied a group norm relative to other groups. However, this 
approach offers an incomplete portrayal of how group norms grow and develop. 
Comparison processes can play a powerful role, as evidenced by the findings in the 
other empirical chapters of this thesis, but additional factors work to inform group 
norms from within the group. In day to day life, group members do not simply make 
social observations in isolation from each other. Rather, they discuss with each other 
the meaning and importance of how their group performs relative to other groups, 
which behaviours are important, and which outcomes are valued. Through interaction, 
group members work toward a consensus that serves to inform the group’s norms, 
priorities, and social reality. This chapter examines how small-group interaction can be 
a mechanism for environmental norm formation, leading to powerful and enduring 
behavioural effects. 
The Social Identity Approach and Small-Group Interaction 
Most social identity research has focused on how identity is informed through 
top-down deductive contexts, such as through receiving comparative feedback. While 
this approach has been productive in investigating how group members respond to 
comparisons and implied norms, it has been criticized for being too mechanistic in its 
theorising of identity formation, portraying group members as passive recipients of 
social identities and neglecting the role of the individual (Greenwood, 2004). This 
critique feeds into a larger debate within social psychology of viewing social processes 
as either being primarily individually-driven or group-driven. Responding to this 
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criticism, some social identity theorists have claimed that using paradigms of either 
individual or group influence alone creates an artificial and inaccurate dichotomy 
around how social influence occurs. Instead, it is said that “influence is constituted by 
both individual and social levels simultaneously and inseparably” (p. 33, italics in original; 
Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005). However, it is also acknowledged that the social 
identity approach has not given bottom-up interpersonal processes of influence the 
same attention as top-down processes. To address this, Postmes, Haslam, and Swaab 
developed an interactive model of identity formation that formally elaborates how 
bottom-up processes contribute to social identity formation. 
The key mechanism through which these bottom-up, inductive processes of 
social influence occurs is through discussion with other group members. As group 
members interact with each other, they are likely to reach consensus on some points, 
especially when group identification is high (Turner, 1991). This social consensus serves 
to validate individuals’ beliefs in line with the consensus view (Correll & Park, 2005; 
McGarty, Turner, Oakes, & Haslam, 1993; Sechrist & Stangor, 2001) and leads 
members to believe their views are more accurate (Baron et al., 1996). When a view is 
shared and discussed by the group, it is likely to become a local group norm and is 
especially likely to guide individual behaviour (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005; 
Postmes, Spears, Lee, & Novak, 2005). In one study of computer-mediated 
communication, conducted at a time when home computers were still uncommon, 
participants were found to develop communication norms idiosyncratic to their groups, 
responding in kind to local norms of tone, grammar, and use of humour (Postmes, 
Spears, & Lea, 2000). Research into stereotypes has found that group discussion can 
reinforce stereotypical beliefs (Myers & Bishop, 1970). Discussing negative stereotypes 
led group members to be more likely to discriminate against the discussed groups later 
(L. Smith & Postmes, 2009; L. Smith & Postmes, 2010a). Notably, individual 
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rumination of negative stereotypes did not have this same effect, suggesting that 
discussion in particular is key to creating discriminatory norms. However, discussion 
can also be used to challenge and overcome stereotypical beliefs, overriding the 
negative effects of stereotype threat (L. Smith & Postmes, 2010b). Thus, people appear 
to use the content of discussion to interpret and guide group responses to complex 
social problems in a way that impacts real behaviours. 
Using principles of inductive identity formation, recent research has shown 
small-group interaction can powerfully affect public behaviour. For example, using 
opinion-based groups, which are groups based around a common belief, such as an 
endorsement of human rights (Bliuc, McGarty, Reynolds, & Muntele, 2007), 
researchers have found that small-group interaction is a highly effective way of evoking 
action. This has been demonstrated for promoting clean water availability in the 
developing world (Thomas & McGarty, 2009) and reducing prejudice against those 
with mental disorders and indigenous minorities (McGarty, Khalaf, Blink, Gee, & 
Stone, 2007). In a similar vein, additional research has found that small-group 
discussion can successfully be used to counter and delegitimise existing negative 
ingroup stereotypes (L. Smith & Postmes, 2010b). In these studies, the content of 
group discussion guided individual behaviours after the discussion was complete, 
supporting Postmes, Haslam, and Swaab’s (2005) notion of inductive norm formation 
through interaction among group members. 
Classic Investigations of Small-Group Interaction  
 Although the social identity approach has formulated new ideas about how 
discussion influences behaviour, social interaction has long been recognised as an 
important process for making sense of new information. Sherif (1936) found that when 
participants interacted, they formed distinct group norms in interpreting visual stimuli. 
Participants were asked to estimate how far a light in a darkened room moved. The 
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light was actually stationary, but it appeared to move because of an optical illusion 
caused by autokinetic motion. Each group interacted and decided how far the light 
moved. Sherif noted that participants’ sense of reality was often influenced by 
observing and accepting the information provided by others, which he termed 
informational influence. While different groups had very different estimations, within 
each group, the interpretation of reality was consistent. These norms were internalised 
and persisted for years after the group’s short-lived discussion. Festinger (1954) 
expanded on these ideas, theorising that group members use discussion for more than 
just interpreting arbitrary information, but much more broadly to interpret the fabric of 
social reality itself. 
 While Sherif found that the group norms developed through social interaction 
to be very durable, their influence on actual behaviour was less clear. To investigate 
this, Kurt Lewin (1947) studied small-group interaction regarding the promotion of 
offal (organ) meat to American housewives during wartime. One group received a 
lecture from an expert about the benefits of consuming offal, while another group 
received some basic information about offal and then had a small-group discussion. Of 
the group receiving the lecture, 3% went on to prepare offal at home in the following 
months, while 32% of those in the small-group discussion prepared offal. This same 
effect was then replicated with feeding cod liver oil and orange juice to babies (Radke & 
Kilsurich, 1947) and implementing work policies against discrimination (Lewin & 
Butler, 1956, as cited in Turner, 1991). Further research found that the critical element 
in determining action was the culmination of consensus that is often the product of 
group discussion (Bennet, 1955; Pelz, 1958, both as cited in Turner, 1991). 
Although discussion has a long history in psychological research, the social 
identity perspective allows a new understanding of how these past findings work to 
influence actual behaviour. As group members reached consensus interpreting the 
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information they were given, they established local norms of how to act in response. 
Whether the scenario involved how far a light moved, whether to eat offal, or whether 
to give babies dietary supplements, these local norms all had powerful effects in 
influencing behaviour months and years beyond the original interaction. This durability 
was not found with individually-focused manipulations and attests to the strength of 
small-group interaction in influencing behaviour. 
Inductive and Deductive Influence 
Although inductive and deductive influence have been studied in depth 
separately, less research has examined how they might operate together. Postmes, 
Haslam, and Swaab (2005) theorise that they often work in tandem, with deductive 
comparisons providing a context for inductive discussion. This type of integrative 
influence can be seen in the research of L. Smith and Postmes (2010a), where inductive 
norms of discrimination developed out of discussion focused around portraying other 
groups negatively. 
While deductive and inductive influence can work together, this is not always 
the case. Inductive norm formation involves interaction between people and is 
therefore more “organic” compared to the effects of deductive comparison contexts. 
As such, the outcomes are more difficult for experimenters to predict. Discussion 
content may not be consistent with the norms implied by deductive comparisons. 
Indeed, researchers have found that many manipulations that influence norms and 
behaviours in individual settings do not have the same effect after small-group 
interaction (Postmes, Spears, Sakhel, & de Groot, 2001). This may be because inductive 
norms are more powerful and override the deductive norm, as evidenced by the strong 
effect sizes found in group discussion research. Thus, deductive influence can help 
direct inductive influence, as in the case of discrimination in L. Smith and Postmes 
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(2010a), but if discussion does not dwell on deductive comparisons, then those 
deductive influences are likely to have little effect. 
The Present Research 
 In the present research, I repeat the basic procedure of Study 1, with the 
addition of a small-group interaction after the experimental manipulation. I predict that 
small-group interaction will allow for the creation of local, inductive norms, allowing 
the content of discussion to guide group members’ behaviours long after the discussion 
has ended. As supported by past research, the experimental manipulation that 
influenced behaviour in Study 1 through deductive processes may not be influential, as 
inductive discussion processes tend to be stronger determinants in norm formation 
than deductive processes. 
Based on the strength of small-group interaction in producing enduring 
behavioural change, I predict that the content of discussion will influence 
environmental behaviour, both for better and for worse. Based on self-categorization 
principles, I believe the extent to which participants discuss environmental behaviour 
will predict how much pro-environmental behaviour they engage in one week later. I 
believe the process behind this is the creation of inductive, local norms, rather than just 
participants who value the environment also discuss it and act on it. To account for 
this, I predict that discussion content will moderate behaviours even when controlling 
for pre-test pro-environmental values. 
 Given past research findings, I cannot make specific predictions about how the 
discussion groups will interpret and act upon the experimental manipulation. In Study 
1, this same manipulation led high-identifiers to assimilate toward the implied norm; 
however, previous research has found that group norm manipulations that work in 
individual settings often do not work after small-group interaction (Postmes et al., 
2001). Thus, while results may be similar to Study 1, the deductive norm of the 
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manipulation may be overpowered by the strength of the inductive norms created 
through interaction. 
STUDY 3 
Method 
Participants 
Participants (N = 69) were university students of ages 18 to 37 years, with a 
median age of 18 years. Participants were recruited after lectures and through email 
from a pool of first-year students, and divided into groups of 3 to 5 (N = 
17). Participation was rewarded through academic research participation credits and a 
chance to win a £20 online shopping voucher. 
Design 
This design was very similar to Study 1, using a 2 × 2 between-subjects design, 
with independent variables of valence (positive or negative) and comparison type 
(specific intergroup or general). Unlike in Study 1, participants engaged in a small-group 
discussion of up to 20 minutes after reading the manipulation. These discussions were 
recorded and assessed for content of environmental behaviour and length of 
discussion. Social identification as a university student and environmental values were 
measured before the manipulation, and dependent variables of pro-environmental 
behaviour were measured at the time of manipulation (Time 1) and one week later 
(Time 2).  
Manipulations 
As in Study 1, participants were provided with information about the University 
of Exeter’s environmental performance relative to other universities, either in general, 
or specifically compared to the University of Plymouth. Participants were told Exeter 
was either doing well, or poorly. The manipulation was worded as follows, with words 
 111 
in bold indicating text that varied depending on condition, with the words in square 
brackets appearing in the specific intergroup comparison condition: 
“To figure out what kinds of people are helping the environment, 
DEFRA (The Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs) has 
been studying groups of people throughout the UK.  
 
In a recent study released in early 2007, they found that although most 
people care about the environment, students at the University of Exeter 
have been doing a particularly good/poor job. Over the past two years, 
students at Exeter have been saving/wasting 15% more electricity than 
the national average for university students. Additionally, students at 
Exeter have been recycling 22% more/less than the national average. [In 
addition to doing better/worse than average, Exeter students 
significantly outperformed/underperformed in comparison to their 
local rival, the University of Plymouth.] Students at Exeter say they value 
the environment, and/but their actions /do not live up to their words.” 
 
Following the manipulation but before the discussion, participants were asked 
to respond to the following items, “Exeter students value the environment”; “Exeter 
students are taking action to protect the environment”; “Exeter students are doing 
enough to protect the environment”; and “Exeter students are behaving in accordance 
with their values”. These items were highly reliable (α = .85) and were averaged into a 
single measure. 
Measures 
 Social identification. As in Study 1, identification with the University of Exeter was 
measured at the start of the study with 9 items like, “I identify with other students at 
the University of Exeter,” with four items reverse-scored, such as, “I have little respect 
for the University of Exeter,” using a 7-point Likert-style scale anchored with “strongly 
disagree” and “strongly agree.” The measure was adapted from a scale developed by 
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Ellemers, Kortekaas, and Ouwerkerk (1999), and was reliable (α = .80) and averaged 
into a single measure. 
Environmental values. Environmental values were measured with two items, “I 
value the environment” and “The environment is an important issue to me personally.” 
These were measured at the very start of the study (Pretest), after the discussion (Time 
1), and one week later (Time 2). These items were reliable (r = .74, p < .001; r = .82, p < 
.001; r = .77, p < .001, respectively), and were averaged together for each time. 
 Discussion analysis. In the small-group discussions after the manipulation, 
participants were given a sheet of paper with directions to discuss three questions, 
“How does the group feel about Exeter students’ environmental performance?”, “Do 
group members feel satisfied with their own environmental behaviour?”; and “Do 
group members have plans to change their own environmental behaviour?” These 
discussions were recorded with the participants’ permission, but no experimenters were 
in the room during the discussions. Two independent raters, who were blind to 
participants’ conditions and quantitative responses, assessed the extent to which 
participants discussed environmental behaviour while discussing the questions and gave 
each group a score on a scale of 1 to 10. The two raters’ scores were correlated (r = .56, 
p = .02), giving inter-rater reliability to the assessments. The two sets of scores were 
averaged into a single measure (M = 5.81; SD = 1.21). The length in seconds for which 
participants discussed the questions was also noted (M = 596; SD = 197). 
 Pro-environmental volunteering. Volunteering intentions were measured after the 
discussion. As in Study 1, participants were told that they would receive contact 
information for a wide range of pro-environmental charities and organisations that they 
could choose to volunteer with, such as regional wildlife trusts, local university student 
groups, and national groups like Friends of the Earth. The organisations were balanced 
to provide a range of organisation types and political orientations, so as to minimise the 
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influence of any one particular organisation on participants’ volunteering intentions. 
Participants were asked “Would you be willing to spend time helping these 
organizations?,” measured on a 7-point scale, anchored with “not at all” and “very 
much so”. Participants were then asked “During a typical week, how much time (in 
hours) would you be willing to volunteer to these kinds of organisations?,” and 
responded freely. Because the measurement range of these two items was different, 
they were standardised into z-scores. These standardised scores were highly correlated 
(r = .67, p < .001) and were averaged into a single measure. 
Pro-environmental behaviours. As in Study 1, after completing the volunteering 
information, participants were asked to look over a list of ten actions they could do 
which would benefit the environment, such as “Wash clothes at a lower temperature,” 
and “Take recyclables to a recycling bin”. These ten ideas were generated by non-
participating students through pilot testing. Participants were asked to select five of 
these ten ideas that they believed they could realistically do within the next week, but 
were not explicitly directed to engage in them. At Time 2, participants were contacted 
through email and reminded of the five actions they selected and asked how much they 
had engaged in them over the past week, responding on a 7-point scale anchored with 
“not at all” and “very much so”. These items were reliable (α = .69) and were averaged 
into a single measure. As in Study 1, participants were asked at Time 2, “Over the past 
one week, how much have you conserved electricity? (turned off lights when leaving a 
room, put on a jumper before turning on the heating, bought energy efficient products 
instead of inefficient ones, etc).”, and responded on a 7-point scale anchored with “not 
at all” and “very much so”. The responses for the five pro-environmental behaviours 
and energy conservation were highly correlated (r = .62, p < .001). Because the energy 
conservation item measures a broad range of behaviours, and the five specific items 
only measure one type of behaviour each, the two overall scores were averaged together 
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into a single measure of general self-reported conservation at Time 2. This combined 
measure was the primary dependent variable for Time 2 conservation. 
Procedure 
Participants were invited to participate in the study through email and through 
announcements after lectures. Participants arrived at classrooms and were directed to 
form groups of 3 to 5 with people they did not already know, with each group sharing 
the same experimental manipulation. Participants were not aware of the experimental 
design or that there were multiple manipulations. After the manipulation, participants 
were asked to discuss their thoughts regarding the three discussion points listed above. 
These discussions were recorded with participants’ permission, but the experimenters 
left the room for these discussions. All aspects of the questionnaire were completed 
individually rather than in groups. Once participants completed the survey (Time 1), 
they were thanked, and led to believe the study had ended. One week later (Time 2), 
participants were contacted again through email to report how much energy they had 
conserved, and if they had engaged in the environmental behaviours they had selected 
at Time 1. Of the 69 participants who completed Time 1, 47 completed Time 2. 
Following this, all participants were thanked again and debriefed. 
Results 
Full descriptive statistics are provided in Table 5.1 
Overview of Typical Discussion Content 
In a typical exchange, participants would discuss their own environmental 
behaviours, both positive and negative, as a group. Often, one or more group members 
would state that groups members should improve, and other members would concur 
and make specific commitments. Exchanges were often group-focussed, identified by 
use of the collective pronoun “we,” with discussion focussed on what “we” the group 
feel and what “we” should be doing. This kind of exchange is shown below. Many 
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groups also showed a high level of within-group agreement, with participants verbally 
affirming the views of other participants while they were speaking, also as shown 
below. Participants A, B, C, and D were from Group 14, while participants E, F, and G 
were from Group 9. In the first extract, Participant A starts by explaining why she does 
not recycle, citing difficulty and because other university members do not do it either. 
 
A: If recycling was easier here, then I would do it, but I 
just can’t be bothered, because I can’t… because no one else 
does it, you’re like, well I’m not going to bother [D: 
That’s the thing.] I’m not going to separate my rubbish. 
 
The group then discussed their non-environmentally-friendly behaviours, and 
concluded they were not satisfied with their current behaviours. 
 
A: Do we feel satisfied with our own environmental 
behaviour? Now, we’re kind of on the agreement that none of 
us [D: Yeah], well, you might be, but certainly people who 
are in catered halls [B: Yeah] [C: Yeah], I’m not, thinking 
about it, I’m not satisfied with it. [C: No]  
[…] 
D: Well, we should improve, it would be nice. 
 
Participant A, who had just recently explained why she did not recycle, then 
decides that she will start recycling. Participants B and C also say they will improve their 
behaviours. However, all participants say they focus on behaviours they view as easy to 
achieve. 
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A: Now that I know [B: Yeah, 15%, yeah] that my actions are 
actually making an impact [B: Yeah], from what we’ve read 
here that students at Exeter have been wasting 15% more 
electricity and recycling 22% less than the national 
average, I’m like well actually maybe I should [B: Should do 
it, yeah] put my wine bottles in a separate bin, so yeah, I 
think I might, [B: Yeah, I think I need to start changing] 
on these easy things I will start changing, I will make an 
effort now to do my bottles… 
[…] 
B: So, yeah… 
A: Has this…? 
C: Yeah, I’ll probably turn off my lights and stuff [B: 
Yeah, lights], and walk, because it’s quite easy. I just 
flick a switch. 
 
Note that participants used Exeter’s negative feedback as a reason to collectively 
engage in more pro-environmental behaviour rather than less, which is the opposite of 
the effect for high identifiers in Chapter 4 and the intergroup condition in Chapter 6. 
This use of discussion to reverse an expected effect is consistent with the research of L. 
Smith and Postmes (2010b), who found that participants used counter-stereotypical 
discursive strategies to reverse the behavioural effects of stereotype threat. 
Participants also shared practical information about how to engage in pro-
environmental behaviours, as in this extract from Group 9 regarding recycling points. 
 
E: They do give you the leaflet in the welcome pack about 
saving energy and saving water, but there didn’t seem to be 
anything else about recycling. 
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F: Well this is the thing. Recycling, we can, our recycle 
point outside Berks, we can only recycle glass. 
E: We’ve got glass, tins, and plastic. I was impressed with 
plastic. 
F: I didn’t know that, because at home we have the green 
bags and we literally recycle everything [E: Yeah] apart 
from kitchen waste, [E: Yeah] and I’m just not used to not 
recycling. I feel really bad that… 
 
The group then had a lengthy conversation about the location of recycling 
points, and participant F says she will start recycling more because of this information. 
 
F: I didn’t know there was one [a recycling point] by Clydesdale.  
G: Yeah. 
E: Yeah, if you go right down, they’re all there. 
[…] 
F: Now that I’m aware of the recycling points, I’ll do more, 
because I wasn’t aware there were ones by Clydesdale. 
 
All 17 of the groups viewed the state of the natural environment as a problem 
and considered pro-environmental behaviour to be generally desirable. However, while 
some groups discussed the topic enthusiastically for most of the allotted time, other 
groups only discussed environmental issues briefly for a few minutes before continuing 
to other unrelated topics. Thus, in the quantitative analysis that follows this section, 
length of the discussion is included as a moderating variable. 
Manipulation Check 
To confirm that participants understood the manipulation, we analysed our 
manipulation check items with a 2 (valence: positive, negative) × 2 (comparison: 
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general or intergroup) analysis of variance. The results revealed a main effect of 
valence, F(1,65) = 37.25, p < .001, ηp2 = .37, with positive feedback scoring higher (M 
= 4.59, SD = 0.89) than negative feedback (M = 3.32, SD = 0.82), indicating that 
participants understood the manipulation feedback. As expected, comparison type was 
not significant, F(1,65) = 0.03, p = .86, ηp2 < .01, and neither was the interaction, 
F(1,65) = 1.01, p = .32, ηp2 = .02. 
Table 5.1.  
Means and Standard Deviations of Variables by Valence and Comparison Type, Study 3.  
 
      
 Positive Negative  
     Total 
 No Comp. Comp. No Comp. Comp.  
      
      
Manipulation Check 4.47(0.92) 4.72(0.88) 3.41(0.91) 3.24(0.74) 3.91(1.06) 
Identification 5.65(0.84) 5.70(1.00) 5.82(0.51) 5.57(0.65) 5.69(0.74) 
Pre-Test Env. Values 5.53(0.67) 5.33(1.20) 5.24(1.39) 5.17(0.92) 5.31(1.07) 
Env. Values (Time 1) 5.24(0.77) 5.47(1.20) 5.24(1.47) 5.42(0.83) 5.33(1.09) 
Env. Values (Time 2) 5.71(0.73) 5.82(0.84) 5.09(1.70) 5.09(1.48) 5.45(1.23) 
Pro-Env. Volunteering (z) 0.01(0.89) 0.16(0.95) -0.11(0.97) -0.04(0.89) 0.00(0.91) 
Gen. Conservation (Time 2) 4.83(0.92) 5.15(1.24) 4.81(1.60) 5.16(1.29) 4.98(1.23) 
      
Note. All scores measured on a scale of 1 to 7, except for volunteering, which is a 
composite of two volunteering-related z-scores. “No Comp.” refers to the general 
intergroup comparison, while “Comp.” refers to the specific intergroup comparison 
condition. 
 
Moderation of Identification and Feedback Valence on Pro-Environmental Behaviour 
To investigate how student social identification is related to feedback valence, 
intergroup comparisons, and pro-environmental behaviours, we followed methods 
outlined by Aiken and West (1991) for conducting moderated regression analyses of 
continuous and categorical data. Feedback valence (coded as good, 1; bad, -1), 
intergroup comparisons (coded as intergroup, 1; general, -1) and student social 
identification (centred with M = 0) were entered at Step 1 of the regression, followed 
by the three two-way interaction terms at Step 2, and the three-way interaction term at 
Step 3.  
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The analysis for pro-environmental volunteering intentions showed that none of 
the predictors at any level were significant, final R2 = .04, F(7,61) = 0.32, p = .94. The 
full results are presented in Table 5.2. 
For general conservation one week later, the only significant predictor was the 
interaction between comparison and identification, β = 0.52, t(40) = 2.40, p = .02 at 
Step 2. However, the Step overall was not significant, ∆R2 = .12, ∆F(6,40) = 1.93, ∆p = 
.14, final R2 = .18, F(7,39) = 1.23, p = .31. The full results are presented in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.2.  
Moderated Regression Table for Volunteering by Valence and Comparison Type (Time 1), Study 3.  
 
      
 B Std. Error β t p 
      
      
Step 1      
(Constant) .004 .111  .036 .972 
Valence .082 .111 .090 .736 .464 
Comparison .061 .111 .067 .545 .587 
Identification .136 .150 .112 .907 .368 
      
      
Step 2      
(Constant) .009 .114  .079 .937 
Valence .075 .114 .082 .654 .515 
Comparison .068 .115 .075 .589 .558 
Identification .148 .167 .121 .887 .378 
ID×Valence -.074 .165 -.061 -.449 .655 
ID×Comparison .105 .155 .086 .675 .502 
Comp.×Valence .004 .115 .005 .039 .969 
      
      
Step 3      
(Constant) .004 .116  .037 .971 
Valence .079 .116 .087 .679 .499 
Comparison .069 .116 .076 .596 .554 
Identification .153 .169 .125 .906 .368 
ID×Valence -.083 .169 -.068 -.489 .627 
ID×Comparison .086 .169 .070 .510 .612 
Comp.×Valence .004 .116 .004 .031 .976 
ID×Val.×Comp. .050 .169 .041 .295 .769 
      
Note. N = 69. Valence is coded as negative = -1, positive = 1. Comparison is coded as 
general = -1, specific = 1. To prevent multicollinearity, identification is centred with M 
= 0. Step 1 R2 = .023 (p = .67); Step 2 ∆R2 = .011 (∆p = .88);  
Step 3 ∆R2 = .001 (∆p = .77). 
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Table 5.3.  
Moderated Regression Table for General Conservation by Valence and Comparison Type (Time 2), 
Study 3. 
 
      
 B Std. Error β t p 
      
      
Step 1      
(Constant) 5.016 .182  27.592 <.001 
Valence -.002 .181 -.002 -.012 .990 
Comparison .175 .181 .143 .966 .339 
Identification .299 .219 .202 1.367 .179 
      
      
Step 2      
(Constant) 5.026 .177  28.436 <.001 
Valence -.069 .179 -.056 -.384 .703 
Comparison .218 .179 .178 1.214 .232 
Identification .237 .240 .160 .986 .330 
ID×Valence -.033 .239 -.022 -.137 .892 
ID×Comparison .521 .217 .354 2.398 .021 
Comp.×Valence -.043 .179 -.035 -.240 .812 
      
      
Step 3      
(Constant) 5.014 .182  27.622 <.001 
Valence -.062 .182 -.051 -.343 .733 
Comparison .215 .182 .176 1.183 .244 
Identification .237 .243 .160 .975 .335 
ID×Valence -.042 .243 -.029 -.174 .863 
ID×Comparison .486 .243 .330 2.000 .052 
Comp.×Valence -.036 .182 -.030 -.200 .843 
ID×Val.×Comp. .085 .243 .057 .349 .729 
      
 
Note. N = 47. Valence is coded as negative = -1, positive = 1. Comparison is coded as 
general = -1, specific = 1. To prevent multicollinearity, identification is centred with M 
= 0. Step 1 R2 = .060 (p = .44); Step 2 ∆R2 = .119 (∆p = .14);  
Step 3 ∆R2 = .003 (∆p = .73). 
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When the interaction of comparison type and identification was decomposed 
through simple slopes analysis, no difference was found for low-identifiers between 
comparison types, B = 0.22 t(43) = 1.04, p = .30. However, for high-identifiers, 
intergroup comparisons led to more behaviour than when there was no comparison, B 
= 0.59, t(43) = 2.47, p = .02. These results are plotted in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1. The interaction of comparison type and identification on self-reported 
environmental behaviours one week after discussion, Study 3. “No Comparison” refers 
to the general intergroup comparison, while “Comparison” refers to the specific 
intergroup comparison condition. 
 
Moderation of Discussion Length and Content on Pro-Environmental Values 
Because all groups viewed pro-environmental behaviour positively, time spent 
discussing pro-environmental behaviour was chosen as a moderator. If some groups 
had viewed pro-environmental behaviour negatively, than that factor would need to be 
added to the analysis. The valence of the discussion content would very likely moderate 
the outcome on the dependent variables, with more time talking about pro-
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environmental behaviour negatively leading to less behaviour, similar to how L. Smith 
and Postmes (2009, 2010a) found that negative discussion about minorities led to an 
increase in prejudiced behaviour. 
I investigated how discussion length and discussion environmental behaviour 
content may moderate pro-environmental values, following the methods outlined by 
Aiken and West (1991) applied in hierarchical linear modelling (HLM) using HLM 
v6.08 (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). This is appropriate because individual-level data is 
nested within groups. Values at Time 1 or Time 2 were set as the level-1 outcome 
variable, prior values were set as the level-1 independent variable, while discussion 
length and environmental behaviour discussion content were set as level-2 predictor 
variables, along with the interaction term of discussion length and content. Discussion 
length, discussion content, and pre-existing values were centred with M = 0. The full 
results of these moderations are presented in Tables 5.4-5.6. Significant predictors are 
reported below. 
For environmental values at Time 1, including pre-test values, only pre-test 
values were a significant predictor, γ = 0.705, t(13) = 6.23, p < .001, with no significant 
effects from discussion length, behavioural content of discussion, or the interaction of 
these two. See Table 5.4. 
For environmental values at Time 2, including pre-test values, pre-test values 
were a significant predictor, γ = 0.455, t(13) = 3.42, p = .002, while behavioural 
discussion content was marginal, γ = 0.210, t(13) = 1.80, p = .094, with more discussion 
content leading to higher values one week later. Discussion length and the interaction 
were not significant. See Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.4.  
Moderated HLM Table for Values (Time 1) by Discussion Time and Content with Pre-Test Values, 
Study 3. 
 
     
 γ Std. Error t p 
     
     
Step 1     
(Constant) 5.400 0.136 39.596 <.001 
Time Talking <0.001 0.001 -0.541 .596 
Beh. Content 0.155 0.141 1.097 .291 
Pre-test Values 0.705 0.113 6.221 <.001 
     
     
Step 2     
(Constant) 5.282 0.157 33.545 <.001 
Time Talking -0.001 0.001 -0.692 .501 
Beh. Content   0.231 0.148 1.557 .143 
Pre-test Values 0.705 0.113 6.228 <.001 
Time×Content <0.001 0.001 1.246 .235 
     
 
Note. Participant N = 47, Group N = 17. To prevent multicollinearity, Time Talking, 
Behavioural Content of Discussion, and Pre-Test Values are centred with M = 0. 
 
 
Table 5.5.  
Moderated HLM Table for Values (Time 2) by Discussion Time and Content with Pre-Test Values, 
Study 3. 
 
     
 γ Std. Error t p 
     
     
Step 1     
(Constant) 5.496 0.204 26.894 <.001 
Time Talking -0.002 0.001 -1.603 .131 
Beh. Content 0.210 0.209 1.795 .094 
Pre-test Values 0.455 0.133 3.421 .002 
     
     
Step 2     
(Constant) 5.309 0.235 22.546 <.001 
Time Talking -0.002 0.001 -1.823 .091 
Beh. Content   0.511 0.222 2.306 .038 
Pre-test Values 0.458 0.113 3.448 .002 
Time×Content 0.001 0.001 1.420 .179 
     
 
Note. Participant N = 47, Group N = 17. To prevent multicollinearity, Time Talking, 
Behavioural Content of Discussion, and Pre-Test Values are centred with M = 0. 
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For environmental values at Time 2, including values at Time 1, Time 1 values 
were a significant predictor, γ = 0.523, t(13) = 4.02, p < .001, as was behavioural 
discussion content, γ = 0.197, t(13) = 2.187, p = .047, with more environmental 
behaviour discussion content leading to higher values one week later. Discussion length 
and the interaction were not significant. See Table 5.6. Thus, the more participants 
discussed environmental behaviours, the more they reported valuing the environment 
one week later, but not immediately following the discussion. This effect was present 
when accounting for pre-existing values. 
 
Table 5.6.  
Moderated HLM Table for Values (Time 2) by Discussion Time and Content with Values (Time 
1), Study 3. 
 
     
 γ Std. Error t p 
     
     
Step 1     
(Constant) 5.441 0.171 31.877 <.001 
Time Talking -0.002 0.001 -1.634 .124 
Beh. Content 0.324 0.179 1.813 .091 
Values (Time 1) 0.541 0.130 4.168 <.001 
     
     
Step 2     
(Constant) 5.300 0.204 25.941 <.001 
Time Talking -0.002 0.001 -1.812 0.093 
Beh. Content 0.197 0.200 2.187 0.047 
Values (Time 1) 0.523 0.130 4.015 <.001 
Time×Content 0.001 0.001 1.215 .246 
     
 
Note. Participant N = 47, Group N = 17. To prevent multicollinearity, Time Talking, 
Behavioural Content of Discussion, and Values (Time 1) are centred with M = 0. 
 
Moderation of Discussion Length and Content on Pro-Environmental Behaviour 
To investigate how discussion length and environmental behaviour content may 
moderate pro-environmental behaviours, I used HLM to follow a similar procedure as 
above. Discussion length and environmental behaviour content were centred with M
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0. The full output of the following moderations is presented in Tables 5.7-5.9. 
Volunteering intentions were set as the level-1 outcome variable, while discussion 
length and environmental behaviour discussion content were set as level-2 predictor 
variables, along with the interaction term of discussion length and content. At Step 1, 
discussion length was not significant, γ < 0.001, t(13) = -1.01, p = .33, and neither was 
behavioural content, γ = -0.075, t(13) = 0.63, p = .54. The interaction was added at Step 
2, but this was not significant either, γ < 0.001, t(13) = -0.15, p = .82. See Table 5.7. 
 
Table 5.7.  
Moderated HLM Table for Volunteering (Time 1) by Discussion Time and Content, Study 3. 
 
     
 γ Std. Error t p 
     
     
Step 1     
(Constant) -0.011 0.118 -0.097 .924 
Time Talking <0.001 0.001 -1.013 .329 
Beh. Content -0.075 0.119 -0.632 .537 
     
     
Step 2     
(Constant) 0.001 0.146 0.005 .834 
Time Talking <0.001 0.001 -0.968 .351 
Beh. Content -0.083 0.132 -0.630 .640 
Time×Content <0.001 0.001 -0.146 .887 
     
 
Note. Participant N = 47, Group N = 17. To prevent multicollinearity, Time Talking, 
Behavioural Content of Discussion, and Pre-Test Values are centred with M = 0. 
 
We repeated the same analyses above using general conservation at Time 2 as 
the outcome variable. At Step 1, discussion length was not significant, γ < 0.001, t(13) 
= -0.26, p = .80, and neither was behavioural content, γ = 0.34, t(13) = 1.46, p = .17. 
The interaction was added at Step 2, which was significant, γ = 0.003, t(13) = 2.32, p = 
.037. See Table 5.8. To investigate this interaction, I decomposed it with simple slope 
analyses. When discussion time was low, discussion content had no impact on 
behaviour, γ = 0.071, t(13) = 0.31, p = .76. When discussion time was high, discussion 
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content had a significant impact on conservation behaviour one week later, γ = 1.067, 
t(13) = 2.89, p = .013, with more discussion content leading to more self-reported 
behaviours. This interaction is plotted in Figure 5.2. 
 To investigate the role of environmental values, I repeated the analyses above 
with pre-test values added as an individual-level variable. These results were very similar 
to the results without controlling for values, with no qualitative differences. In the 
interest of space, the moderated HLM tables controlling for values can be found in 
Appendix A. Thus, the connection between environmental behaviour discussion 
content and behaviour cannot be explained just by pre-existing values. 
 
Table 5.8.  
Moderated HLM Table for General Conservation (Time 2) by Discussion Time and Content,  
Study 3. 
 
     
 γ Std. Error t p 
     
     
Step 1     
(Constant) 4.917 0.232 21.181 <.001 
Time Talking <0.001 0.001 -0.259 .800 
Beh. Content 0.339 0.233 1.456 .167 
     
     
Step 2     
(Constant) 4.600 0.243 18.944 <.001 
Time Talking <0.001 0.001 -0.607 .554 
Beh. Content 0.569 0.222 2.561 .024 
Time×Content 0.003 0.001 2.322 .037 
     
 
Note. Participant N = 47, Group N = 17. To prevent multicollinearity, Time Talking 
and Behavioural Content of Discussion are centred with M = 0. 
 
 While hierarchical linear modelling has advantages over traditional multiple 
linear regression in that it can account for different levels of variance within each 
nested group, HLM does not have an equivalent to R2 to report the variance explained 
by the model. To estimate R2, I repeated all of the analyses above using traditional 
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moderated regression techniques. The results were very similar to the results using 
HLM, with regression tables reported in Appendix B. Notably, the R2 was very high, R2 
= .37 using pre-test values and discussion to predict future behaviours and R2 = .50 
using Time 2 values and discussion to predict past behaviour. 
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
Low Behaviour High Behaviour
Discussion Content
G
en
er
al
 C
o
n
se
rv
at
io
n
High Time
Low Time
 
Figure 5.2. The interaction of environmental discussion content and discussion length 
on self-reported environmental behaviours one week after discussion, controlling for 
pre-test environmental values, Study 3. 
 
Predictive Power of Environmental Values and Behaviour 
To better understand how discussion may influence the connection between 
values and behaviours, I tested the correlations between values and behaviours, and 
compared these results to Study 1. Pre-test environmental values were good predictors 
of volunteering intentions, r = .48, p < .001 and general conservation one week later r = 
.45, p < .001. At Time 1, after the manipulation and discussion, values remained good 
predictors of volunteering, r = .33, p = .005 and conservation one week later, r = .48, p 
< .001. At Time 2, values were an excellent predictor of general conservation, r = .66, p 
< .001.  
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I then compared these correlations with those in Study 1 to see if they differed 
(see Table 5.9 for comparison). A Fisher’s z-test found the correlation between pre-test 
values and volunteering between this study and Study 1 were not significantly different, 
z = 1.22, p = .22. Similarly, the difference in correlations between pre-test values and  
 
Table 5.9 
Correlation r and R2 Values of Value Centrality and Env. Behaviours by Presence of Discussion, 
Studies 1 and 3. 
 
    
 Pre-Test Values Values Time 1 Values Time 2 
r(R2)       
 No Dis. Discuss No Dis. Discuss No Dis. Discuss 
       
       
Time 1:       
Volunteering .32(.10)** .48(.23)** .31(.10)** .33(.11)** .30(.09)** .26(.07)† 
       
Time 2:       
Gen. Conservation .21(.04)† .45(.20)** .16(.03) .48(.23)** .31(.10)** .66(.44)** 
       
 
Note. The data for “No Discussion” come from Study 1; the data for “Discussion” 
come from the present study. Volunteering intentions were measured at Time 1. 
General conservation self-report measures were self-report measures at Time 2, one 
week after Time 1. 
** = p < .01; * = p < .05; † = p < .1 
 
conservation one week later was not significant, z = 1.43, p = .15. Correlations between 
studies of values at Time 1 and volunteering were not different, z = .14, p = .89, but the 
difference in correlations between Time 1 values and general conservation was 
significant, z = 1.9, p = .05, with the relationship being stronger in this study (see 
Figure 5.3). At Time 2, the correlation between values and general conservation was 
again significantly different, z = 2.5, p = .01, with the correlation in this study being 
stronger than in Study 1, which had no group discussion. Thus, close to the time of 
manipulation, values and behavioural intentions were similar between studies, but as 
time progressed, values remained good predictors only in the present study. Engaging 
in small-group interaction narrowed participants’ value-action gap significantly. 
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Figure 5.3. R2 levels of environmental values (Time 1) predicting volunteering intentions 
(Time 1) and self-reported conservation behaviours one week later (Time 2), Studies 1 
and 3. 
 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to test the effect of small-group interaction on 
environmental values, intentions, and behaviours. Because the design of this study was 
very similar to Study 1, the results of these two studies can be compared to examine the 
effect of discussion. Past research indicates that manipulations that work on individuals 
in surveys often do not have the same effect after group discussions (Postmes et al., 
2001), which may be because inductive social influence over-rides the relatively weaker 
effect of deductive social influence. In support of this, the present study did not 
replicate the effects of valence and identity as found in Study 1. Results suggest 
participants understood the manipulation, as indicated by the manipulation check. 
Although these results are a departure from Study 1, they are not unexpected. 
I also predicted that the environmental behaviour content of the discussion 
would guide individual values and behaviours through the induction of group norms. I 
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found the more the group talked about environmental behaviours, the more the 
individuals valued the environment one week later, though not immediately following 
the discussion. This was not simply a case of people with high values both talking about 
and continuing to value the environment, as this effect was strong while controlling for 
pre-test values and values just after the discussion.  
I found a similar effect for self-reported conservation behaviour at Time 2, but 
not volunteering intentions at Time 1. The non-effect on volunteering at Time 1 may 
be because none of the groups actually discussed volunteering, while all of the groups 
discussed the private-sphere everyday conservation behaviours measured at Time 2. 
When discussion time was short, environmental behaviour content made no impact on 
behaviours. However, when discussion time was longer, the proportion of that time 
spent talking about environmental behaviour had a strong impact on the behaviours 
people reported one week later, with more talk translating into more behaviour. Again, 
this was not simply a matter of people who value the environment talking about it and 
then acting on it, as this effect remained strong even when controlling for initial 
environmental values. Thus, this study offers strong support for the notion that small-
group discussion provides a powerful and enduring influence in guiding environmental 
values and behaviour. 
I theorise that the process behind this effect is the induction of local group 
norms. Based on social identity principles, the subject matter of group discussion 
implies which ideals are valued by the group and what kind of behaviours are desirable. 
As group members reach consensus, local group norms are formed. These group 
norms go on to influence behaviour after the discussion has ended, as people 
internalise these norms as a part of their self-concept. The outcomes of this study 
provide support for this notion in the case of self-reported conservation behaviour one 
week later. However, there was no effect immediately after the discussion on 
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volunteering behaviour. This may be because environmental volunteering behaviour is 
notoriously difficult to predict (Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999; Stern, 
2000), or because the inductive norms formed through interaction take some time to 
become internalised, as was seen with the influence on values in this study. Regardless, 
the strong effect on self-reported behaviours one week after the discussion suggests 
discussion can lead to robust and durable effects on behaviour. 
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In conservation psychology, and social psychology as a whole, many models of 
normative influence portray norms as being external and coercive (see Chapter 1 for a 
review). In this theoretical paradigm, people conform to norms not because they want 
to, but because of the external repercussions if they do not. However, in this study, the 
effects of normative influence were found in anonymous responses, long after the 
discussion group had disbanded. This supports a conceptualisation of norms as 
internally motivating rather than just external and coercive. 
 An alternative explanation to the effects found here is that individuals simply 
spent more time and cognitive effort engaging with environmental issues, and any kind 
of engagement, not just discussion, may be responsible for these effects. Because I did 
not also test for individual engagement, I cannot definitively rule out this possibility. 
However, research carried out by L. Smith and Postmes (2010a) compared the effects 
of group discussion versus individual rumination in exploring discrimination. They 
found that individual rumination did not produce the effects found with group 
discussion, suggesting individual cognitive engagement is unlikely to have the same 
effect as group discussion determining environmental behaviours. Thus, I feel 
confident that while individual engagement of environmental issues are likely to have 
some effects on behaviours, the processes found in the present study are not simply an 
aggregate of several individual-level processes that could be recreated with participants 
in isolation. 
The deductive social comparisons in this study did not have the same influence 
on behaviours as in Study 1. An intergroup comparison led to slightly more 
conservation behaviour for high identifiers, although this effect was fairly weak. The 
valence of the feedback, which implied normative behaviour in Studies 1 and 2, did not 
have any effect in the present study. This is consistent with past research that 
manipulation effects can recede when combined with small-group interaction (Postmes 
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et al., 2001). In other research, manipulations sometimes do have an effect, influencing 
group discussion like a deductively-informed “seed” that grows into an inductively-
guided social process (L. Smith & Postmes, 2010a). Like real growing things, the 
outcome is not always controllable. Discrepancies in normative fit, which may still be 
influential in individual settings, may recede when the group considers them 
collectively. In this case, participants may question whether the environmental 
performance of their university relative to others is actually representative of them 
personally. Discussion can be a tool for challenging and overcoming existing 
stereotypes (L. Smith & Postmes, 2010b), and group members may use discussion to 
dismantle unwanted comparisons and their implied connotations for the ingroup. 
The predictive power of the measures used here is noteworthy. Conservation 
psychology has a history of chronically poor predictions of pro-environmental 
behaviours. A meta-analysis of attitudinal models of environmental behaviour found a 
typical prediction of 12% of variance in environmental behaviour explained (Hines, 
Hungerford, & Tomera, 1986/87), while Stern’s VBN model, one of the most elaborate 
and exhaustive measures, comprising more than 50 items, predicts 19.4% of the 
variance in past private-sphere environmental behaviours (Stern et al., 1999). In 
contrast, I used two items (the items comprising values at Time 1) to predict 23% of 
the variance in future private-sphere environmental behaviours and using values at Time 
2, 44% of the variance in past private-sphere behaviours was predicted. Using the 
simple content analysis of the group discussions, 25% of the variance in future pro-
environmental behaviours was predicted and 37% was predicted when pre-test values 
were added to the model. With values at Time 2, the model explains 50% of the 
variance in concrete, specific self-reported environmental behaviours. This level of 
explanatory power is unusually strong for the domain of conservation psychology and 
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highlights the importance of incorporating group-level social influence into theories of 
environmental behaviour.  
Narrowing the Value-Action Gap 
A frequent finding among conservation psychologists is that while pro-
environmental values are very high among the public, those values are often not 
actualised into pro-environmental behaviour. This has been termed the value-action 
gap, and is one of the leading quandaries within conservation psychology as a sub-
discipline. In Kollmuss and Agyeman’s (2002) review of the environmental value-action 
gap literature, they find that while explanations are as plentiful as they are diverse, none 
of these explanations have been particularly informative or predictive of actual 
outcomes (see Chapter 1 for a review of some common theoretical approaches). While 
many studies have contributed to narrowing the value-action gap, no theoretical 
approach has been able to close it or explain it conclusively. 
The discussion in this study worked to close the value-action gap significantly. 
Whereas in Study 1 there was little relationship between values and behaviours, the 
discussion in the present study strengthened the correlation dramatically (see Figure 
5.3). Research into values suggests values influence behaviour when the values are 
activated (i.e., conscious) and central to the self (Verplanken & Holland, 2002). Small-
group interaction can help facilitate both of these aspects, by increasing the conscious 
links between behaviours and environmental impacts, and making values more or less a 
part of identity though inductive social identity principles. Although intriguing, the 
exact process was not documented here, and more research is needed to investigate this 
further. 
Practical Implications 
 The results of this study offer a number of practical implications. This study 
demonstrates that discussion content can influence individual environmental values and 
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behaviours in very powerful ways. The explanatory power found here outstretches 
most other studies in the research literature, far beyond measuring environmental 
attitudes (Hines, Hungerford, & Tomera, 1986/87), comprehensive multivariate models 
(Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999), or flat-out paying people to conserve 
(Stern, 1999). One reliable effect found here is that those with high environmental 
values have even higher values after discussion, and the reverse is true for those with 
low values. This effect can be exploited by having those with high values discuss the 
environment more often. However, the effect that discussion content influences 
behaviour independent of values is more difficult to control. Small-group interaction is 
an “organic” process, and attempts at outside control may be unsuccessful, especially in 
public campaigns. If implemented in an intervention setting, a facilitator or preset 
guided questions may be helpful in keeping discussion topical. 
 Discussion should not be seen as a panacea for promoting environmental 
behaviour, as this research shows the strong effects of discussion can just as easily lead 
to less pro-environmental behaviour instead of more. Even pro-environmental people 
who are exposed to discussion that devalues the environment may end up engaging in 
less pro-environmental behaviour. This highlights the importance of not only targeting 
individuals for change but social groups as well. If discussion is used as an intervention 
technique, pre-testing may be necessary to identify those with higher values and limit 
discussion to those individuals, using subtle techniques to keep discussion on topic. 
This facilitator-led discussion format has already had success in promoting activism 
behaviours in opinion-based groups (McGarty et al., 2007; Thomas & McGarty, 2009). 
Overall, the inductive processes created by small-group interaction appear to be 
more powerful than the deductive processes explored in the other studies in this thesis. 
The comparison manipulations that were reliable in the other studies had an effect of 
comparison type in this study, but not feedback valence. The variance explained by 
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group discussion in this study is much higher than from comparative feedback received 
individually in the other studies, making group discussion a good candidate for use in 
controlled interventions. However, organised discussion would be difficult to 
implement on a large scale, while comparative feedback is very simple to use publicly, 
so the size of the target audience and the resources available would be guiding factors 
in determining which method to use. 
Limitations and Future Research 
 The results found here appear to be robust and informative, but additional 
research would be helpful in uncovering more information about the underlying 
theoretical process. Based on the social identity approach, I predicted that group 
members reach consensus through discussion, which implies local group norms. These 
internalised norms go on to inform individual behaviours. While past research has 
found strong support for each of these steps, as reviewed above, I did not measure 
specific process variables in this study, and I cannot rule out other processes. For 
example, many participants made verbal commitments to change their behaviour in the 
discussion. Past research has found eliciting commitments to be an effective way of 
changing environmental behaviour such as water conservation (Dickerson, Thibodeau, 
Aronson, & Miller, 1992) and recycling (Fried & Aronson, 1995), and these effects 
could have been driving part of the behavioural change. However, commitment effects 
need not be incompatible with or exclusive of social identity processes, particularly 
when commitments take place within a group setting when group identity is salient. 
Simply thinking about environmental issues for several minutes may have also served to 
promote behaviour. To tease apart these alternate processes, future research should 
include conditions where participants either have a discussion, make an environmental 
commitment without discussion, or ruminate about environmental issues privately. 
Research by L. Smith and Postmes (2010b) on discrimination which compared private 
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rumination to discussion found rumination did not impact discriminatory behaviour 
while discussion did have an effect, suggesting a special role for the social aspect of 
discussion. Further research may also uncover additional insights about small-group 
processes, such as the effect of group conflict on influencing behaviour, and better 
understanding of the determinants that lead to group discussion content. 
While strong effects for discussion were found in this study, other forms of 
small-group interaction may provide similar effects. In previous studies, computer-
mediated communication has also been shown to offer a route to inductive group norm 
formation (Postmes et al., 2000; Postmes et al., 2001). Further research could be 
directed at how alternative forms of small-group interaction, such as through the 
internet, can lead to similar effects. Online discussions may be particularly powerful in 
guiding behaviour because people often gather online around their particular opinions, 
allowing the content of their discussion to be more homogenous and consensual than a 
similar discussion offline. This may be observed on forums and websites dedicated to 
environmentalism or, likewise, denial of climate change. These groups often become 
highly-consensual echo-chambers of opinion. Being able to communicate with like-
minded others online may provide a competing set of inductive group norms to 
compete with the prevailing geographical norms. 
 Although this study did not measure behaviour directly, it did measure specific 
self-reports of concrete behaviours that participants personally selected. However, 
specifically-defined self-reports are considered to be fairly robust. Furthermore, studies 
of small-group interaction in other domains have found behavioural effects (L. Smith & 
Postmes, 2010b). Thus, I have some confidence that these differences in self-reported 
behaviour were reflections of changes in real behaviours, and not just perceptions of 
behaviour. 
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 More generally, conservation psychologists would benefit from integrating 
social influence factors into their future research. Because human behaviours are 
socially informed, studying only individual-level variables limits explanatory power to 
the constraints of the theoretical paradigm, as reviewed in Chapter 1. Relying on self-
reported normative influence is not enough, as participants routinely dismiss that their 
actions are influenced by others (Cialdini, 2005; Nolan, Schultz, Cialdini, Goldstein, & 
Griskevicius, 2008), illustrating the need to measure actual normative influence rather 
than self-reported influence. Despite this, the results are clear; inductive social influence 
is a powerful determinant of behaviour, and both future researchers and campaigners 
would benefit from exploiting this rather than ignoring it. 
Conclusion 
 In summary, this study examined the effect of small-group interaction on 
environmental values and behaviour. First, the comparative feedback that led to effects 
in Studies 1 and 2 no longer had an effect with the addition of discussion. Second, 
environmental behaviour discussion content was found to guide both values and 
behaviour, with more pro-environmental behaviour content leading to greater values 
and behaviour one week after discussion. This was independent of initial values, 
providing support for the notion that group norms developed inductively through 
discussion play an important role in guiding behaviours. Finally, discussion led to a 
much stronger connection between environmental values and behaviours. These results 
may explain why prior research in conservation psychology, which usually does not 
account for interaction among people, has typically found a poor relationship between 
values and behaviours. 
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– CHAPTER 6 – 
Differential Effects of Comparisons Between Groups and Comparisons Within Groups 
 
Despite recent growth in research into the psychology of environmental 
behaviour, relatively little of it has examined the social setting in which environmental 
behaviour occurs. In Chapters 4 and 5, I examined varying types of intergroup 
comparisons, and how other factors, such as social identification strength or small-
group interaction, can moderate comparison effects. In the present chapter, I will 
explore how comparisons between groups can be different from comparisons within a 
group. 
The research that exists on social influences and environmental behaviour has 
tended to look at social influence in the form of intergroup competition. For example, 
Siero and colleagues (1996) studied energy use at two Dutch factories. At one factory, 
workers received comparative feedback about how both they and the competing 
factory were performing at saving energy. The other factory workers received 
information about their own environmental behaviour but were unaware of the other 
factory’s involvement. The results showed that both groups saved energy in response to 
feedback, but the group receiving comparative feedback conserved more, and 
continued to do so six months after the intervention. Although Siero and colleagues did 
not investigate the psychological mechanisms behind the apparent effects of these 
group-level comparisons, they attributed these to a “competitive orientation” (p. 245) 
that became internalised among the factory employees. However, Siero and colleagues 
do not investigate how comparisons within groups may be different from comparisons 
between groups. 
The aim of the current research is to further explore how the individual’s social 
milieu influences decision-making processes regarding the natural environment. 
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Specifically, drawing on the social identity approach (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 
1991), I argue that individual behaviour is often understood and enacted with reference 
to self-defining social groups. For example, the extent to which issues are perceived to 
be important often depends on whether they connect to important group 
memberships, and behaviours are more likely to be enacted to the extent that they are 
consistent with salient group norms (e.g., Smith, Terry, Crosier, & Duck, 2005; see also 
Hogg & Smith, 2007). Thus, the performance of one’s group with respect to 
environmental issues (e.g., Siero et al., 1996) can seem to frame the ways in which 
individuals think about and engage in environmental behaviour. The present research 
addresses this issue by demonstrating that not only is group context important to 
understand how people respond to social feedback, but small differences in the framing 
of social comparisons have substantial power to influence how we perceive and act 
upon that feedback. 
Social Identity and Influence 
Individual behaviour can be particularly intractable even in the face of concerted 
efforts to promote change, a point that has been demonstrated in a variety of domains 
including drug abuse prevention (Derzon & Lipsey, 2002; West & O'Neal, 2004), sexual 
health (Albarracín et al., 2005; Brückner & Bearman, 2005; Hauser, 2004; Trenholm et 
al., 2007), and conservation behaviour (Stern, 1999; Stern et al., 1986). Many 
unsuccessful behaviour change campaigns share the assumption that each person will 
make their own choices based on the facts they have, the attitudes they hold, and their 
rational self-interest. In contrast to this assumption, there is ample evidence that 
individual knowledge (e.g., Hornik, 1989; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002) and general 
attitudes are poor predictors of specific behaviours (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein 
& Ajzen, 1975; Newhouse, 1990; Wicker, 1969). Even individual economic incentives 
tend to fare poorly (Stern, 1999; Stern et al., 1986). Thus, although important, 
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individual factors (i.e, knowledge, attitudes, and incentives) seem to provide an 
incomplete account of the process of behaviour change. One reason for this is that 
individual decisions about how to act in a given domain are also framed by a multitude 
of social influences (Hornik, 1997), the power of which is often underestimated 
(Cialdini, 2005; Nolan, Schultz, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2008). Instead of 
ignoring sources of social influence, those who seek to change behaviour may do better 
by capitalising on them, and harnessing their persuasive power. 
 The social identity approach offers a comprehensive account of when and why 
different sources of social influence can become effective guides to individual 
behaviour. According to this perspective, comprising both social identity theory (Tajfel 
& Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & 
Wetherell, 1987), people are members of a number of different social groups (e.g., 
nationality, occupation, gender, etc). These group memberships can be an important 
basis for identity alongside more personal preferences and experiences. The approach 
predicts that when a group membership is the salient basis for self-definition in a given 
context, individuals will tend to appraise the situation through the lens of that identity, 
and their thoughts, feelings, and actions will reflect the shared norms, values and 
standards associated with that identity. In this way, social influence occurs through the 
mechanism of shared group membership (Turner, 1991). Importantly, rather than being 
a force imposed externally upon an individual, social influence stems from an 
internalised sense of identity.  
 In addition to highlighting the importance of social identities to individual 
behaviour, another key aspect of this approach is the idea that identities are flexible and 
dynamic. The specific identities that are salient, and the meaning that is attached to 
these, vary in response to context (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 
1990). Here, intergroup comparisons are thought to be particularly important: what it 
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means to be a member of one group is often defined in contrast to relevant outgroups. 
For example, Doosje, Haslam, Spears, Oakes, and Koomen (1998) demonstrated that 
whether or not psychologists described themselves as dramatic or scientific dependent 
on whether they compared their group to physicists or dramatists, respectively. 
Applying these principles to the environmental domain, research by Rabinovich, 
Morton, Postmes, and Verplanken, (2008) explored how intergroup comparisons 
influence ingroup stereotypes and individual environmental action. Consistent with the 
social identity approach, their results showed that when British participants compared 
their group to the USA (a stereotypically poor-performing group in environmental 
terms) they perceived their nation as more stereotypically environmental than when 
they compared this group to Sweden (a stereotypically well-performing group in 
environmental terms). In addition to shifting ingroup stereotypes, these comparisons 
shifted individual environmental intentions: British participants reported more positive 
environmental intentions after comparing their group to the USA, and less positive 
intentions after comparing their group to Sweden. Importantly, these effects on 
individual intentions were mediated through the centrality of environmental values to 
the self. Thus, intergroup comparisons define not just who we are collectively, but also 
who the individual is as a group member and how they act in turn.  
The effects of Rabinovich and colleagues (2008) provide an important 
qualification to the work of Siero et al. (1996). Rather than all forms of intergroup 
comparison increasing pro-environmental action via activation of a “competitive 
orientation”, positive intergroup comparisons are likely to be more effective at 
encouraging behaviour via the internalisation of positive stereotypes about one’s group. 
Thus, the extent to which comparisons facilitate behaviour is likely to be contingent on 
the extent to which these contribute to a positive sense of identity, at least in intergroup 
contexts. In the absence of a comparison outgroup (i.e., in intragroup contexts) these 
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processes of self-stereotyping are likely to play less of a role, and accordingly the 
superiority of positive comparisons may also recede. Under these conditions, negative 
comparisons may in fact be more effective at stimulating behaviour than positive 
comparisons. 
In the absence of a comparison outgroup, group members may reflect on how 
their current behaviour meets their group’s own standards, implicitly suggesting a group 
goal of resolving any discrepancies between the group’s standards and actual group 
performance. Past research has found that goals generated from within the group are 
more motivating, lead group members to be more willing to compensate for weaker 
group members, and to place a higher importance on group success than when goals 
are instigated from outside the group (Wegge & Haslam, 2005). The effectiveness of 
group goal-setting is explained through self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), 
where the act of group categorization leads to increased social identity accessibility and 
fit, and people see themselves more as prototypical group members and less as 
individuals. This in turn reinforces a sense of common fate and purpose (Oakes, 
Haslam, & Turner, 1991; Wegge & Haslam, 2003). 
If the group has improved upon their past behaviour, group members are likely 
to conclude that they are living up to their own standards. This may contribute to 
positive feelings, but there may be little motivation to continue to improve, as people 
feel they, or their group, have “done enough”. This is consistent with the “boomerang 
effect,” whereby unqualified positive feedback results in reduced environmental 
behaviour (Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007). Similarly, 
positive intragroup comparisons over time have also been found to reduce motivation 
to combat sexism (Schmitt, Spoor, Danaher, & Branscombe, 2009); positive intragroup 
comparisons of discrimination against women (i.e., how gender equality has improved 
over time) led female participants to be relatively content with current levels of 
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discrimination against women, to expect sexual discrimination to be less frequent, and 
to be more weakly identified with other women. When the comparisons were 
intergroup (i.e., how women are still treated less than equally with men today) women 
were more dissatisfied with current levels of gender discrimination. In other words, 
drawing attention to improvement on past problems can lead to complacency and 
reduced motivation, even if the original problem still exists. 
In contrast, negative intragroup feedback should highlight the extent to which 
the group’s current performance is not living up to its own standards. The discrepancy 
between present performance and the standards set by their group in the past suggests 
an unspoken goal that the group should restore their collective performance to match 
their shared standards. Unlike with intergroup comparisons, no outgroup is readily 
available for group members to contrast and self-stereotype against. Consistent with 
self-categorization theory, this intragroup comparison will lead group members to a 
sense that the group problem is shared and should be addressed collectively with a 
common purpose (Wegge & Haslam, 2003). While negative feedback can elicit 
defensiveness and rejection when it is linked to an outsider (the intergroup sensitivity 
effect: Hornsey, 2005; Hornsey & Esposo, 2009), decoupling criticism from an outside 
group and keeping the context of the criticism ‘in house’ can lead people to take that 
feedback constructively and to act on it. Thus, intragroup comparisons can provide a 
more productive context to provide negative feedback than with intergroup 
comparisons, where the association of an outside group may lead to outright rejection 
of any criticism. 
The Present Research 
In this chapter, I examine the effects of different types of comparison on 
individual intentions in the environmental domain. Chapter 4 has already examined 
some of these ideas, but only in the context of intergroup comparisons. Previous 
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research has demonstrated that intergroup comparative feedback can motivate positive 
environmental behaviour (Siero et al., 1996), but that the effect of such intergroup 
comparisons may be contingent on the extent to which they portray the ingroup in a 
positive light (Rabinovich et al., 2008). To address this question, I considered how the 
effects of feedback valence might be contingent on the group-based context of the 
feedback. Specifically, although positive feedback may be superior to negative feedback 
in the context of intergroup comparisons, negative feedback may be more motivating in 
the context of intragroup comparisons. In addition, different processes may be 
responsible for the effects of comparative feedback in inter- versus intragroup contexts. 
In line with self-categorization theory, I expect that intergroup comparisons 
result in perceptions that contrast the ingroup away from outgroup standards. Thus 
positive comparisons (i.e., with a poorer performing outgroup) elicit greater 
conservation behaviour because group members come to see their group, and therefore 
themselves, as people who value and act to protect the environment. Negative 
comparisons (i.e., with a better performing outgroup) should instead lead to 
disengagement from conservation behaviour as group members perceive concern for 
the environment is not a central value for their group or their self. Along these lines, 
the process behind intergroup comparison effects should stem from shifting 
perceptions of the ingroup stereotype, which is then internalised into the self (i.e., self-
stereotyping).  
Drawing on more general principles from the social identity approach, my 
expectation is that intragroup comparisons should lead to different effects. In the 
absence of an outgroup, the ingroup should be the focus of attention and group 
members should be more attuned to whether their ingroup is living up to its own 
standards. If group standards are not being met, this implies a shared goal of matching 
their behaviour to their standards. Accordingly, in intragroup contexts, positive 
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comparisons should lead to less conservation behaviour as people feel the group’s goals 
have been accomplished (see Schultz et al., 2007; Spoor & Schmitt, 2009). Conversely, 
negative comparisons should lead to greater conservation behaviour as this situation 
highlights how the ingroup has fallen short of its own standards, increasing motivation 
to perform better. 
In sum, my predictions involve different effects of group-level comparative 
feedback (positive, negative) on individual behaviour depending on whether that 
feedback involves intergroup or intragroup comparisons. To test these predictions I 
conducted two experiments in which participants received feedback about Britain’s 
national CO2 emissions either in comparison to an outgroup or to Britain’s own 
previous performance (i.e., an intergroup versus an intragroup comparison). The 
specific information presented in these comparisons was varied such that it was either 
relatively positive for the ingroup (i.e., Britain was doing better than an outgroup or its 
own past) or relatively negative for the ingroup (i.e., Britain was doing worse than an 
outgroup or its own past). Importantly, the actual level of Britain’s CO2 emissions 
remained constant across conditions; only the comparative information varied. 
STUDY 4 
Method 
Participants 
Participants (N = 104) were university students of ages 18 to 50, with a median 
age of 20 years. All participants were British citizens. Participants were recruited by 
email from a list of university students who had volunteered at the start of the academic 
year to take part in psychological studies. Participation was rewarded with a chance to 
win one of four online vouchers worth £20 each.  
 147 
Design 
 This study used a 2 × 2 between-subjects design, with independent variables of 
comparison type (intergroup or intragroup) and comparison valence (positive, 
negative). All information collected from participants was gathered in the form of an 
online questionnaire. The manipulations were contained in an explanatory text read by 
participants before they completed the dependent variables (conservation behavioural 
intentions, environmental value centrality, and shared responsibility). Items were 
measured on a 7-point Likert-style scale anchored with “Strongly Disagree” and 
“Strongly Agree” or similar labels, depending on the context of the item. 
Manipulations 
In the intergroup comparison condition, participants were provided with 
information about Britain’s environmental performance relative to other nations. 
Specifically, they were told British people were either polluting half as much as 
Americans (a relatively positive, downward comparison) or twice as much as Swedes (a 
relatively negative, upward comparison). The exact wording of the manipulation was as 
follows: 
The UN Statistics Division tracks greenhouse gas emissions from each nation. 
They found that in 2004, the average British person emitted 9.8 tonnes of CO2 
equivalent greenhouse gasses. In comparison, the average American [Swedish] 
person polluted far more, 20.4 [less, 4.7] tonnes of greenhouse gasses. Per 
person, British people are polluting less than half [more than twice] as much 
as American [Swedish] people. 
 
Words in bold indicate text that varied depending on condition, with the words 
out of square brackets appearing in the positive intergroup comparison manipulation, 
and words in square brackets in the negative intergroup comparison. The bolding and 
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brackets were not present in the original text. In the intragroup comparison condition, 
the wording of the manipulation was identical, except that the comparisons were made 
with British people of the past, rather than people from other nations. Specifically, 
participants were told that British people were now polluting half as much as British 
people 10 years ago (a positive comparison) or twice as much as British people 10 years 
ago (a negative comparison). The actual amount that British people were said to be 
polluting today remained the same across conditions. To check the effectiveness of this 
manipulation, immediately after reading the text participants were asked the extent to 
which they agreed that “Britain is taking better care of the environment than 
Sweden/America/in the past”.  
Measures 
 After participants were exposed to the manipulations, participants completed 
measures of national stereotypes and intentions to engage in conservation behaviour.  
National stereotypes. After reading the manipulations and completing the 
manipulation check, participants first completed eight items concerning national 
stereotypes about Britain, America and Sweden in terms of the dimensions of 
competence (“competent,” “intelligent,” and “skilled”, α = .89 for the ingroup; α = .91 
for the outgroup), warmth (“warm,” “friendly,” and “trustworthy”, α = .85 for the 
ingroup; α = .77 for the outgroup), and environmentalism (“environmentally aware” 
and “environmentally active”, α = .65 for the ingroup; α = .98 for the outgroup). In the 
two intra-group comparison conditions, only stereotypes about British people were 
measured. 
 Conservation intentions. Conservation intentions were then measured through the 
item, “Over the next week, do you intend to do environmental behaviours like save 
energy and recycle?” This was anchored with “not at all” and “very much so” on a 7-
point scale. 
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Procedure 
Participants were invited to participate in the study through email and given a 
link to one of the four surveys. Participants were not aware of the experimental design 
or that there were multiple versions of the survey. Once participants completed the 
survey, they were debriefed and compensated via email.  
Results 
Full descriptive statistics are presented in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1.  
Means and Standard Deviations of All Variables in Studies 4 and 5 by Feedback Valence and 
Comparison Type. 
 
      
 Intergroup Intragroup  
Study 4     Total 
 Positive Negative Positive Negative  
      
      
Manipulation Check 6.03(0.80) 2.59(1.35) 5.33(1.32) 3.43(1.65) 4.36(1.93) 
Ingroup Competence 4.77(0.84) 4.72(1.00) 4.40(1.17) 4.46(1.11) 4.62(1.02) 
Ingroup Warmth 4.02(1.03) 4.07(1.22) 3.81(1.13) 3.96(1.18) 3.98(1.12) 
Ingroup Environmental 4.48(0.79) 4.24(1.19) 3.81(0.97) 3.85(1.00) 4.14(1.02) 
Outgroup Competence 4.24(1.18) 5.21(0.71) — — 4.71(1.09) 
Outgroup Warmth 4.63(1.04) 4.60(0.92) — — 4.62(0.98) 
Outgroup Environmental 2.04(1.04) 5.76(0.80) — — 3.84(2.08) 
Conservation Intentions 4.81(1.30) 4.90(1.61) 5.48(1.50) 5.30(1.19) 5.08(1.42) 
      
      
 Intergroup Intragroup  
Study 5     Total 
 Positive Negative Positive Negative  
      
      
Manipulation Check 6.00(1.30) 2.19(1.07) 5.66(1.10) 3.28(1.65) 4.33(2.06) 
Env Value Centrality 4.37(1.36) 3.60(1.27) 4.11(1.42) 4.73(1.20) 4.17(1.37) 
Shared Env Responsibility 5.95(1.12) 5.38(1.40) 5.41(1.48) 6.03(0.74) 5.66(1.27) 
Conservation Intentions 5.44(1.27) 4.79(1.62) 5.11(1.59) 5.62(1.19) 5.21(1.47) 
      
 
Note. All scores measured on a scale of 1 to 7. 
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Manipulation Check 
 The manipulation check indicated that participants understood the 
manipulation. In a 2 × 2 ANOVA, there was a main effect of valence, F(1,100) = 
110.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .52, with participants in the positive conditions having rated 
Britain as performing better at environmental behaviour (M = 5.75, SD = 1.08) than 
those in the negative conditions (M = 2.96, SD = 1.53). There was no main effect of 
comparison type, F(1,100) = .086, p = .77, ηp2 = .001. However, the effect of valence 
was qualified by a significant interaction, F(1,100) = 9.23, p = .003, ηp2 = .085, with the 
magnitude of the difference being greater for intergroup comparisons ( Mpositive = 6.03, 
SD = 0.80; Mnegative = 2.59, SD = 1.35) rather than intragroup comparisons (Mpositive = 
5.33, SD = 1.32; Mnegative = 3.43, SD = 1.65). Thus, the manipulation was successful, 
but especially so for intergroup comparisons. 
National Stereotypes 
 To analyse national stereotypes, I conducted a series of ANOVAs. Outgroup 
stereotypes only applied to intergroup comparison conditions and were analysed with 
one-way ANOVAs of positive and negative valence. For outgroup competence, there 
was a main effect of valence, F(1,58) = 14.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .20, with the Swedish (M 
= 5.21, SD = 0.71) viewed as more competent than Americans (M = 4.24, SD = 1.18). 
For outgroup warmth, there was no significant difference between groups, F(1,58) = 
0.02, p = .89, ηp2 < .001. For outgroup environmentalism, there was a large main effect, 
F(1,58) = 239.32, p < .001, ηp2 = .81, with the Swedish (M = 5.21, SD = 0.71) seen as 
more pro-environmental than the Americans (M = 2.05, SD = 1.04). 
 Ingroup stereotypes were analysed with 2 × 2 ANOVAs of comparison type 
and valence. For ingroup national stereotypes of competence, there was no main effect 
of valence, F(1,100) = 0.002, p = .97, ηp2 < .001, comparison, F(1,100) = 2.49, p = .118, 
ηp2 = .02, or significant interaction, F(1,100) = 0.08, p = .77, ηp2 = .001. For ingroup 
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stereotypes of warmth, there were no significant effects, valence, F(1,100) = 0.19, p = 
.69, ηp2 = .002, comparison, F(1,100) = 0.52, p = .47, ηp2 = .005, or significant 
interaction, F(1,100) = 0.05, p = .83, ηp2 < .001. For environmentalism, there was no 
significant effect of valence, F(1,100) = 0.27, p = .61, ηp2 = .003, but there was a 
significant effect of comparison type, F(1,100) = 7.26, p = .008, ηp2 = .07, with 
intergroup comparisons (M = 4.37, SD = 1.00) leading to more environmental 
stereotypes than intragroup comparisons (M = 3.83, SD = 0.98). The interaction was 
not significant, F(1,100) = 0.50, p = .48, ηp2 = .005. 
Conservation Intentions 
To analyse conservation intentions, I ran a 2 × 2 ANOVA of comparison type 
and valence on environmental behaviour intentions. The results revealed a marginally 
significant effect of comparison type, F(1,100) = 3.69, p = .058, ηp2 = .036, with 
intergroup comparisons associated with lower environmental behaviour (M = 4.85, SD 
= 1.45) than intragroup comparisons (M = 5.39, SD = 1.33). The main effect of 
valence was not significant, F(1,100) = .02, p = .89, ηp2 < .001, and neither was the 
interaction, F(1,100) = .22, p = .64, ηp2 = .002. 
Discussion 
For national stereotypes, participants did find the Swedish to be more pro-
environmental than the Americans. However, British stereotypes did not change, 
except for an increase in pro-environmental stereotypes with intergroup comparisons 
over intragroup comparisons. This may be a social-competition effect. 
 For the conservation intentions, the only effect found was that intergroup 
comparisons led to slightly less behaviour than intragroup comparisons. This is 
unexpected for social identity theory, and at odds with the national stereotype results, 
as social competition through comparisons typically causes an increase in behaviour 
rather than a decrease. 
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These results did not support my predictions, and are not in line with prior 
research on intergroup comparisons. However, several participants left feedback that 
they found the national stereotyping questions to be offensive and inappropriate. In 
prior studies that have measured national stereotypes (e.g., Rabinovich et al, 2008), the 
questions have been more subtle than ours. I believe that this measure may have 
confounded the study’s results by causing participant hostility toward the experiment 
and clouding potential results. To investigate this further, I repeated the study, but 
without the national stereotype questions. The additional process variables of 
environmental value centrality and shared environmental responsibility were also 
included. 
STUDY 5 
In this study, I seek to improve upon the previous study by removing the 
potentially confounding effect of the national stereotype questions. Additionally, 
process variables have been included to further investigate how the predicted changes 
occur. 
For intergroup comparisons, the between-group, deductive comparison should 
lead to a change in self-stereotyping, defined by a shift in the values which are 
considered central to the group. To document this empirically, the effects of intergroup 
comparisons are predicted to be mediated through changes in the centrality of 
environmental values to the self in response to intergroup comparisons. This chain of 
effects has been demonstrated in previous research (i.e., Rabinovich et al., 2008).  
For intragroup comparisons, the opposite behavioural effects from intergroup 
comparisons are expected, and for this process to be focused on meeting internal group 
goals. This should be mediated by a re-emphasis on collective standards and particularly 
shared responsibility, because when group goals are internally devised, rather than 
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imposed from outside, groups efforts are characterized by shared responsibility for 
accomplishing those goals (Wegge & Haslam, 2003).  
Method 
Participants 
Participants (N = 157) were university students of ages 18 to 47 years, with a 
median age of 19. Similar to Study 4, all participants were British citizens. Participants 
were recruited by email from a list of university students who had volunteered at the 
start of the academic year to take part in psychological studies. Participation was 
rewarded with a chance to win one of eight online vouchers worth £20 each. 
Design 
 This study used the same 2 × 2 between-subjects design, with independent 
variables of comparison type (intergroup or intragroup) and comparison valence 
(positive, negative) as in Study 4. 
Manipulations 
The manipulation and manipulation check were identical to Study 4. 
Measures 
 After participants were exposed to the manipulations, participants completed 
the same measures as in Study 4, with the exception of national stereotypes, and the 
addition of environmental value centrality and perceptions of shared national 
responsibility for environmental care. 
Environmental value centrality. Participants indicated their agreement with the 
following statements: “Protecting the environment is not really central to my values,” 
and, “In the scheme of things, there are a lot of other issues that are more important 
than the environment,” anchored with the labels “strongly disagree” and “strongly 
agree” on a 7-point scale. These items were phrased as reverse items to reduce social 
desirability and restricted variance that can occur with positively-framed value items. 
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These items were significantly correlated (r = .52, p < .001) and scored such that higher 
scores indicated that the environment was a more central value. 
Shared environmental responsibility. This was measured through the single item, 
“Citizens share responsibility for their nation’s environmental record” in which 
participants indicated their agreement on a 7-point scale anchored with “strongly 
disagree” and “strongly agree”. 
Procedure 
As in Study 4, participants were invited to participate in the study through email 
and given a link to one of the four surveys. Participants were not aware of the 
experimental design or that there were multiple versions of the survey. Once 
participants completed the survey, they were debriefed and compensated via email. 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
 The manipulation check indicated that participants understood the 
manipulation. In a 2 × 2 ANOVA, there was a main effect of comparison valence, 
F(1,153) = 229.44, p < .001, ηp2 = .60, with participants in the positive comparison 
conditions rating Britain as performing better at environmental behaviour (M = 5.82, 
SD = 1.20) than those in the negative conditions (M = 2.66, SD = 1.45). No significant 
main effect of comparison type was found, F(1,153) = 3.37, p = .07, ηp2 = .02. 
However, the effect of comparison valence was qualified by a significant interaction, 
F(1,153) = 12.28, p = .001, ηp2 = .07, with the magnitude of the difference being greater 
for intergroup comparisons (Mpositive = 6.00, SD = 1.30; Mnegative = 2.19, SD = 1.07) 
than for intragroup comparisons (Mpositive = 5.66, SD = 1.10; Mnegative = 3.28, SD = 
1.65). Thus, as in Study 4, the manipulation was successful, but especially so for 
intergroup comparisons. 
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Conservation Intentions 
 To test the effect of the experimental manipulation on conservation behaviour 
intentions, I conducted a 2 × 2 ANOVA. This analysis revealed no main effects of 
feedback valence, F(1,153) = .09, p = .77, ηp2 = .001 or comparison type, F(1,153) = 
1.23, p = .27, ηp2 = .008. There was, however, a significant interaction, F(1,153) = 6.23, 
p = .014, ηp2 = .04. This interaction is depicted in Figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1. Mean shared conservation intentions by feedback valence and comparison 
type, Study 5. 
 
Follow-up analyses revealed a significant effect of comparison valence in the 
intergroup comparison condition, F(1,153) = 4.08, p = .045, ηp2 = .026: positive 
comparisons (M = 5.44, SD = 1.27) were associated with stronger intentions to engage 
in conservation behaviour than negative comparisons (M = 4.79, SD = 1.62). The same 
effect did not reach significance in the intragroup condition, F(1,153) = 2.31, p = .13, 
ηp2 = .015. However, the pattern of means was in the opposite direction with negative 
comparisons (M = 5.63, SD = 1.19) associated with stronger intentions than positive 
comparisons (M = 5.11 SD = 1.59). Looked at differently, there was a significant effect 
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of context for negative comparisons, F(1,153) = 6.11, p = .02, ηp2 = .04, such that 
intergroup comparisons resulted in weaker behavioural intentions (M = 4.79, SD = 
1.66) than intragroup comparisons (M = 5.62, SD = 1.19). There was no effect of 
context for positive comparisons, F(1,153) = 1.03, p = .31, ηp2 = .007. In combination, 
these patterns suggest that the effects of comparative feedback on intentions depends 
on the context of that feedback: Negative feedback elicits stronger intentions when 
delivered in an intragroup context than an intergroup context, whereas positive 
feedback is more effective in intergroup contexts than negative feedback.  
 The same analysis performed on value centrality revealed a significant main 
effect of comparison type, F(1,153) = 4.28, p = .04, ηp2 = .03, with intragroup 
comparisons (M = 4.38, SD = 1.36) associated with higher levels of environmental 
value centrality than intergroup comparisons (M = 3.97, SD = 1.36). There was no 
effect of comparison valence, F(1,153) = 0.13, p = .72, ηp2 = .001. However, the 
interaction between these factors was significant, F(1,153) = 10.76, p = .001, ηp2 = .07. 
As can be seen in Figure 6.2, this mirrored the pattern found for conservation 
behaviour intentions.  
Follow-up comparisons revealed that the interaction was driven by significant, 
but opposing, effects in the intergroup and intragroup conditions. In the intergroup 
condition, positive comparisons (M = 4.37, SD = 1.36) were associated with greater 
centrality of environmental values than negative comparisons (M = 1.27, SD = 1.27), 
F(1,153) = 6.95, p = .009, ηp2 = .04. In the intragroup condition this was reversed, with 
negative comparisons (M = 4.73, SD = 1.20) associated with greater centrality of 
environmental values than positive comparisons (M = 4.11, SD = 1.43), F(1,153) = 
4.07, p = .026, ηp2 = .03. 
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Figure 6.2. Mean environmental value centrality by feedback valence and comparison 
type, Study 5. 
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Figure 6.3. Mean shared environmental responsibility by feedback valence and 
comparison type, Study 5. 
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The ANOVA on shared responsibility revealed no significant main effects of 
comparison type, F(1,153) = 0.76, p = .78, ηp2 < .001, or valence, F(1,153) = 0.18, p = 
.89, ηp2 < .001, but the two-way interaction between these factors was significant, 
F(1,153) = 8.75, p = .004, ηp2 = .05 (see Figure 6.3). Follow-up tests again revealed that 
this was due to significant, but opposing, effects of valence in each of the comparison 
conditions. In the intergroup comparison condition, positive comparisons (M = 5.95, 
SD = 1.12) were associated with a stronger sense of shared responsibility than negative 
comparisons (M = 5.38, SD = 1.48), F(1,153) = 4.17, p = .043, ηp2 = .03. In the 
intragroup condition, this pattern was reversed with negative comparisons (M = 6.03, 
SD = 0.74) associated with a stronger sense of shared responsibility than positive 
comparisons (M = 5.41 SD = 1.48), F(1,153) = 4.58, p = .034, ηp2 = .03.  
Mediation 
Our expectation was that the differential effects of comparison type in response 
to intergroup and intragroup comparisons would be differentially mediated by value 
centrality (in the intergroup condition) and shared responsibility (in the intragroup 
condition). Given the parallel patterns of effect, each of these patterns of mediation 
was possible.  
To test whether value centrality mediated the effect of comparison valence on 
intergroup comparisons I conducted a series of regressions following the logic of Baron 
and Kenny (1986). As demonstrated in the above analyses, in the intergroup 
comparison condition, there were significant effects of comparison valence (coded as 
positive = 1, negative = 2) on conservation intentions (β = -0.22, p = .049) and value 
centrality (β = -0.29, p = .009). When both comparison valence and value centrality (the 
proposed mediator) were included as simultaneous predictors of intentions, value 
centrality was a significant predictor of conservation intentions (β = 0.36, p = .001), but 
valence was not (β = -0.12, p = .29). A significant Sobel test (z = -2.09, p = .037) 
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confirmed that value centrality was a statistically significant mediator of the effect on 
conservation intentions. I then tested whether similar mediation effects occurred in the 
intragroup comparison conditions. Comparison valence was not found to be a 
successful predictor of conservation intentions (β = .18, p = .13), while value centrality 
was modestly significant (β = .23, p = .049). When both valence and value centrality 
were included together, valence was not significant (β = .08, p = .48) while value 
centrality was significant (β = .45, p < .001). A Sobel test showed this was not 
significant (z = 1.81, p = .07). Thus, the mediating effect of value centrality was 
significant for intergroup comparisons but not intragroup comparisons. This mediation 
is depicted in Figure 6.4. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4. Mediation of value centrality on valence and environmental intentions for 
intergroup comparisons, Study 5. 
 
We conducted a similar analysis as above with shared responsibility as a 
mediator in the intragroup comparisons. As per the previous analyses, though trending 
in the predicted direction, valence was not a significant predictor of conservation 
intentions, (β = 0.36, p = .13). However, comparison valence did predict shared 
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(β = -.22, p = .049) 
β = -.12, p = .29 
Sobel z = -2.09, p = .037 
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responsibility (β = 0.25, p = .032). With both predictors entered, shared responsibility 
significantly predicted conservation intentions (β = 0.49, p < .001), and the effect of 
comparison valence reduced further (β = 0.06, p = .59). A significant Sobel test (z = 
1.98, p = .048) confirmed that shared responsibility mediated the effect of comparison 
valence on conservation intentions. I then tested whether this mediation effect would 
occur with intergroup comparisons. Valence was a modest predictor of conservation 
intentions (β = -0.22, p = .049) and shared responsibility (β = -0.22, p = .048). When 
both valence and shared responsibility were included in the model together, the modest 
effect of valence remained unchanged (β = -0.23, p = .049), while shared responsibility 
did not predict intentions at all (β = -0.03, p = .78). A Sobel test confirmed there was 
no mediation effect (z = 0.28, p = .78). Thus, shared responsibility only mediated the 
valence effect within the intragroup comparison conditions. This mediation is depicted 
in Figure 6.5. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5. Mediation of shared responsibility on valence and environmental intentions 
for intragroup comparisons, Study 5. 
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Discussion 
The results of this experiment broadly supported the hypotheses. Specifically, 
the results revealed consistent interactions between comparative context (intergroup 
versus intragroup) and comparison valence (positive versus negative) on environmental 
intentions, the centrality of environmental values, and perceptions of shared 
responsibility for environmental problems. Thus, rather than group based comparisons 
increasing performance uniformly via engendering a “competitive orientation” (Siero et 
al., 1996), the effects of these comparisons depend on their context and value. 
When comparisons were intergroup (i.e., relative to the performance of another 
nation), positive comparisons increased behavioural intentions relative to negative 
comparisons. Thus, in an intergroup context, participants seemed to contrast away 
from the outgroup standard and internalise this as a guide to their own behaviour. This 
interpretation is further supported by the mediating role of environmental value 
centrality in the intergroup condition: in comparison to a poorly performing outgroup, 
participants emphasised the centrality of environmental values to their self and 
expressed intentions that accorded with these. In contrast, when comparisons were 
intragroup (i.e., relative to the nation’s own past performance), the opposite pattern 
emerged, and negative comparisons were associated with stronger intentions to behave 
environmentally, particularly when compared to the effects of negative feedback in 
intergroup contexts, which seemed de-motivating rather than motivating. I predicted 
that awareness that one’s group is falling short of its own standards should motivate 
behaviour in response to negative intragroup feedback as people re-affirm their group’s 
collective standards. Consistent with this, perceptions of shared responsibility did play 
some role in mediating the effects of intragroup comparisons on behaviour: in response 
to negative comparisons with a better performing past, group members emphasised 
their shared responsibility for environmental stewardship and expressed stronger 
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intentions to behave environmentally. However, the pattern of mediation via shared 
responsibility in intragroup contexts was not as strong as that of value centrality in 
intergroup contexts, perhaps because intergroup comparisons tend to be more striking 
and less subtle than intragroup comparisons over time, which may seem more distant 
and less proximal than contemporaneous intergroup comparisons. Despite this, both 
environmental value centrality and shared responsibility played a role in mediating 
intergroup and intragroup comparisons respectively. 
Study 5 produced very different behavioural effects from Study 4, and the 
primary difference between the two studies was the removal of the national stereotype 
items. This supports out interpretation that Study 4’s results may have been skewed by 
the inclusion of these items. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
While the results of Study 4 did not produce the predicted effects, Study 5 did. 
Based on participant feedback, I believe Study 4’s results were the effect of a 
confounding measure that offended participants. When the measure was removed, the 
results were as expected.  
The patterns in Study 5 are consistent with the social identity approach. 
Depending on the context of group-based comparisons, individual group members are 
likely to be guided by different identity-relevant concerns when contemplating their 
own behaviour. Consistent with self-categorization principles, the guiding principle in 
intergroup contexts is likely to be differentiation from relevant outgroups (Doosje et al., 
1998). Thus, self-perception and action becomes contrastive under these conditions as 
people embody the contextual stereotype of their group (Rabinovich et al., 2008). 
When we outperform another group, the dimension of that success becomes a more 
central aspect of collective identity, and more central to individual self-definition and 
action. However, when our group is outperformed, the dimension in question is likely 
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to become less important to collective definition and self-definition accordingly. These 
patterns of response to intergroup comparison provide a theoretical adjunct to the 
effects identified in prior research on environmental group comparisons (Siero et al., 
1996); intergroup comparisons will only lead to more positive intentions when these 
reflect positively on collective identity.  
Although the pattern of effects in the intragroup condition was reversed, this is 
also consistent with the social identity approach. In the absence of an outgroup against 
which the ingroup is defined, comparisons to our group and its past define us by who 
we have been. Especially when past performance sets a high standard, sub-optimal 
behaviour by group members in the present highlights a discrepancy between our own 
standards and current performance. This kind of negative comparison is not so easily 
disengaged from, as is the case for negative intergroup comparisons. Instead, deviation 
from our own high standards is likely to be concerning and prompt group members to 
redouble their efforts to live up to these standards, and set restoration of group 
standards as an implied group goal. According to self-categorization theory, goals 
originating from within the group are characterized by a sense of shared responsibility 
(Wegge & Haslam, 2003), and tend to be more motivating for group members than 
goals originating from outside the group, such as from outgroup members (Wegge & 
Haslam, 2005). This theoretical interpretation of these results highlights that both types 
of social comparisons, between groups and within groups, have the power to motivate 
people to action, but the paths of thought and behavioural outcomes are heavily 
dependent on the context of that comparison. 
Although the results here can be predicted with the social identity perspective, 
this does not mean these particular combinations of comparative feedback will always 
produce this exact set of responses. The effects of social comparisons may manifest 
themselves differently depending on additional factors like specifics of the group 
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identity, intergroup relations, and situational factors. For example, a group that shares a 
belief in the rejection of environmental concerns as a part of its identity, such as the 
climate change denial movement, would not be expected to respond in the same 
fashion as seen in the present study. Similarly, comparison groups with particularly 
hostile or amicable relations may react differently than to these studies’ participants. In 
these cases, social comparisons are still influential, but the nature of their outcome may 
vary. 
Beyond these specifically theoretical concerns, the results of this study 
demonstrate how an individual’s social milieu has considerable power to influence 
environmentally relevant action. The relevance of social factors such as these has often 
been neglected by both behaviour change researchers and campaigners. Harnessing the 
power of social contexts to structure individual thought and action provides an exciting 
opportunity for behaviour change, over and above approaches that seek to change 
attitudes and intentions one individual at a time. That said, I am not advocating for a 
social group-focused understanding of environmental behaviour instead of an 
individual-focused understanding, but rather that these two approaches constitute an 
inseparable whole. In human society, there can be no groups without individuals, and 
no individuals without groups. Viewing group and individual processes as exclusive 
rivals of each other is an artificial and unnecessary distinction (Postmes, Haslam, & 
Swaab, 2005), and the group-individual intersection is a particularly rich and 
informative domain for research. This was true of the results: participants’ individual 
feelings about shared responsibility or value centrality and their group feedback together 
best predicted behaviour, not either of these individual- or group-level attributes. 
Likewise, past research has found the combination of both individual and group 
attributes, such as personal attitudes and group norms, to be more predictive of 
behaviour than either alone (Terry, Hogg, & White, 1999; Terry, Hogg, & McKimmie, 
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2000). Along these lines, I recommend that both future researchers and campaigners 
adapt approaches that take into account the combination of both individual- and 
group-level processes.  
Practical Implications 
 These results suggest a number of practical implications for behavioural 
intervention campaigns. Although competition has long been promoted as a way to 
increase behaviour, my research suggests that this may succeed or backfire, depending 
on the success of the group in question. While winning competitors may be spurred to 
further action, losing competitors may disengage from the behaviour altogether, using 
social creativity to value other aspects, such as common variations of the claim, “we 
may pollute a lot, but we are productive, and that is what counts.” Because prior 
research has shown that people are more likely to accept criticism from a fellow 
ingroup member than an outgroup source (Hornsey, Oppes, & Svensson, 2002), 
negative competitive messages may best be communicated from within the group 
rather than an external source (but see Rabinovich & Morton, 2009). 
If a group has been improving their environmental behaviour, unqualified praise 
may also be harmful in maintaining the behavioural improvement. Research by Schultz 
and colleagues (2007) has documented a boomerang effect where individuals that 
receive positive personal feedback relax their efforts. In this study, I have documented 
a similar effect, but applied to the group level rather than just the individual level. 
Positive feedback about the group as a whole may lead to a sense of complacency that 
the group has “done enough” and individual members may relax their efforts. Research 
by Schultz and colleagues suggests this boomerang effect can be avoided by reinforcing 
the injunctive norm that the group still values the targeted behaviour. My data suggest 
that positive feedback can maintain positive behaviour when it is delivered in an 
intergroup context and thereby the praised behaviour becomes defining of the group in 
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a positive sense (Rabinovich et al., 2008). In addition to intentional behavioural 
intervention campaigns, these comparative framing effects are worth bearing in mind 
by the news media, non-governmental organisations, and politicians, all of whom 
regularly make very public social comparisons on the topic of the environment. 
Conclusion 
 These results have demonstrated that social comparisons have the power to 
frame interpretations of and responses to environmental feedback, and that intragroup 
comparisons can be fundamentally different to intergroup comparisons. In this chapter, 
each group’s present behaviour was the same, but the nature of the comparisons to the 
ingroup was altered, which led to distinct influences in patterns of thought and 
behavioural intentions regarding the environment. The present research offers practical 
applications to pro-environmental campaigns: Specifically, if group environmental 
performance is of good quality and collective maintenance of this is desired, then praise 
should be delivered in ways that highlight the achievements of the group relative to 
others but should not rely on reflecting solely about the ingroup alone. However, if 
group environmental performance is poor and the goal is to encourage collective 
betterment, then criticism should be delivered in ways that highlight the group’s failings 
relative to the group’s own standards, but not relative to other groups. This study 
highlights the interconnectedness of group-level and individual-level psychological 
variables, and how both should be addressed when understanding behavioural change. 
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– CHAPTER 7 –  
General Discussion 
 
The state of global environment is one of the most pressing concerns today. In 
addition to the compelling scientific evidence of the impact of climate change, 
environmental degradation is leading to an accelerating pace of species extinction and 
loss of biodiversity. More mundanely, many aspects of modern life currently require the 
extraction of unsustainable levels of finite resources that are dwindling in supply. While 
the challenges of environmental degradation may seem over-whelming, much progress 
can be made now by engaging in more environmentally sustainable everyday 
behaviours. As highlighted by the writing of Victor Lebow (1955), as cited at the start 
of this thesis, people’s actions toward the environment often have psychological 
motivations, and these can be developed to promote environmentally sustainable 
behaviour or to hinder it. Psychologists have recently realised their role in 
understanding and promoting sustainable behaviour, but most prior research has been 
scattered in its theoretical perspective and modest in its predictive power of behaviour. 
The aim of the research presented in this thesis was to investigate how 
environmental behaviours are influenced by social forces, a perspective that has been 
under-appreciated in most traditional research on environmental behaviour. Where 
social influence is examined, such as in most social normative approaches, variability in 
how norms work and the role of group membership are not usually taken into account 
(see Chapter 2 for a few notable exceptions). My research has been guided by the social 
identity approach, which provides a theoretical framework for understanding how 
individuals place themselves within social groups, how these groups relate to each 
other, and the consequences of both these things for individual behaviour. The social 
identity approach theorises that individuals identify with a number of social groups. 
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Depending on the context, a particular social identity will be salient, such as university 
student or British citizen. As people come to identify with a group, they act more in line 
with how a prototypical group member would act (Turner, 1991). However, group 
norms are also influenced by situational factors, such as comparisons with other, 
relevant groups in the social sphere. Typically, groups seek to be positively distinct 
from other groups, and define themselves in contrast to their comparators (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1978). The nature of social comparisons implies a particular meaning for social 
identity (Doosje, Haslam, Spears, Oakes, & Koomen, 1998). Typically, the perceived 
norms of one’s group contrast away from comparison outgroups, which in turn may be 
internalised by group members into individual values and behaviours (Rabinovich, 
Morton, Postmes, & Verplanken, 2008). Group members also develop group norms 
inductively through discussion with other members (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005; 
L. Smith & Postmes, 2009, L. Smith & Postmes, 2010a; L. Smith & Postmes, 2010b). 
Both these types of social influence (i.e., norm deduction via intergroup comparison, 
norm induction via intragroup interaction) have been found to be powerful 
determinants of behaviour in other domains, but their application to environmental 
behaviour has previously been limited. 
To investigate this, I developed three related strands of research into group-
based social influence in the environmental domain. In Chapter 4, I examined how 
social comparisons can imply group norms, and how the strength of social 
identification moderates how individuals’ behaviours will respond to those 
comparisons. In Chapter 5, I looked at how discussion within groups allows the 
formation of strong local norms, and how discussion content guides values and 
behaviours long after discussion has ended. In Chapter 6, I investigated how different 
types of social comparisons, either between groups or within one’s own group, can lead 
to differing psychological and behavioural outcomes. In all three chapters, I found 
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effects of social influence on individual environmental behaviour. In the present 
chapter, I summarise the primary results, provide an overall theoretical interpretation of 
their meaning, and discuss the practical application of these findings to real-world 
scenarios of environmental behaviour. 
Chapter 4: Summary of Results 
 The two experimental studies presented in Chapter 4 show how social 
comparisons can lead to differing behavioural outcomes among group members, 
depending on their strength of identification with the relevant ingroup. Drawing on 
social identity theory, I argued that comparative feedback can imply group norms by 
portraying the group as relatively positive or negative on a given dimension relative to 
others and that individuals who identify strongly with their group are more likely to 
internalise and self-stereotype implied group norms than low-identifiers (Ellemers, 
Spears, & Doosje, 1997; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002). Thus, I predicted that the 
group norms implied through comparative feedback would have different meanings for 
group members, depending on how much they identify with the group. 
 To test these ideas, Study 1 presented student participants with environmental 
feedback about their university that was either positive or negative (valence). This 
feedback was framed either generally, or as a specific comparison with another 
university (comparison type). Participants’ identification with their university was also 
measured, as were their intentions to engage in environmental volunteering. One week 
later, participants were contacted again to report their behaviour on a number of pro-
environmental activities they had selected from a list one week earlier. As predicted, 
low-identifiers were more willing to volunteer when the feedback was negative rather 
than positive, contrasting away from the implied norm. High-identifiers showed a 
similar assimilation pattern, but this did not reach conventional levels of significance. 
Contrary to predictions, the effect of feedback was not intensified when it was 
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delivered as part of a specific intergroup comparison. Importantly, the effects on 
intentions were also relatively short-lived; there were no effects on conservation 
behaviours reported one week later.  
While these initial results were promising, I felt the manipulation may have been 
too subtle and the environmental behaviours too restrictive. I refined the manipulation 
and measures and ran an additional study to continue to test these predictions. In Study 
2 the comparison manipulation was changed to be more direct by giving feedback 
about the rival university, and participants could choose any conservation behaviour 
they wanted, rather than selecting from a list of pre-determined behaviours. Again, 
there was no effect of comparison type. However, emotion ratings from participants 
suggest the feedback about a rival university may have been interpreted as referencing 
the larger, more abstract ingroup of university students in general (i.e., a common 
ingroup at a higher level of abstraction). Apart from this, as predicted, there were 
effects of feedback valence on behaviours moderated by identification. High-identifiers 
intended to volunteer more when feedback was positive and less when feedback was 
negative, replicating the result of Study 1. Low-identifiers again showed a mirrored 
response of higher intentions when feedback was negative and lower intentions when 
feedback was positive. Importantly, one week later, high-identifiers still displayed this 
pattern of assimilation to the implied norm in their reported behaviours, while the 
pattern of contrast by low-identifiers had disappeared by Time 2. This endurance of the 
manipulation across time among high-identifiers suggests that they may have indeed 
internalised the group-based feedback. 
 Together, the results of these initial studies demonstrate that group-based 
feedback can imply a group norm that is then internalised, particularly by high-
identifiers, guiding subsequent behaviour. However, there was less evidence for the 
hypothesised role of comparison type in this process. The original expectation, guided 
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by social identity theory, was that specific intergroup comparisons would intensify the 
effects of feedback by making this information more ingroup defining relative to 
relevant outgroups. Despite these null effects, I believe that intergroup comparisons 
should still play an important role in influencing how people react, and I investigated 
the role of different forms of group-based comparison more thoroughly in Chapter 6.  
Chapter 5: Summary of Results 
 To build on the observation that group-processes can guide individual 
behaviour, in Chapter 5 I examined the potential role of intragroup processes in this. 
Specifically, I investigated how groups may form environmental norms not just from 
comparative feedback but through interaction with other group members. Past 
research, both classic (Festinger, 1954; Lewin, 1947; Sherif, 1935) and more 
contemporary (L. Smith & Postmes, 2009; L. Smith & Postmes, 2010a; L. Smith & 
Postmes, 2010b), has found that group-based discussion can be a very powerful and 
long-lasting influence on individual behaviour. According to the social identity 
approach, interaction with other group members is part of the process through which 
people establish local group norms (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005). As people reach 
consensus, they work to interpret social reality from the perspective of a group 
member. This is known as the inductive, or “bottom-up,” process of social influence, 
and past research suggests that it can be more powerful than the deductive, or “top-
down” process of influence, which stems from intergroup comparisons (Postmes, 
Haslam, & Swaab, 2005; Postmes, Spears, Sakhel, & de Groot, 2001). Studies have 
demonstrated that the content of small group discussions can influence important 
behaviours, such as whether people will discriminate against minorities (L. Smith & 
Postmes, 2010a) and can also help stigmatised groups overcome the negative effects of 
the stereotypes that are imposed on them by others (i.e., alleviating stereotype threat 
effects: L. Smith & Postmes, 2010b). However, despite these strong effects in other 
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domains, researchers have not applied this approach to studying environmental 
behaviour.  
 To investigate the role of discussion in guiding environmental behaviour, Study 
3 replicated Study 1, with the addition of an up to 20-minute discussion about the 
environment following the experimental manipulation. I predicted that the content of 
the discussion would establish local norms about environmental behaviour, which 
would determine participants’ environmental behaviours over the following week. I also 
predicted that this effect of inductively established local norms would be stronger than, 
and over-riding of, the effects of any norms induced via social comparison. The 
manipulation check suggested that participants did register the social comparisons 
provided in the manipulation, but unlike Study 1, this comparative feedback had almost 
no impact on behavioural intentions. Instead, aspects of the group discussion itself 
proved to be powerful influences on the behaviour of individual group members. 
Discussions were analysed for their content and length. As predicted, the more 
time participants devoted to discussions that focussed on environmental behaviour, the 
more likely they were to subsequently report more pro-environmental behaviour one 
week after the discussion session. Importantly, this effect remained even when 
controlling for initial environmental values. This suggests that the effects of discussion 
cannot be simply attributed to a reinforcement effect whereby people who value the 
environment both talk about it and maintain their already high level of environmental 
behaviour. Discussion also had similar effects on reported values over time: more focus 
on environmental issues within the small groups also shifted participants’ values to be 
more in line with the content of the discussion.  
While these effects of small group interaction on individual behaviour and 
values are themselves interesting, an additional finding from this study was that 
discussion increased the correspondence between values and behaviour, reducing the 
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value-action gap. Study 1, which involved the same design but without discussion, 
revealed no significant correlation between initial environmental values and 
environmental behaviour one week later. Study 3, which simply incorporated discussion 
into the design, showed a very strong correlation between initial values and subsequent 
action. Although the exact mechanism of this effect remains unclear, it seems that 
group-based discussions can activate individual values and support people to 
subsequently act more in line with these. Together, the results of this study support the 
notion that small group discussions can both override intergroup comparisons and lead 
to the formation of local norms that guide behaviour long after discussion has ended. 
Chapter 6: Summary of Results 
 Chapter 6 returned to the issue of group-based comparisons and how these 
might influence people’s individual behavioural responses. Past research in social 
identity theory has found that the choice of comparator influences ingroup stereotypes, 
with people typically contrasting perceptions of their ingroup away from comparison 
outgroups. For example, when psychologists are compared to dramatists, they will 
define themselves as more scientific, but when compared to physicists, they will say 
they are more artistic (Doosje, Haslam, Spears, Oakes, & Koomen, 1998). Thus, group 
identities are dynamic and shift to meet situational contexts (Abrams, Wetherell, 
Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990; Roccas & Brewer, 2002; Turner, 1991). Although 
intergroup comparisons have been the focus of much social identity research, these are 
not the only form of comparison people might engage in. To reach an understanding of 
what their group is and what it represents in the present, people can also engage in 
comparisons with the ingroup of the past (e.g., Mummendey, Klink, & Brown, 2001; 
Nigbur & Cinnirella, 2007). However, less is known about the processes behind and 
effects of comparisons within a group relative to comparisons between groups. The 
goal of the final set of studies within this thesis was to explore this issue.  
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 To investigate this, I conducted two studies of similar design. In Study 5, 
participants received either relatively positive or negative feedback about Britain’s 
environmental record. This was compared with either another nation (i.e., an intergroup 
comparison) or Britain in the recent past (i.e., an intragroup comparison). Importantly, 
Britain’s actual environmental performance was the same in all conditions; only the 
comparison group and its relative performance varied. Following the manipulation, 
national stereotypes of the groups concerned and participants’ pro-environmental 
intentions were measured. I predicted that when compared to an outgroup, participants 
would self-stereotype their own intentions to be in line with the norm implied by the 
comparison (in line with the findings reported in Chapter 4). However, when 
comparisons were within the group, I predicted the opposite pattern of effect. In this 
condition, positive comparisons were expected to result in less pro-environmental 
intentions, whereas negative comparisons were expected to result in more pro-
environmental intentions. To explain this reversal in the effects of comparative 
feedback when delivered within groups, I theorised that under such conditions past 
performance implies an established norm, or standard, for collective performance. 
Positive comparisons (i.e., that the group is doing better than before) therefore imply 
that group members are exceeding their own standards and can relax their efforts, a 
phenomenon similar to the boomerang effect (Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & 
Griskevicius, 2007). A negative comparison, however, implies the group is falling short 
of its own prior standards. This should be concerning and lead to increased efforts to 
live up to these standards.  
 The results of the initial test (Study 5), however, did not support the hypotheses. 
Although this was unexpected, in response to the study, several participants reported 
that they found that national stereotype measure to be offensive. Given this, I 
suspected that reactance may have interfered with the expected effects of this study. To 
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resolve this issue, I conducted a second study (Study 6) using the same design but 
omitting the offending national stereotype measures and assessing the proposed 
process variables. The results of this improved study were consistent with the 
hypotheses: When comparisons were intergroup, positive feedback resulted in more 
positive intentions than negative feedback. The opposite was observed when 
comparisons were intragroup, with negative comparisons resulting in more positive 
intentions than positive comparisons.  
To investigate the processes behind these effects, environmental value centrality 
and shared environmental responsibility were also measured. I theorised that for 
intergroup comparisons, the underlying process involves shifts in ingroup stereotyping 
and therefore self-stereotyping as a group member. To capture this process, the 
centrality of environmental values to the self were assessed (Rabinovich et al., 2008), 
and this did indeed mediate the effects of feedback valence in the intergroup 
comparison condition. In contrast, when comparisons are within group, I expected that 
effects should be driven by a perceived discrepancy between current behaviour and 
collective goals. To capture this process, feelings of collective responsibility to improve 
the ingroup’s environmental record were assessed. Indeed, the results revealed that 
feedback valence affected feelings of shared responsibility in the intragroup comparison 
condition. There was also evidence of mediation via this variable, though this was not 
as strong as the mediation of value centrality for intergroup comparisons. Together, 
these studies show that both inter- and intra-group comparisons can drive 
environmental behaviour, at least when these comparisons do not trigger reactance, but 
that the nature of, and processes behind, these effects are likely to be quite different. 
Intergroup comparisons lead to behaviour in line with the implied ingroup stereotype, 
mediated through shifts in self perception, such as value centrality. Intragroup 
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comparisons lead to behaviour in line with previously established group standards, 
mediated through feelings of shared responsibility.  
Integration of Results 
 Taken together, these studies provide a complex portrayal of how social group 
influence can affect behaviour. Perhaps the single most consistent message from this 
research is that interpretations of identity can be highly nuanced, and small differences 
in circumstances can lead to considerable differences in behavioural outcomes. While 
social influence can be powerful, it does not lend itself to one-size-fits-all interventions. 
 The results from Chapters 4 and 6 suggest that social comparisons can be used 
to deduce the content of group identity. Looking to others can inform people about 
themselves, whether this kind of comparison involves an outgroup, as in Chapters 4 
and 6, or the ingroup of the past, as in Chapter 6. I theorised that in either case, the 
group’s performance relative to the comparator implies a particular norm, and people 
self-stereotype to this implied norm, which goes on to guide behaviour. How people 
respond to this comparison depends upon their own individual-level traits, such as how 
closely they identify with the group. Intergroup comparisons tend to inform identities 
in a way that contrasts away from the comparator, while intragroup comparisons tend 
to assimilate identity content toward the comparator, because the comparator is the 
ingroup itself. 
There is also some evidence that the specifics of the group identity can affect 
the outcome. For example, participants in the intergroup comparison condition in 
Chapter 6 responded as a whole in a similar way to the high-identifiers in Chapter 4. 
One of the differences between the chapters is that Chapter 4 focused on university 
identity among students, most of who were in their first year, while Chapter 6 focused 
on British identity among British citizens. While I can only speculate on the reasons for 
the different outcomes, the nature of the specific group identities could be a likely 
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reason. National identity may be more concrete, but also more stable in its relation to 
the self. A recently gained university identity may be more flexible in its content and 
more novel as a part of participants’ psychological repertoire of identities, allowing for a 
broader range of interpretations of group comparisons.  
 Social influence can also occur through inductive influence, which is more of a 
bottom-up process than deductive influence. I theorised that as group members 
interact, the content of their discussion inducts norms which go on to guide group 
members’ behaviours, and in Chapter 5, the extent to which groups talked about pro-
environmental behaviours went on to predict members’ behaviour independent of their 
initial values. This process is quite different from deductive comparisons, and 
empowers group members to take more control over the development of their identity, 
and potentially override the effects of deductive comparisons. While different, these 
two routes of social influence are similar in the respect that they may operate outside 
the bounds of conscious awareness to guide individuals’ future behaviours. 
 Taken together, these results portray dual processes where the content and 
salience of identity is perpetually being informed both by comparison targets and 
interactions between group members themselves. While these processes were studied 
separately in this thesis, outside of the laboratory, they are likely to blend into and fuel 
each other. The full extent to which these processes interact is unknown, but 
comparisons may provide a context for discussion to occur, and discussion may be 
used to either reinforce or challenge existing group stereotypes.  
Theoretical Implications 
 The findings from this research demonstrate that people are responsive to 
group-level feedback when forming intentions about how to act as individuals, but that 
this effect is most likely and enduring when people identify with the relevant group. 
This effect is also moderated by the type of feedback that is entailed. Apart from social 
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comparisons, small group interaction may be an effective way of creating a social 
context that reinforces positive behaviour over time; however, the effects of small 
group interaction are contingent on what happens in interaction itself and may need to 
be structured to be most effective. Many of these relatively simple social manipulations 
had a lasting effect on individuals’ everyday pro-environmental behaviours.  
Our findings are consistent with the social identity approach, which proposes 
that in many situations people’s behaviour is framed by their group membership rather 
than driven by purely individual factors. When group membership is salient, or when 
people identify strongly with a group, they tend to think and act as an interchangeable 
member of a social group rather than as an autonomous and independent-minded 
individual (see Chapter 2 for a review of social identity theory and self-categorization 
theory). I documented that simple social comparisons and group-based interactions can 
influence environmental behaviours one week later, and that how people react to a 
social comparison is moderated by how much an individual identifies with their group. 
I believe that in all of these studies, the manipulation worked to craft a particular group 
norm for how group members should approach the environment, and that these norms 
can be developed through deductive processes (i.e., comparisons: Studies 1, 2, 4, and 5) 
and inductive processes (e.g., interaction: Study 3). 
In all of these studies, the experimental manipulations were simple and 
straightforward. People regularly encounter similar social comparisons of nations, 
regions, and other groups in the news media. In the wake of chronic and conspicuous 
environmental degradation, people have frequent occasion to discuss the environment 
and what should be done about it. Thus, the experimental manipulations used in my 
studies are likely to be occurring to most people outside the laboratory on a regular 
basis. These ongoing processes are likely to have very real effects on people’s thoughts 
and behaviours toward the environment. 
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While traditional self-categorization theory suggests these effects normally only 
occur when a social identity is salient (Turner, 1991), some of the effects remained after 
a week without any reminder of the social group in question. The longevity of these 
effects suggests the social comparison and discussion effects were, to some extent, 
internalised at the individual level. Thus, rather than speaking of social and individual 
factors as if they were mutually exclusive understandings of human behaviour 
(Greenwood, 2004), it is more accurate to understand them as complementary and 
intertwined (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005; Postmes, Spears, Lee, & Novak, 2005). 
In my studies, social influence provided a route to reaching individual thoughts and 
behaviours, and in time, the aggregate of group members’ actions are likely to feed into 
the perceptions of group identity. 
Despite the success of the socially-grounded interventions in this thesis, social 
influence is surprisingly absent from most established pro-environmental models of 
behaviour, as reviewed in Chapter 1. Informational, economic, attitudinal, and habitual 
models are all defined by a focus on particular attributes of individual people. For the 
most part, social influence and norms have only had a peripheral role in conservation 
psychology. A partial explanation for this is that asking people directly about group 
norms and influence tends to provide the appearance of no effect, as people regularly 
underestimate the extent that they are influenced by social norms (Cialdini, 2005; 
Nolan, Schultz, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2008). Most normative models see 
social norms as social forces, in the literal sense of the word, rather than social influences. 
In this conception, social forces are located externally to the individual and coercively 
press upon people against their will, against the “true” individual self. Integrative 
models, such as Stern’s Value-Belief-Norm model, maintain this perception that social 
factors reside at the sidelines of influence, and when they do act, they are seen to be 
mostly monolithic to a society, static, and external to the individual (Stern, Dietz, Abel, 
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Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999). However, my research supports a very different 
interpretation of social influence. 
First, these results offer compelling evidence that the behavioural change 
documented was internally motivated within the self, and not a result of forced 
conformity. In all of my studies, participants responded privately, either on paper 
questionnaires or using computers in private at their own discretion. Because 
participants answered privately, were assured of confidentiality, and did not provide 
their names, social coercion or demand characteristics are unlikely explanations for the 
social influence that occurred. This empirical demonstration of the interconnectedness 
of social influence and individual pro-environmental behaviours underlines the need to 
widen conservation psychologists’ theoretical lens to encompass both social- and 
individual-level attributes. 
 Second, I have shown that social identity content and implied norms are not 
static and monolithic, but contextual and dynamic. By shifting comparisons to be 
negative or positive, and between groups or within a group, the pattern of effects also 
shifted. In Chapter 4, the effect of comparisons also varied by strength of 
identification. Thus, social influence is not some unchanging constant, but its effects 
are highly contextual and dependent on individual-level variables. This conception is 
supported by past research in self-categorization theory (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, 
Hogg, & Turner, 1990; Roccas & Brewer, 2002). Although this sensitivity to framing 
makes social influence more difficult to deploy in public campaigns, the rewards of 
doing it correctly may be worth the additional effort. 
 Based on the results of this thesis, and additional work within the social identity 
framework, I believe that one explanation for conservation psychology’s historically 
low predictive power of environmental behaviour is that most research has focussed on 
individual-level traits while ignoring social considerations. Given the research here, and 
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that of other social identity theorists, it may be that individual-level traits have been 
poor predictors of environmental behaviour because they have been incongruent with 
social traits. This conflict between individual factors and social factors may lead to 
despair and inaction regarding the environment. Prior research has already found that 
individuals’ environmental attitudes become much better predictors of behaviour when 
supported by a complementary pro-environmental group norm (Terry & Hogg, 1996; 
Terry, Hogg, & McKimmie, 2000; Terry, Hogg, & White, 1996). People are reminded 
daily about their collective poor stewardship of the earth, and based on the present 
research, this feedback is likely to be absorbed into people’s sense of social self. If 
social influence and individual attributes can pull with each other rather than against, 
the behavioural effect is likely to be more productive than either type of influence 
alone. In this regard, the findings of this thesis can be applied in a complementary 
fashion to many of the theories and techniques of existing models of environmental 
behaviour. All of the models described here share some overlap, and need not be 
conceived as exclusive of each other. Taking an ecumenical approach by combining the 
models below with a greater understanding of social processes may provide the most 
beneficial outcome. 
Informational models. The informational model assumes people do not conserve 
because they do not have the necessary information. Social influence can help remedy 
this barrier by acting as a knowledge vector for both environmental problems and 
practical solutions for how to implement new behaviours. As seen in the discussion 
extracts from Chapter 5, group members use discussion to convey this kind of 
information. Because the information comes from an ingroup source, it is more likely 
to be trusted than if it came from an outgroup, such as a governmental organisation. 
 Rational-economic models. In the review of economic incentives for environmental 
behaviour, a surprising conclusion was that the economic value of the incentive was 
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often unrelated to whether it influenced behaviour. Instead, how programmes were 
marketed had a larger influence on whether these programmes were taken up by the 
public. Because financial costs can represent a very real barrier to particular 
environmental behaviours, such as buying a more efficient boiler or installing home 
insulation, economic programmes still have a valuable role to play, and harnessing 
social influence to promote uptake may be well worth the additional planning. Future 
intervention programmes that promote economic incentives may be more successful if 
they harness social influence to do so. Likewise, because many economic decisions are 
socially meaningful in terms of status and identity (e.g., hybrid cars, organic food, 
drying clothes outside rather than in a dryer), successful incentive programmes will 
need to be mindful of the compatibility between existing identities in the target group 
and how economic incentives are chosen.  
 Attitudinal models. Attitudinal models are both plentiful and diverse, but in many 
cases, individuals’ attitudes are surprisingly weak predictors of behaviour (Newhouse, 
1990, Wicker, 1969). As mentioned, attitudes become better predictors of behaviour 
when they are supported by a congruent social ingroup norm (Terry & Hogg, 1996; 
Terry, Hogg, & McKimmie, 2000; Terry, Hogg, & White, 1996), which may help 
explain why attitudes alone are typically weak predictors. Because identity salience shifts 
regularly (Turner, 1991), attitude/group norm congruency may also shift, making the 
accuracy of attitudes as behavioural predictors context-dependent. Because 
incongruence between group attitudes and individuals’ attitudes and lack of identity 
salience could pose barriers, interventions may have better success by targeting both 
individual and group attitudes simultaneously. Associating the target behaviour with the 
relevant group so that the identity is more likely to become salient when behavioural 
opportunities arise would also be beneficial. 
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Habitual models. This thesis’ theoretical approach is quite distinct from the 
literature on automatic, habitual behaviours, but applying both approaches together 
may allow for especially durable interventions. Social influences often change over time, 
as different identities become meaningful (Turner, 1991), making durability a potential 
weakness to socially influenced behaviour. However, if the behaviour is repeated often 
enough before this, habituation may serve to crystallize or “lock in” the behavioural 
gains from social influence. Likewise, because habits are weakest when situational 
context is in flux, such as when someone moves house or changes their job (Wood, 
Tam, & Witt, 2005), a social influence based campaign may have greater success when 
timed to correspond with these life changes.  
Social Dilemma Models. Traditional social dilemma models emphasize the role of 
past experience with commons actors, such as with tit-for-tat strategies (Dawes, 1980). 
More recent social dilemma theorising has incorporated actors’ norms (Ostrom, 2000) 
into their models. This thesis’ research offers additional insight in to the role past 
experience and norms can play to influence social dilemma outcomes. First, past 
experience has the power to create new implied norms; thus past commons decisions 
can influence future decisions. Second, because groups often seek positive 
distinctiveness from each other, groups of actors may contrast away from the actions of 
a perceived rival, not because it is in their best material interest, but because of 
deductive social influence. Where possible, social dilemmas may have better outcomes 
where a superordinate identity can be fostered, expanding the sphere of concern to 
include other actors and making unsustainable choices less appealing. 
 Normative Models. While norms have been portrayed as weak predictors of 
behaviour (Ajzen, 1991, Armitage & Conner, 2001) the conclusion from the social 
identity approach and this research is that norms matter, but they are complex, 
overlapping, and only particular norms are influential. Group norms are attached to 
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particular groups, and group identities are fluid in both their meaning and salience. 
Thus, theoretical models and intervention campaigns that use norms must be careful to 
target relevant ingroup norms, and to be aware that group members have the power to 
induct new norms among themselves; conceptualising norms as static across society is 
unlikely to be successful. Because people then to underestimate normative influence 
(Cialdini, 2005), subtle measures may be needed to accurately assess the role that norms 
play. 
More research is needed to investigate these possibilities, but there is now little 
doubt that group identities contribute to environmental behaviours in subtle yet 
meaningful ways. When integrated into more traditional models of environmental 
behaviour, both explanatory power and behavioural influence may be increased even 
further. 
Practical Implications 
 The first chapter of this thesis reviewed a few of the most pressing 
environmental concerns today: climate change, loss of biodiversity, and the depletion of 
natural resources. At this point, it is worth reminding ourselves of how everyday 
environmentally-relevant behaviours contribute to these problems. The EPA (2006) 
considers the following domains of everyday behaviour to have the most environmental 
impact for carbon emissions: heating/cooling, electricity consumption, and 
transportation. Material goods and food also have significant embedded environmental 
costs. Because many environmental problems are inter-connected, the same behaviour 
can help with several overlapping problems. For example, conserving fuels such as coal, 
oil, and gas can help with all three problems by lowering carbon emissions, requiring 
fewer wild areas to be cleared for resource extraction, and by leaving more of the 
resource for others. While pro-environmental intentions can depart from pro-
environmental impacts (Whitmarsh, 2009), the dependent variables used in this thesis 
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correspond very well to the kinds of behaviours people need to change cause less 
environmental degradation, namely heating, electricity use, transportation, and 
consumption. The looming environmental crises will not be easy to solve, but at least 
the behavioural measures used in this research are aimed in the appropriate direction. 
 The results of this line of research suggest several practical applications for 
designing and implementing pro-environmental campaigns or interventions. Most 
public campaigns have focussed on individual-level variables, such as knowledge, 
economic incentives, or attitudes. As reviewed in Chapter 1, most of these approaches 
have seen only modest success. Increasing individual knowledge often does little to 
nothing to increase behaviours (Ester & Winett, 1982; Geller, 1981; Geller, Erickson, & 
Buttram, 1983; Hirst, Berry, & Soderstrom, 1981; McDougall, Claxton, & Ritchie, 1983) 
and environmental attitudes typically account for about 12% of the variance in pro-
environmental behaviour (Hines, Hungerford, & Tomera, 1986/87). As campaigners in 
other fields have noted, working to change individual-level attributes while social 
attributes remain opposed to change is unlikely to be successful (Hornik, 1989, 1997). 
Some interventions have realised the importance of harnessing social power, such as 
competitions (Siero, Bakker, Dekker, & van den Burg, 1996) and social marketing 
campaigns (McKenzie-Mohr, 2000; McKenzie-Mohr & W. Smith, 1999), but these 
interventions do not provide a theoretically robust account of how and why social 
influence occurs. In each of these three chapters, environmental behaviour was not 
only predicted using social identity principles, but influenced as well. This was done 
with both future intentions and self-reported behaviours on a range of items. In 
Chapters 4 and 6, simple comparative feedback was used as the manipulation, and 
though the effect size of the change in behaviour was fairly modest, it was comparable 
to established manipulations, and relatively substantial given the simplicity of the 
feedback manipulation. Similar manipulations could easily be scaled for mass media 
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campaigns. In Chapter 5, which looked at small-group discussion, the effect size was 
very robust. Discussion content alone accounted for as much as 25% of the variance in 
future behaviour, while adding values to the model increased this to 50% of variance in 
behaviour. This level of explanatory power in a manipulation is very rare for 
environmental campaigns and far exceeds the explanatory power of established 
measures like the New Ecological Paradigm (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978; Dunlap, Van 
Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 2000) and Stern’s Value-Belief-Norm model (Stern, Dietz, Abel, 
Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999). Because few campaigns in the past have fully taken 
advantage of social influences, these implications offer a new package of tools for those 
working with the public to promote pro-environmental behaviours. 
 Our results provide two broad sets of interventions that can be used to 
influence environmental behaviour: deductive social comparisons and inductive group 
interaction. In the present studies, both of these types of interventions led to relatively 
more environmental behaviour or relatively less, depending on conditions. Therefore, it 
is critically important that they be applied in the appropriate settings to achieve a 
desirable outcome. When implementing deductive processes to affect behaviour 
change, it is important to consider the audience that will receive the social comparison. 
Comparisons imply a group norm, and how people respond to that norm depends on 
their level of identification. Based on the results from Chapter 4, as an individual’s 
group identification grows stronger, their behaviour will match the norm implied by the 
comparison more strongly. This effect lasted at least one week after the initial 
comparison. Low-identifiers, however, tended to contrast away from the norm, but this 
effect was short-lived. If a campaigner is creating a message that will go out to people 
with mixed strength of group identification, such as most public media, a comparison 
may have mixed results, as high- and low-identifiers react in opposing ways. If the 
targeted behaviour is a one-off action, such as voting or lowering the boiler thermostat, 
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then the short-lived effect from low-identifiers is likely to be more pronounced than for 
long-term behaviours, like turning off lights and appliances. However, if the 
campaigner is able to reach primarily high-identifiers, such as those who subscribe to a 
particular magazine or watch a particular television show, than positive comparisons are 
likely to be more effective. Particular caution must be exercised if the negative 
comparison group might receive the message, as this would likely be detrimental; using 
more general intergroup comparisons may be more desirable than targeting specific, 
identifiable groups, as the positive effects for the ingroup could be retained without 
disparaging another group. 
Additionally, comparison group was found to be a critical factor in how 
feedback is interpreted. Based on my research and others’ (Rabinovich et al., 2008), 
intergroup comparisons appear to evoke self-stereotyping in contrast away from the 
comparator, for strong identifiers at least. Positive comparisons led to more 
environmental behaviour while negative comparisons led to less. However, this was 
only the case for intergroup comparisons. For comparisons within a group, the effect 
was reversed, with positive intragroup comparisons leading to less behaviour. I 
theorised this occurred because group members felt they achieved the normative goal 
implied by past performance and could relax their efforts. This boomerang effect has 
been observed with individuals’ feedback (Schultz et al., 2007), but my research has 
found a similar effect operating at the group level, where positive feedback about the 
group as a whole reduced individual members’ behavioural intentions. In support of the 
interpretation that the boomerang effect is caused by people overachieving beyond 
normative standards, other researchers have been able to reduce the effect by coupling 
positive descriptive feedback with a positive injunctive norm (a smiley face) to reinforce 
the desirability of that behaviour (Schultz et al., 2007). Campaigners must be careful 
when providing positive feedback; if this feedback communicates that one’s group has 
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actually exceeded some previously defined ingroup standard (e.g., as suggested by past 
behaviour), then it can lead to disengagement.  
 Another important consideration is who delivers the message, and whether the 
message may be perceived negatively. Past research has found that intervention 
messages that are deemed too controlling or offensive may produce reactance and 
spark an increase in undesirable behaviour in response (Dickerson, Thibodeau, 
Aronson, & Miller, 1992). In Study 4, several participants reported that they found the 
national stereotyping measure to be offensive, and the pattern of responses was not as 
predicted. Removing the offensive measures seemed to reduce reactance and resulted in 
the expected pattern. Similarly reactive effects may occur when critical feedback is 
delivered by an outgroup rather than ingroup source (Hornsey, 2005; Hornsey & 
Esposo, 2009; Rabinovich & Morton, 2010). Delivering feedback via ingroup sources 
may be the best means to boost credibility. This is especially true for government-
sponsored communications. In case studies in the US, government environmental 
regulators have sometimes been viewed as hypocritical outsiders, eliciting resistance in 
the people they are trying to reach (Brook, Zint, & De Young, 2003; Opotow & Brook, 
2003). Many people identify the government as having responsibility for dealing with 
climate change (Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, & Whitmarsh, 2007) yet many also feel 
that governments have accomplished little in this regard. Governments may be able to 
elicit more pro-environmental behaviour from citizens if the government is seen as 
being more pro-active regarding its own pro-environmental behaviours, and if they can 
successfully portray its message as applying to a super-ordinate group that includes 
both the government and citizens. Failing that, using an ingroup source, such as people 
similar to the audience, may be more likely to produce a positive effect than a 
government source seen as an outgroup. 
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 The other intervention tool suggested by this research is small-group discussion. 
The domain of conservation psychology is marked by modest effect sizes, and short-
lived successes. Considering conservation psychology’s limited success in interventions, 
the magnitude and duration of effect of small-group discussion is impressive, and 
worthy of both further research and practical implementation. Study 3 found that the 
more participants discussed environmental behaviours, the more likely they were to 
value the environment one week later and to engage in pro-environmental behaviour. 
Notably, these effects remained when controlling for initial values, suggesting a causal 
rather than just correlational role for discussion. In addition the correspondence 
between values and action was increased through discussion (as evidenced by 
comparison of Studies 1 and 3), again suggesting some added value of discussion over 
and above existing individual orientations. These findings are broadly consistent with 
research of opinion-based groups that has found facilitator-led group discussion to be a 
way to promote anti-prejudice and pro-human rights activism behaviour (McGarty, 
Khalaf, Blink, Gee, & Stone, 2007; Thomas & McGarty, 2009). 
 When implementing these inductive processes, intervention designers may 
presume that they can easily harness discussion to promote pro-environmental 
behaviours. They may be correct in this assumption, but only under certain 
circumstances. My research suggests that discussion only promotes behaviour when the 
content actually focuses on environmental behaviours. Based on the results of Study 3, 
off topic discussion may send the message that environmental behaviours are not 
valued and lead to a subsequent decrease in the desired behaviour. In extreme cases, 
discussion may also allow new groups to organise and form a cohesive group identity 
based in opposition to the pro-environmental goal. This appears to be the case with the 
climate change denial movement, which has evolved into a fully fledged social 
movement of its own. The Internet may have played a role in allowing these groups to 
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flourish, as it provides a forum for discussion between people who may otherwise 
encounter few others that share their goals. While promoting discussion may not be 
suitable for a campaign targeting the whole public, it would be likely to have a very 
positive effect if discussions can be led by a facilitator to stay on topic. This kind of 
intervention would be well-suited to schools or businesses, where several interested 
individuals could act as both facilitator and ingroup member. Although it was not 
directly investigated in the present research, it also seems likely that discussion effects 
would only occur when interaction is within a defined and meaningful group boundary. 
Engaging in interaction with members of an outgroup is more likely to create 
polarisation rather than consensus around new local norms. 
Future Research 
 This research has led me to believe that both social comparisons and discussion 
can work to inform group norms, which guide environmental behaviour. However, 
although the results were generally supportive of the hypotheses, I cannot empirically 
demonstrate that norms specifically were the process behind the behavioural change. 
Future research should aim to empirically isolate the processes at work behind these 
effects.  
Many of these findings were surprisingly durable over time, beyond what the 
traditional social identity approach might predict. To further test how well these 
manipulations lead to internalisation, researchers could use social comparisons and then 
later test behavioural intentions after either increasing the salience of the manipulated 
identity or an irrelevant identity. If behavioural intentions are relatively stable across 
salience conditions, then any comparison effects will have been internalised to the 
individual self. If intentions only increase when the relevant identity is salient, the effect 
will have been internalised to that identity only, while if intentions remain unchanged, 
the effect will not have been internalised. 
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While the results in this thesis have been promising and have high internal 
validity, the results have not yet been quantified in objective, real-world behavioural 
measurements with a sample that represents the broader population. Although both 
behavioural intentions and self-reports on a variety of specific past behaviours were 
measured, actual behaviour was not measured. At a minimum, it would seem important 
to replicate these effects with actual behaviour of some kind as a dependent measure; 
indeed, researchers in this area have recently demonstrated that the effects of 
intergroup comparisons can be seen in patterns of actual behaviour such as signing 
environmental petitions and taking information leaflets about environmental issues 
(Rabinovich et al., 2008). A field study with the general population would further 
increase the external validity of these theories and allow for a more accurate 
quantification of the kinds of behavioural change these experimental manipulations can 
produce. 
More broadly within the domain of conservation psychology, I propose that one 
of the reasons conservation psychology has historically achieved only low predictive 
power of environmental behaviour is that behaviour is a product of both individual 
factors and social group norms together, but traditional approaches only measure 
individual factors. Based on my results, and others’ (Terry & Hogg, 1996; Terry, Hogg, 
& McKimmie, 2000; Terry, Hogg, & White, 1996), it seems likely that when social 
factors and individual factors are congruent with each other, behaviour will be much 
more predictable by psychological variables. In much of the world today, individual 
pro-environmental values and attitudes are high, but social group norms are often not 
supportive of a pro-environmental perspective, as illustrated by the widespread 
environmental degradation reviewed in Chapter 1. Future research within conservation 
psychology should examine this interface between individual and social factors in 
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further detail, as the congruency of both levels of factors may allow for both substantial 
theoretical advancement and much more effective pro-environmental interventions.  
Contribution of the Thesis 
 In this thesis, I have made a novel contribution to the understanding of pro-
environmental behaviour, specifically by investigating the research problem from a 
social identity perspective. This framework provides a theoretically derived account of 
when and why social groups influence individual pro-environmental behaviour and 
suggests a range of processes that can be applied in practical interventions. While other 
researchers have studied environmental behaviour using social identity techniques 
(Fielding, McDonald, & Louis, 2008; Fielding, Terry, Masser, & Hogg, 2008; 
Rabinovich et al., 2008; Terry, Hogg, & White, 1999), these lines of research have been 
aimed primarily at advancing the understanding of aspects of social identity and self-
categorization theories, rather than studying environmental behaviour in particular. 
Within conservation psychology as a sub-discipline, social identity principles are under-
utilised, particularly in North America. This thesis is the first line of research to provide 
an in-depth investigation of how several aspects of social identity can influence 
environmental behaviour. I intend for this work to serve as a bridge between social 
identity theorists and conservation psychologists, with the goal of more conservation 
psychologists understanding how social influence can be researched and harnessed to 
promote desirable behaviours and for these interventions to be put into place. 
 Specifically, I have provided theoretically-guided explanations of how social 
comparisons and small-group discussions can influence pro-environmental behaviours. 
Within conservation psychology as a whole, there has been a tendency to adopt 
understandings of behaviour that do not provide an in-depth account of the social and 
psychological processes behind environmental behaviour, such as informational 
models, economic models, and to some extent, attitudinal models. The logic of “if 
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people have more information / more money / better attitudes and values, then they 
will behave in a more environmentally friendly way” has been both theoretically and 
empirically unfulfilling, as reviewed in Chapter 1. To be able to design successful 
interventions, the social and psychological processes behind behaviour must be 
understood. Finally, this thesis contributes guidance on new tools for practical 
interventions to promote real pro-environmental behaviours. The techniques derived 
from this thesis will need to be tested and refined to understand how they can best be 
deployed, but it is hoped that the research in this thesis will provide the theoretical 
groundwork for doing so. 
Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have investigated how social group influence can affect pro-
environmental behaviour. To do this, I conducted five studies along three lines of 
research, exploring how social comparisons (intergroup, intragroup), small group 
interactions, and individual differences in identification with a relevant ingroup guide 
environmental actions. In each chapter, there was evidence of social influences 
interacting with, or working through, individual-level variables to guide environmental 
intentions and behaviours. Importantly, this kind of social influence has been under-
researched in conservation psychology as a whole. The experimental manipulations 
used had effect sizes comparable to or greater than most established theories of 
environmental behaviour, and were similar in design to situations people encounter on 
a daily basis. Thus, I believe that accounting for the interplay between social and 
individual-level variables is key to predicting and influencing pro-environmental 
behaviour. Based on my results, I suggest both deductive social comparisons and 
inductive group discussion can, if implemented carefully, be used to form pro-
environmental group norms. I call on psychologists studying environmental behaviours 
to widen their theoretical scope to include a richer understanding of social-level 
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variables and for pro-environmental campaigners to harness these social influences 
more effectively in their interventions. 
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– APPENDIX A – 
Moderated Hierarchical Linear Modelling Tables Controlling for Values 
 
Table A.1.  
Moderated HLM Table for Volunteering with Pre-Test Values (Time 1), Study 3. 
 
     
 γ Std. Error t p 
     
     
Step 1     
(Constant) 0.056 0.104 0.541 .596 
Time Talking <0.001 0.001 -0.524 .608 
Beh. Content -0.225 0.110 -2.049 .059 
Pre-test Values 0.404 0.103 3.928 <.001 
     
     
Step 2     
(Constant) 0.084 0.128 0.653 .525 
Time Talking <0.001 0.001 -0.454 .657 
Beh. Content -0.243 0.121 -2.006 .066 
Pre-test Values 0.406 0.104 3.903 <.001 
Time×Content <0.001 0.001 -0.373 .715 
     
 
Note. Participant N = 47, Group N = 17. To prevent multicollinearity, Time Talking, 
Behavioural Content of Discussion, and Pre-Test Values are centred with M = 0. 
 
 
Table A.2.  
Moderated HLM Table for General Conservation with Pre-Test Values (Time 2), Study 3. 
 
     
 γ Std. Error t p 
     
     
Step 1     
(Constant) 4.975 0.214 23.274 <.001 
Time Talking <.001 0.001 -0.027 .979 
Beh. Content 0.206 0.220 0.939 .364 
Pre-test Values 0.385 0.154 2.500 .017 
     
     
Step 2     
(Constant) 4.671 0.217 21.518 <.001 
Time Talking <0.001 0.001 -0.371 .717 
Beh. Content   0.425 0.204 2.083 .057 
Pre-test Values 0.396 0.149 2.659 .011 
Time×Content 0.002 0.001 3.030 .004 
     
 
Note. Participant N = 47, Group N = 17. To prevent multicollinearity, Time Talking, 
Behavioural Content of Discussion, and Pre-Test Values are centred with M = 0. 
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– APPENDIX B – 
Moderated Regression Tables 
 
Table B.1. Moderated Regression Table for Volunteering (Time 1), Study 3. 
 
      
 B Std. Error β t p 
      
      
Step 1      
(Constant) -0.005 0.109  -0.042 .967 
Time Talking 0.000 0.001 -.209 -1.502 .138 
Beh. Content 0.030 0.111 .038 0.271 .788 
      
      
Step 2      
(Constant) 0.028 0.130  0.211 .834 
Time Talking 0.000 0.001 -.202 -1.440 .155 
Beh. Content -0.004 0.134 -.004 -0.026 .979 
Time×Content 0.000 0.001 -.068 -0.457 .649 
      
 
Note. N = 69. To prevent multicollinearity, Time Talking and Behavioural Content of 
Discussion are centred with M = 0.  
Step 1 R2 = .04 (p = .29); Step 2 ∆R2 < .01 (∆p = .65). Final R2 = .04. 
 
 
Table B.2. Moderated Regression Table for Volunteering with Pre-Test Values (Time 1), Study 3. 
 
      
 B Std. Error β t p 
      
      
Step 1      
(Constant) -0.005 0.096  -0.048 .962 
Time Talking <0.001 0.001 -.104 -0.835 .407 
Beh. Content -0.103 0.102 -.128 -1.005 .319 
Pre-test Values 0.425 0.095 .500 4.495 <.001 
      
      
Step 2      
(Constant) 0.035 0.115  0.306 .761 
Time Talking <0.001 0.001 -.096 -0.760 .450 
Beh. Content -0.145 0.122 -.181 -1.188 .239 
Pre-test Values 0.426 0.095 .502 4.490 <.001 
Time×Content <0.001 0.001 -.084 -0.642 .523 
      
 
Note. N = 69. To prevent multicollinearity, Time Talking, Behavioural Content of 
Discussion, and Pre-Test Environmental Values are centred with M = 0.  
Step 1 R2 = .27 (p < .001); Step 2 ∆R2 < .01 (∆p = .52). Final R2 = .27. 
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Table B.3. Moderated Regression Table for General Conservation (Time 2), Study 3. 
 
      
 B Std. Error β t p 
      
      
Step 1      
(Constant) 4.958 0.174  28.416 <.001 
Time Talking 0.000 0.001 -.077 -0.462 .646 
Beh. Content 0.375 0.177 .351 2.118 .040 
      
      
Step 2      
(Constant) 4.635 0.195  23.827 <.001 
Time Talking 0.000 0.001 -.111 -.726 .472 
Beh. Content 0.624 0.184 .584 3.394 .001 
Time×Content 0.003 0.001 .446 2.952 .005 
      
 
Note. N = 47. To prevent multicollinearity, Time Talking and Behavioural Content of 
Discussion are centred with M = 0.  
Step 1 R2 = .10 (p = .09); Step 2 ∆R2 = .15 (∆p = .005). Final R2 = .25. 
 
 
Table B.4. Moderated Regression Table for General Conservation (Time 2) with Pre-Test Values, 
Study 3. 
 
      
 B Std. Error β t p 
      
      
Step 1      
(Constant) 5.026 0.165  30.508 <.001 
Time Talking <.001 0.001 -.008 -0.052 .959 
Beh. Content 0.207 0.176 .194 1.175 .246 
Pre-test Values 0.453 0.165 .390 2.738 .009 
      
      
Step 2      
(Constant) 4.714 0.183  25.818 <.001 
Time Talking <.001 0.001 -.045 -0.311 .757 
Beh. Content 0.453 0.181 .425 2.506 .016 
Pre-test Values 0.429 0.152 .369 2.825 .007 
Time×Content 0.003 0.001 .425 3.030 .004 
      
 
Note. N = 47. To prevent multicollinearity, Time Talking, Behavioural Content of 
Discussion, and Pre-Test Environmental Values are centred with M = 0.  
Step 1 R2 = .24 (p = .009); Step 2 ∆R2 = .14 (∆p = .004). Final R2 = .37. 
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Table B.5 Moderated Regression Table for General Conservation (Time 2) with Time 2 Values, 
Study 3. 
 
      
 B Std. Error β t p 
      
      
Step 1      
(Constant) 4.974 0.138  35.942 <.001 
Time Talking 0.001 0.001 .138 1.003 .321 
Beh. Content 0.003 0.158 .003 0.022 .983 
Pre-test Values 0.660 0.127 .661 5.194 <.001 
      
      
Step 2      
(Constant) 4.772 0.164  29.176 <.001 
Time Talking 0.001 0.001 .092 0.683 .499 
Beh. Content 0.201 0.178 .188 1.130 .265 
Pre-test Values 0.583 0.127 .584 4.575 <.001 
Time×Content 0.002 0.001 .276 2.123 .040 
      
 
Note. N = 47. To prevent multicollinearity, Time Talking, Behavioural Content of 
Discussion, and Time 2 Environmental Values are centred with M = 0.  
Step 1 R2 = .45 (p < .001); Step 2 ∆R2 = .05 (∆p = .04). Final R2 = .50. 
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